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feat(security): audit gateway HTTP no-auth exposure

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Peter Steinberger
2026-02-19 14:25:45 +01:00
parent 808a60d3bd
commit e3e0ffd801
7 changed files with 130 additions and 9 deletions
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docs/cli/security.md
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends *
It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
It warns when `gateway.auth.mode="none"` leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (`/tools/invoke` plus any enabled `/v1/*` endpoint).
## JSON output

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docs/gateway/security/index.md
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@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ High-signal `checkId` values you will most likely see in real deployments (not e
| `fs.config.perms_world_readable` | critical | Config can expose tokens/settings | filesystem perms on config file | yes |
| `gateway.bind_no_auth` | critical | Remote bind without shared secret | `gateway.bind`, `gateway.auth.*` | no |
| `gateway.loopback_no_auth` | critical | Reverse-proxied loopback may become unauthenticated | `gateway.auth.*`, proxy setup | no |
| `gateway.http.no_auth` | warn/critical | Gateway HTTP APIs reachable with `auth.mode="none"` | `gateway.auth.mode`, `gateway.http.endpoints.*` | no |
| `gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow` | warn/critical | Re-enables dangerous tools over HTTP API | `gateway.tools.allow` | no |
| `gateway.tailscale_funnel` | critical | Public internet exposure | `gateway.tailscale.mode` | no |
| `gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth` | critical | Token-only over HTTP, no device identity | `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` | no |