diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 787454baa2..839679eb49 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Commands/Doctor: avoid rewriting invalid configs with new `gateway.auth.token` defaults during repair and only write when real config changes are detected, preventing accidental token duplication and backup churn.
 - Sandbox/Registry: serialize container and browser registry writes with shared file locks and atomic replacement to prevent lost updates and delete rollback races from desyncing `sandbox list`, `prune`, and `recreate --all`. Thanks @kexinoh.
 - Security/Exec: require `tools.exec.safeBins` binaries to resolve from trusted bin directories (system defaults plus gateway startup `PATH`) so PATH-hijacked trojan binaries cannot bypass allowlist checks. Thanks @jackhax for reporting.
+- Security/Exec: remove file-existence oracle behavior from `tools.exec.safeBins` by using deterministic argv-only stdin-safe validation and blocking file-oriented flags (for example `sort -o`, `jq -f`, `grep -f`) so allow/deny results no longer disclose host file presence. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
 - Security/Browser: route browser URL navigation through one SSRF-guarded validation path for tab-open/CDP-target/Playwright navigation flows and block private/metadata destinations by default (configurable via `browser.ssrfPolicy`). This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: for the next npm release, harden safe-bin stdin-only enforcement by blocking output/recursive flags (`sort -o/--output`, grep recursion) and tightening default safe bins to remove `sort`/`grep`, preventing safe-bin allowlist bypass for file writes/recursive reads. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
 - Cron/Webhooks: protect cron webhook POST delivery with SSRF-guarded outbound fetch (`fetchWithSsrFGuard`) to block private/metadata destinations before request dispatch. Thanks @Adam55A-code.
diff --git a/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md b/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md
index bd68277b80..f813b89c87 100644
--- a/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md
+++ b/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ are treated as allowlisted on nodes (macOS node or headless node host). This use
 `tools.exec.safeBins` defines a small list of **stdin-only** binaries (for example `jq`)
 that can run in allowlist mode **without** explicit allowlist entries. Safe bins reject
 positional file args and path-like tokens, so they can only operate on the incoming stream.
+Validation is deterministic from argv shape only (no host filesystem existence checks), which
+prevents file-existence oracle behavior from allow/deny differences.
+File-oriented options are denied for default safe bins (for example `sort -o`, `sort --output`,
+`sort --files0-from`, `wc --files0-from`, `jq -f/--from-file`, `grep -f/--file`).
 Safe bins also enforce explicit per-binary flag policy for options that break stdin-only
 behavior (for example `sort -o/--output` and grep recursive flags).
 Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at execution time (no globbing
diff --git a/src/agents/pi-tools.safe-bins.e2e.test.ts b/src/agents/pi-tools.safe-bins.e2e.test.ts
index 694bda8293..314d801c69 100644
--- a/src/agents/pi-tools.safe-bins.e2e.test.ts
+++ b/src/agents/pi-tools.safe-bins.e2e.test.ts
@@ -123,8 +123,7 @@ describe("createOpenClawCodingTools safeBins", () => {
     const { createOpenClawCodingTools } = await import("./pi-tools.js");
     const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-safe-bins-expand-"));
 
-    const secret = `TOP_SECRET_${Date.now()}`;
-    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "secret.txt"), `${secret}\n`, "utf8");
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "secret.txt"), "TOP_SECRET\n", "utf8");
 
     const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
       tools: {
@@ -146,16 +145,57 @@ describe("createOpenClawCodingTools safeBins", () => {
     const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
     expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
 
-    const result = await execTool!.execute("call1", {
-      command: "head $FOO ; wc -l",
-      workdir: tmpDir,
-      env: { FOO: "secret.txt" },
-    });
-    const text = result.content.find((content) => content.type === "text")?.text ?? "";
+    await expect(
+      execTool!.execute("call1", {
+        command: "head $FOO ; wc -l",
+        workdir: tmpDir,
+        env: { FOO: "secret.txt" },
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow("exec denied: allowlist miss");
+  });
 
-    const blockedResultDetails = result.details as { status?: string };
-    expect(blockedResultDetails.status).toBe("completed");
-    expect(text).not.toContain(secret);
+  it("does not leak file existence from sort output flags", async () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const { createOpenClawCodingTools } = await import("./pi-tools.js");
+    const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-safe-bins-oracle-"));
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "existing.txt"), "x\n", "utf8");
+
+    const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
+      tools: {
+        exec: {
+          host: "gateway",
+          security: "allowlist",
+          ask: "off",
+          safeBins: ["sort"],
+        },
+      },
+    };
+
+    const tools = createOpenClawCodingTools({
+      config: cfg,
+      sessionKey: "agent:main:main",
+      workspaceDir: tmpDir,
+      agentDir: path.join(tmpDir, "agent"),
+    });
+    const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
+    expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
+
+    const run = async (command: string) => {
+      try {
+        const result = await execTool!.execute("call-oracle", { command, workdir: tmpDir });
+        const text = result.content.find((content) => content.type === "text")?.text ?? "";
+        return { kind: "result" as const, status: result.details.status, text };
+      } catch (err) {
+        return { kind: "error" as const, message: String(err) };
+      }
+    };
+
+    const existing = await run("sort -o existing.txt");
+    const missing = await run("sort -o missing.txt");
+    expect(existing).toEqual(missing);
   });
 
   it("blocks sort output flags from writing files via safeBins", async () => {
diff --git a/src/infra/exec-approvals-allowlist.ts b/src/infra/exec-approvals-allowlist.ts
index a20c4672bc..4ebe6bbd3a 100644
--- a/src/infra/exec-approvals-allowlist.ts
+++ b/src/infra/exec-approvals-allowlist.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-import fs from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
 import type { ExecAllowlistEntry } from "./exec-approvals.js";
 import {
@@ -31,14 +30,6 @@ function isPathLikeToken(value: string): boolean {
   return /^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]/.test(trimmed);
 }
 
-function defaultFileExists(filePath: string): boolean {
-  try {
-    return fs.existsSync(filePath);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
 export function normalizeSafeBins(entries?: string[]): Set<string> {
   if (!Array.isArray(entries)) {
     return new Set();
@@ -62,57 +53,253 @@ function hasGlobToken(value: string): boolean {
   return /[*?[\]]/.test(value);
 }
 
-type SafeBinOptionPolicy = {
-  blockedShort?: ReadonlySet<string>;
-  blockedLong?: ReadonlySet<string>;
+type SafeBinProfile = {
+  minPositional?: number;
+  maxPositional?: number;
+  valueFlags?: ReadonlySet<string>;
+  blockedFlags?: ReadonlySet<string>;
 };
 
-const SAFE_BIN_OPTION_POLICIES: Readonly<Record<string, SafeBinOptionPolicy>> = {
-  // sort can write arbitrary output paths via -o/--output, which breaks stdin-only guarantees.
-  sort: {
-    blockedShort: new Set(["o"]),
-    blockedLong: new Set(["output"]),
+const NO_FLAGS = new Set<string>();
+const SAFE_BIN_GENERIC_PROFILE: SafeBinProfile = {};
+const SAFE_BIN_PROFILES: Record<string, SafeBinProfile> = {
+  jq: {
+    maxPositional: 1,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--arg",
+      "--argjson",
+      "--argstr",
+      "--argfile",
+      "--rawfile",
+      "--slurpfile",
+      "--from-file",
+      "--library-path",
+      "-L",
+      "-f",
+    ]),
+    blockedFlags: new Set([
+      "--argfile",
+      "--rawfile",
+      "--slurpfile",
+      "--from-file",
+      "--library-path",
+      "-L",
+      "-f",
+    ]),
   },
-  // grep recursion flags read from cwd (or provided roots), so they are not stdin-only.
   grep: {
-    blockedShort: new Set(["d", "r"]),
-    blockedLong: new Set(["dereference-recursive", "directories", "recursive"]),
+    maxPositional: 1,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--regexp",
+      "--file",
+      "--max-count",
+      "--after-context",
+      "--before-context",
+      "--context",
+      "--devices",
+      "--directories",
+      "--binary-files",
+      "--exclude",
+      "--exclude-from",
+      "--include",
+      "--label",
+      "-e",
+      "-f",
+      "-m",
+      "-A",
+      "-B",
+      "-C",
+      "-D",
+      "-d",
+    ]),
+    blockedFlags: new Set([
+      "--file",
+      "--exclude-from",
+      "--dereference-recursive",
+      "--directories",
+      "--recursive",
+      "-f",
+      "-d",
+      "-r",
+      "-R",
+    ]),
+  },
+  cut: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--bytes",
+      "--characters",
+      "--fields",
+      "--delimiter",
+      "--output-delimiter",
+      "-b",
+      "-c",
+      "-f",
+      "-d",
+    ]),
+  },
+  sort: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--key",
+      "--field-separator",
+      "--buffer-size",
+      "--temporary-directory",
+      "--compress-program",
+      "--parallel",
+      "--batch-size",
+      "--random-source",
+      "--files0-from",
+      "--output",
+      "-k",
+      "-t",
+      "-S",
+      "-T",
+      "-o",
+    ]),
+    blockedFlags: new Set(["--files0-from", "--output", "-o"]),
+  },
+  uniq: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--skip-fields",
+      "--skip-chars",
+      "--check-chars",
+      "--group",
+      "-f",
+      "-s",
+      "-w",
+    ]),
+  },
+  head: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set(["--lines", "--bytes", "-n", "-c"]),
+  },
+  tail: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set([
+      "--lines",
+      "--bytes",
+      "--sleep-interval",
+      "--max-unchanged-stats",
+      "--pid",
+      "-n",
+      "-c",
+    ]),
+  },
+  tr: {
+    minPositional: 1,
+    maxPositional: 2,
+  },
+  wc: {
+    maxPositional: 0,
+    valueFlags: new Set(["--files0-from"]),
+    blockedFlags: new Set(["--files0-from"]),
   },
 };
 
-function parseLongOptionName(token: string): string | null {
-  if (!token.startsWith("--") || token === "--") {
-    return null;
+function isSafeLiteralToken(value: string): boolean {
+  if (!value || value === "-") {
+    return true;
   }
-  const body = token.slice(2);
-  if (!body) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  const eqIndex = body.indexOf("=");
-  const name = (eqIndex >= 0 ? body.slice(0, eqIndex) : body).trim().toLowerCase();
-  return name.length > 0 ? name : null;
+  return !hasGlobToken(value) && !isPathLikeToken(value);
 }
 
-function hasBlockedSafeBinOption(execName: string, token: string): boolean {
-  const policy = SAFE_BIN_OPTION_POLICIES[execName];
-  if (!policy || !token.startsWith("-")) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  const longName = parseLongOptionName(token);
-  if (longName) {
-    return policy.blockedLong?.has(longName) ?? false;
-  }
-  if (token === "-" || token === "--") {
-    return false;
-  }
-  for (const ch of token.slice(1)) {
-    if (policy.blockedShort?.has(ch.toLowerCase())) {
-      return true;
+function validateSafeBinArgv(args: string[], profile: SafeBinProfile): boolean {
+  const valueFlags = profile.valueFlags ?? NO_FLAGS;
+  const blockedFlags = profile.blockedFlags ?? NO_FLAGS;
+  const positional: string[] = [];
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i += 1) {
+    const token = args[i];
+    if (!token) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (token === "--") {
+      for (let j = i + 1; j < args.length; j += 1) {
+        const rest = args[j];
+        if (!rest || rest === "-") {
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (!isSafeLiteralToken(rest)) {
+          return false;
+        }
+        positional.push(rest);
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+    if (token === "-") {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!token.startsWith("-")) {
+      if (!isSafeLiteralToken(token)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      positional.push(token);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (token.startsWith("--")) {
+      const eqIndex = token.indexOf("=");
+      const flag = eqIndex > 0 ? token.slice(0, eqIndex) : token;
+      if (blockedFlags.has(flag)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (eqIndex > 0) {
+        if (!isSafeLiteralToken(token.slice(eqIndex + 1))) {
+          return false;
+        }
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!valueFlags.has(flag)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const value = args[i + 1];
+      if (!value || !isSafeLiteralToken(value)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      i += 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    let consumedValue = false;
+    for (let j = 1; j < token.length; j += 1) {
+      const flag = `-${token[j]}`;
+      if (blockedFlags.has(flag)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (!valueFlags.has(flag)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const inlineValue = token.slice(j + 1);
+      if (inlineValue) {
+        if (!isSafeLiteralToken(inlineValue)) {
+          return false;
+        }
+      } else {
+        const value = args[i + 1];
+        if (!value || !isSafeLiteralToken(value)) {
+          return false;
+        }
+        i += 1;
+      }
+      consumedValue = true;
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!consumedValue && hasGlobToken(token)) {
+      return false;
     }
   }
-  return false;
-}
 
+  const minPositional = profile.minPositional ?? 0;
+  if (positional.length < minPositional) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (typeof profile.maxPositional === "number" && positional.length > profile.maxPositional) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
 export function isSafeBinUsage(params: {
   argv: string[];
   resolution: CommandResolution | null;
@@ -151,44 +338,9 @@ export function isSafeBinUsage(params: {
   ) {
     return false;
   }
-  const cwd = params.cwd ?? process.cwd();
-  const exists = params.fileExists ?? defaultFileExists;
   const argv = params.argv.slice(1);
-  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
-    const token = argv[i];
-    if (!token) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (token === "-") {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (token.startsWith("-")) {
-      if (hasBlockedSafeBinOption(execName, token)) {
-        return false;
-      }
-      const eqIndex = token.indexOf("=");
-      if (eqIndex > 0) {
-        const value = token.slice(eqIndex + 1);
-        if (value && hasGlobToken(value)) {
-          return false;
-        }
-        if (value && (isPathLikeToken(value) || exists(path.resolve(cwd, value)))) {
-          return false;
-        }
-      }
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (hasGlobToken(token)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (isPathLikeToken(token)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (exists(path.resolve(cwd, token))) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
+  const profile = SAFE_BIN_PROFILES[execName] ?? SAFE_BIN_GENERIC_PROFILE;
+  return validateSafeBinArgv(argv, profile);
 }
 
 export type ExecAllowlistEvaluation = {
diff --git a/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts b/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
index 7daf609200..e3a3914efe 100644
--- a/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
+++ b/src/infra/exec-approvals.test.ts
@@ -524,6 +524,64 @@ describe("exec approvals safe bins", () => {
     expect(defaults.has("sort")).toBe(false);
     expect(defaults.has("grep")).toBe(false);
   });
+
+  it("blocks sort output flags independent of file existence", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const cwd = makeTempDir();
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, "existing.txt"), "x");
+    const resolution = {
+      rawExecutable: "sort",
+      resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/sort",
+      executableName: "sort",
+    };
+    const safeBins = normalizeSafeBins(["sort"]);
+    const existing = isSafeBinUsage({
+      argv: ["sort", "-o", "existing.txt"],
+      resolution,
+      safeBins,
+      cwd,
+    });
+    const missing = isSafeBinUsage({
+      argv: ["sort", "-o", "missing.txt"],
+      resolution,
+      safeBins,
+      cwd,
+    });
+    const longFlag = isSafeBinUsage({
+      argv: ["sort", "--output=missing.txt"],
+      resolution,
+      safeBins,
+      cwd,
+    });
+    expect(existing).toBe(false);
+    expect(missing).toBe(false);
+    expect(longFlag).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("does not consult file existence callbacks for safe-bin decisions", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    let checkedExists = false;
+    const ok = isSafeBinUsage({
+      argv: ["sort", "-o", "target.txt"],
+      resolution: {
+        rawExecutable: "sort",
+        resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/sort",
+        executableName: "sort",
+      },
+      safeBins: normalizeSafeBins(["sort"]),
+      cwd: "/tmp",
+      fileExists: () => {
+        checkedExists = true;
+        return true;
+      },
+    });
+    expect(ok).toBe(false);
+    expect(checkedExists).toBe(false);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("exec approvals allowlist evaluation", () => {