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310490221e
* chore: bump chromium in DEPS to 144.0.7500.0
* chore: fixup patch indices
* 7088768: Reland "download reclient only for chromeos by default"
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/7088768
* Revert "7088768: Reland "download reclient only for chromeos by default""
This reverts commit 149d9fc92e.
* build: explicitly disable reclient
* 7013355: [api] Remove deprecated PropertyCallbackInfo::Holder()
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/v8/v8/+/7013355
* [video pip] Enable video picture-in-picture controls update
Refs https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/6701399
* fixup! [api] Remove deprecated PropertyCallbackInfo::Holder()
---------
Co-authored-by: electron-roller[bot] <84116207+electron-roller[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Shelley Vohr <shelley.vohr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: John Kleinschmidt <jkleinsc@electronjs.org>
Co-authored-by: deepak1556 <hop2deep@gmail.com>
71 lines
3.9 KiB
Diff
71 lines
3.9 KiB
Diff
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Shelley Vohr <shelley.vohr@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 11:44:57 +0200
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Subject: fix: crash loading non-standard schemes in iframes
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This fixes a crash that occurs when loading non-standard schemes from
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iframes or webviews. This was happening because
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ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanAccessDataForOrigin contains explicit
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exceptions to allow built-in non-standard schemes, but does not check
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for non-standard schemes registered by the embedder.
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This patch adjusts the origin calculation for subframe non-standard schemes in
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- browser process at `NavigationRequest::GetOriginForURLLoaderFactoryUncheckedWithDebugInfo`
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- render process at `DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin`
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When top level frame navigates to non-standard scheme url, the origin is calculated
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as `null` without any derivation. It is only in cases where there is a `initiator_origin`
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then the origin is derived from it, which is usually the case for renderer initiated
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navigations and iframes are no exceptions from this rule.
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The patch should be removed in favor of either:
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- Remove support for non-standard custom schemes
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- Register non-standard custom schemes as websafe schemes and update
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CPSPI::CanAccessDataForOrigin to allow them for any navigation.
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- Update the callsite to use RFHI::CanCommitOriginAndUrl in upstream, previous
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effort to do this can be found at https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3856266.
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Upstream bug https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1081397.
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diff --git a/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc b/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
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index 3624c9c96f3ac526e99fb09c378144439c707442..fd818f40e9c3e1efe15dcbb369270a27e2f50483 100644
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--- a/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
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+++ b/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
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@@ -11466,6 +11466,11 @@ url::Origin NavigationRequest::GetOriginForURLLoaderFactoryUnchecked() {
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target_rph_id);
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}
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+ if (!common_params().url.IsStandard() && !common_params().url.IsAboutBlank()) {
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+ return url::Origin::Resolve(common_params().url,
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+ url::Origin());
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+ }
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+
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// In cases not covered above, URLLoaderFactory should be associated with the
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// origin of |common_params.url| and/or |common_params.initiator_origin|.
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url::Origin resolved_origin = url::Origin::Resolve(
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diff --git a/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc b/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
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index 347137f6e28054860d3616a8559c4e38374465e6..546044c8b2479f601f6620617f902d3899b5d28c 100644
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--- a/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
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+++ b/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
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@@ -2324,6 +2324,10 @@ Frame* DocumentLoader::CalculateOwnerFrame() {
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scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin(
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Document* owner_document) {
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scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> origin;
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+ bool is_standard = false;
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+ std::string protocol = url_.Protocol().Ascii();
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+ is_standard = url::IsStandard(
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+ protocol.data(), url::Component(0, static_cast<int>(protocol.size())));
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// Whether the origin is newly created within this call, instead of copied
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// from an existing document's origin or from `origin_to_commit_`. If this is
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// true, we won't try to compare the nonce of this origin (if it's opaque) to
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@@ -2360,6 +2364,9 @@ scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin(
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// non-renderer only origin bits will be the same, which will be asserted at
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// the end of this function.
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origin = origin_to_commit_;
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+ } else if (!SecurityOrigin::ShouldUseInnerURL(url_) &&
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+ !is_standard) {
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+ origin = SecurityOrigin::Create(url_);
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} else {
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// Otherwise, create an origin that propagates precursor information
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// as needed. For non-opaque origins, this creates a standard tuple
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