Files
electron/patches/chromium/allow_new_privileges_in_unsandboxed_child_processes.patch
electron-roller[bot] 0c45d160d6 chore: bump chromium to 118.0.5949.0 (main) (#39505)
* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 118.0.5949.0

* chore: update mas_disable_remote_accessibility.patch

Xref: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4705386

no manual code changes; existing patch applied with fuzz

* chore: update printing.patch

Xref: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4779059

no manual code changes; existing patch applied with fuzz

* chore: add OffScreenRenderWidgetHostView::InvalidateLocalSurfaceIdAndAllocationGroup()

Xref: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/4563504

Add an impl for a new pure virtual method that was added upstream.

Local impl inspired by upstream implementations in same CL

* chore: update patches

---------

Co-authored-by: electron-roller[bot] <84116207+electron-roller[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Charles Kerr <charles@charleskerr.com>
Co-authored-by: PatchUp <73610968+patchup[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-08-15 15:44:24 -04:00

28 lines
1.3 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Apthorp <nornagon@nornagon.net>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 12:02:51 -0700
Subject: allow new privileges in unsandboxed child processes
This allows unsandboxed child process to launch setuid processes on Linux.
diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc b/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
index ff73345339ccaa9d5375184efb13185ed9f0a298..bd80ca431a5c50ac001d7607841c64e90f4fe4c3 100644
--- a/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
+++ b/content/browser/child_process_launcher_helper_linux.cc
@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@ bool ChildProcessLauncherHelper::BeforeLaunchOnLauncherThread(
options->fds_to_remap.emplace_back(sandbox_fd, GetSandboxFD());
}
+ // (For Electron), if we're launching without zygote, that means we're
+ // launching an unsandboxed process (since all sandboxed processes are
+ // forked from the zygote). Relax the allow_new_privs option to permit
+ // launching suid processes from unsandboxed child processes.
+ if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kNoZygote) &&
+ delegate_->GetZygote() == nullptr) {
+ options->allow_new_privs = true;
+ }
+
options->environment = delegate_->GetEnvironment();
} else {
DCHECK(GetZygoteForLaunch());