electron/patches/chromium/fix_crash_loading_non-standard_schemes_in_iframes.patch

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shelley Vohr <shelley.vohr@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 11:44:57 +0200
Subject: fix: crash loading non-standard schemes in iframes

This fixes a crash that occurs when loading non-standard schemes from
iframes or webviews. This was happening because
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanAccessDataForOrigin contains explicit
exceptions to allow built-in non-standard schemes, but does not check
for non-standard schemes registered by the embedder.

This patch adjusts the origin calculation for subframe non-standard schemes in
 - browser process at `NavigationRequest::GetOriginForURLLoaderFactoryUncheckedWithDebugInfo`
 - render process at `DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin`

When top level frame navigates to non-standard scheme url, the origin is calculated
as `null` without any derivation. It is only in cases where there is a `initiator_origin`
then the origin is derived from it, which is usually the case for renderer initiated
navigations and iframes are no exceptions from this rule.

The patch should be removed in favor of either:
  - Remove support for non-standard custom schemes
  - Register non-standard custom schemes as websafe schemes and update
  CPSPI::CanAccessDataForOrigin to allow them for any navigation.
  - Update the callsite to use RFHI::CanCommitOriginAndUrl in upstream, previous
  effort to do this can be found at https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3856266.

Upstream bug https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1081397.

diff --git a/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc b/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
index deb3de267fb5e6a326985fa7943e5a66217888f8..ad53374b86efe1db1e2c2e06056cd3b50696ad9b 100644
--- a/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
+++ b/content/browser/renderer_host/navigation_request.cc
@@ -11158,6 +11158,11 @@ url::Origin NavigationRequest::GetOriginForURLLoaderFactoryUnchecked() {
             target_rph_id);
   }
 
+  if (!common_params().url.IsStandard() && !common_params().url.IsAboutBlank()) {
+    return url::Origin::Resolve(common_params().url,
+                                url::Origin());
+  }
+
   // In cases not covered above, URLLoaderFactory should be associated with the
   // origin of |common_params.url| and/or |common_params.initiator_origin|.
   url::Origin resolved_origin = url::Origin::Resolve(
diff --git a/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc b/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
index 094f7359e5d3b701676daa6c26fa6f8dee9d4a29..ac23e8b6e5b16670e942bf4801d97296176e2a00 100644
--- a/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
+++ b/third_party/blink/renderer/core/loader/document_loader.cc
@@ -2332,6 +2332,10 @@ Frame* DocumentLoader::CalculateOwnerFrame() {
 scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin(
     Document* owner_document) {
   scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> origin;
+  bool is_standard = false;
+  std::string protocol = url_.Protocol().Ascii();
+  is_standard = url::IsStandard(
+      protocol.data(), url::Component(0, static_cast<int>(protocol.size())));
   // Whether the origin is newly created within this call, instead of copied
   // from an existing document's origin or from `origin_to_commit_`. If this is
   // true, we won't try to compare the nonce of this origin (if it's opaque) to
@@ -2368,6 +2372,9 @@ scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> DocumentLoader::CalculateOrigin(
     // non-renderer only origin bits will be the same, which will be asserted at
     // the end of this function.
     origin = origin_to_commit_;
+  } else if (!SecurityOrigin::ShouldUseInnerURL(url_) &&
+             !is_standard) {
+    origin = SecurityOrigin::Create(url_);
   } else {
     // Otherwise, create an origin that propagates precursor information
     // as needed. For non-opaque origins, this creates a standard tuple