---
authors: ["Blake M Scurr"]
title: "The zk-ECDSA Landscape"
image: "/articles/the-zk-ecdsa-landscape/the-zk-ecdsa-landscape-cover.webp"
tldr: "This post was authored by grantee [Blake M Scurr](https://github.com/BlakeMScurr). His mandate was to explore zk-ECDSA, build applications with zk-ECDSA, and contribute to ZKPs to make this vision come true."
date: "2023-04-18"
canonical: "https://mirror.xyz/privacy-scaling-explorations.eth/djxf2g9VzUcss1e-gWIL2DSRD4stWggtTOcgsv1RlxY"
tags:
  [
    "zk-ecdsa",
    "privacy",
    "zero-knowledge proofs",
    "ethereum",
    "circom",
    "cryptography",
    "nullifiers",
    "PLUME",
    "identity",
    "signature verification",
  ]
projects: ["anon-klub"]
---

## Introduction

Ethereum is a principled project, popular for being a credibly neutral payment, financial, and computing system.

Unfortunately, to achieve neutrality, it has sacrificed privacy because every transaction must be public to be verified. Recent advances in [ZKP (Zero-Knowledge Proof)](https://ethereum.org/en/zero-knowledge-proofs/) systems have made it practical to achieve privacy while maintaining verifiability. There are new privacy focused ZK blockchains such as [Mina](https://minaprotocol.com/), [Aleo](https://www.aleo.org/) and [Zcash](https://z.cash/), but L1 development is hard and slow, especially on a large, established protocol like Ethereum. Instead of adding privacy to the underlying system, we as smart contract developers can rewrite the ecosystem to respect privacy, while keeping the L1 simple and transparent. This is the promise of zk-ECDSA.

Normally, dApps work by verifying signatures on transactions then executing smart contract logic. Ethereum uses a particular signature scheme called [ECDSA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm) because the signatures are very short and efficient for any given security level as opposed to, say, [RSA signatures](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem)>). This means there are millions of ECDSA keys for Ethereum addresses ready to be utilised.

To support privacy on-chain with these existing keys, we need to add some extra logic to our smart contracts. Instead of directly verifying signatures, we can verify ECDSA signatures and execute arbitrary logic inside ZKPs, then verify those proofs on-chain, then execute our smart contract logic. Thus, without any change to Ethereum itself, we can support privacy where users want it.

## Use Cases

### Mixers

Mixers were one of the first widespread use cases for ZKPs on Ethereum, with Tornado Cash handling [over $7B](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916). Tornado Cash prevents double spending by using an interactive nullifier, which is a special piece of data the user must hold onto to access their funds. Keeping this nullifier secure can be just as important as keeping a private key secure, but in practice it needs to, at some point, be in plaintext outside the wallet or secure enclave in order to generate the ZKP. This is a significant UX problem, especially for a security conscious user who has already gone to great lengths to protect their private key.

zk-ECDSA can solve this by generating a nullifier deterministically from the private key, while keeping the user private. This is a subtle problem, and existing ECDSA signatures aren't quite suitable. We explain the PLUME nullifier, the top contender to solve this problem below.

#### Blacklists

Financial privacy is good, but it can have downsides. The US Treasury [accused Tornado Cash](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916) of laundering over $455M of funds stolen by a US sanctioned North Korean hacker group. Tornado Cash itself was subsequently sanctioned.

There may be a middle ground, where privacy is preserved for normal users, but authorities can prevent hackers receiving their funds. The following is not an ideal scheme, as it gives authorities power to freeze funds of law-abiding citizens, but it is a start.

In order to get your funds out of a compliant mixer, you must prove in a ZKP that you own an address that deposited funds, has not already retrieved their funds, and _does not belong to a blacklist_. This means having to do a proof of non-membership inside the ZKP.

### Private Safes

Many projects use safes like [Safe](https://safe.global/) (formerly Gnosis Safe) to control funds split between multiple parties. Generally this means using your personal key to sign votes for how the money is spent, those votes are then sent to the chain and executed when enough parties agree. However, this means publicly linking your personal finances to some project, which is generally not desirable. Instead of sending a publicly readable signature, the user can send a ZKP proving their vote without revealing their identity on-chain. [zkShield](https://github.com/bankisan/zkShield) is an example of a private safe in development.

It may be surprising that we don't need nullifiers for safes, since they are usually required for private financial applications. If you wanted to keep your votes private from other owners of the same safe you would need nullifiers. However, people sharing a safe are generally cooperative, so the sensible approach by zkShield is to create non-private signatures off-chain with efficient-ecdsa, and verify them in a ZKP. Nullifiers are also often used in financial applications to prevent double-spending, but that is irrelevant here because safes don't have an inbuilt payment system.

### Private Voting

Voting on, for example, a DAO proposal (or on political candidates or legislation!) should generally be done privately to prevent retribution, bribery, and collusion. Instead of collating signatures, we can collate ZKPs, provided they output a deterministic nullifier to prevent double votes.

### Airdrops

Many projects such as [Arbitrum](https://arbitrum.io/) and [ENS](https://ens.domains/) have introduced a governance token as they mature. This is generally done to reward early users, and give the community power over the protocol. However, if a token holder wants to vote on a proposal anonymously, they will have to sell their token, use a mixer, buy the token back at another address, and then vote with that unlinked address. Instead, we could offer airdrops anonymously by default. To do this, you simply make a list of all the addresses eligible for the drop, hash them into a Merkle tree, and allow people to claim their tokens by proving membership in that list.

Airdrops usually offer granular rewards, giving more tokens to earlier users, etc. Unfortunately, high granularity would reduce the anonymity set. The easiest implementation would be if every address received the same amount. You could also mitigate the loss of privacy while allowing different rewards by letting people claim the airdrop for multiple addresses at a time, and offering multiple rewards per address, though this would introduce additional complexity in the circuit.

### Private NFTs

Privacy can be used in creative ways in NFTs too. For example, you could allow any CryptoPunk holder to mint a "DarkPunk," where their original address is not linked to their original CryptoPunk. This would be done by taking a snapshot of addresses holding CryptoPunks, and gateminting by requiring a ZKP that shows you own some address in that list. Note, any set of addresses could be used for gating - i.e., people who lost money in The DAO hack, or people who have burned 100+ ETH.

Similarly, a new NFT project could allow private minting. First you'd buy a ticket publicly on-chain, then privately prove you are a ticket holder to mint the NFT. This could be implemented with an interactive nullifier, but zk-ECDSA could be used to save on-chain costs at the expense of prover time.

### Message Boards

zk-ECDSA will also enable off-chain use cases.

Anonymity can be a useful tool for voicing controversial ideas, or givng a voice to less powerful people. Suppose a DAO is trying to coordinate on how to spend its treasury, political factions inevitably form and it can be hard to oppose consensus, or it might be hard to get your voice heard. Instead of relying on a traditional message board where every message is tied to a username, you can conduct discussions anonymously, or pseudonymously using ZKPs rather than signatures directly. Traditional anonymous boards are subject to sybil attacks, but in zk message boards you have to prove membership in a group and/or prove you are using a unique deterministic pseudonym derived from your public key.

[heyanoun.xyz](https://www.heyanoun.xyz/) from PersonaeLabs is a project exploring this area.

### Gated Content

zk-ECDSA can be used as an authentication for access to web content.

For example, suppose you want to create some private content for [Nouns NFT](https://nouns.wtf/) holders. The standard solution would be "Sign in with Ethereum", where you would verify your address, and the server could verify that you own a Noun on-chain. However, this gives the website your personal financial details for that address, which may be enough to track and target you. This is dangerous, especially since you are known to hold a valuable NFT. Instead we can create "Sign in as Noun" functionality by simply proving you own an address in the set of Nouns holders.

Using zk-ECDSA is still not easy. You have to carefully choose the right library and proof system for your use case. There are two critical questions: do you need nullifiers, and do you need on-chain verification? It's important to choose the right tool for your use case, because prover time can be radically improved if you don't need nullifiers or on-chain verification.

Most of the work below was done at [PersonaeLabs](http://personaelabs.org/) and [0xparc](https://0xparc.org/). As part of this grant, I wrote the initial verifier circuit for the nullifier library.

### Merkle Tree Basics

The circuits for most applications require some kind of signature/nullifier verification, and set membership. [Merkle trees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree) are a simple, efficient method of set membership, where security relies on a hash function. A circom implementation of Merkle trees originating from Tornado Cash has been well battle tested. During my grant I used a Merkle tree with the Poseidon hash, which is a hash function that's efficient in ZK circuits. [This implementation](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/e2e-zk-ecdsa/blob/a5f7d6908faac1aab47e0c705bc91d4bccea1a73/circuits/circom/membership.circom#L13), which verifies a public key, signature, and Merkle proof may be a useful starting point for your application. Note, that you should remove the public key check if unnecessary, and swap the signature verification out for the most efficient version possible for your constraints.

### Non-Membership

Merkle trees don't naturally enable us to prove that an address is _not_ in a given list. There are two possible modifications we can make to make this possible, and the first is [probably the best option](https://alinush.github.io/2023/02/05/Why-you-should-probably-never-sort-your-Merkle-trees-leaves.html).

The recommended approach is using a sparse Merkle tree. A sparse Merkle tree of addresses contains every possible address arranged in order. Since Ethereum addresses are 160 bits, the Merkle tree will be of depth 160 (note the amazing power of logarithmic complexity!), meaning Merkle proofs can still be efficiently verified in a ZKP circuit. The leaves of the tree will be 1 if the address is included in the set, and 0 if it is not. So by providing a normal Merkle proof that the leaf corresponding to an address is 0, we prove that the address is not in the list.

The alternative is sorting a list of addresses, and using 2 adjacent Merkle proofs to show that the address's point in the list is unoccupied. This is the approach [I used](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/e2e-zk-ecdsa/pull/76) in this grant, but I wouldn't recommend it due to the complexity of the circuit, and additional proof required to show that the list is sorted, which introduces [systemic complexity](https://vitalik.ca/general/2022/02/28/complexity.html).

### Off-chain, no nullifiers

The fastest way to privately verify a signature is [spartan-ecdsa](https://personaelabs.org/posts/spartan-ecdsa/), with a 4 second proving time in a browser. ECDSA uses elliptic curves, and the specific curve used for Ethereum signatures is called secp256k1. Spartan-ecdsa is primarily fast because it uses right-field arithmetic by using a related elliptic curve called secq256k1. This secp256k1's base field is the same as secq256k1's scalar field, the arithmetic is simple, but this means we have to use a proof system defined for secq256k1 such as [Spartan](https://github.com/microsoft/Spartan) (note, Groth16, PlonK etc aren't available as they rely on [pairings](https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/exploring-elliptic-curve-pairings-c73c1864e627), which aren't available in secq256k1). Unfortunately, Spartan does not yet have an efficient verifier that runs on-chain (though [this is being worked on](https://github.com/personaelabs/spartan-ecdsa/tree/hoplite)). Ultimately, this is just an way to verify ECDSA schemes in ZKPs, so, like all plain ECDSA schemes, it can't be used as a nullifier.

### On-chain, no nullifiers

A predecessor to spartan-ecdsa is [efficient-ecdsa](https://personaelabs.org/posts/efficient-ecdsa-1/). The difference is it uses expensive wrong-field arithmetic implemented with multi-register big-integers. The current implementation is circom, which is a natural frontend to any R1CS proof system such as Groth16, as well as having built in support for PlonK and fflonk. This means it can be verified on-chain at minimal cost. However, the prover is significantly slower than for spartan-ecdsa since the circuit requires 163,239 constraints compared to spartan-ecdsa's astonishing 8,076. Efficient-ecdsa is a major ~9x improvement over 0xparc's initial [circom-ecdsa](https://github.com/0xPARC/circom-ecdsa) implementation, which is achieved by computing several values outside the circuit.

### Nullifiers

Nullifiers are deterministic values that don't reveal one's private identity, but do prove set membership. These are necessary for financial applications to prevent double spending, in addition to private voting and pseudonymous messaging. Intuitively, an ECDSA signature should work as a nullifier, but it is not, in fact, deterministic on the message/private key. ECDSA signatures include a random scalar (known [in the wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm#Signature_generation_algorithm) as _k_) which is used to hide the private key. Even if this scalar is [generated pseudorandomly](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979), there is no way for the verifier to distinguish between a deterministic and random version of the same signature. Therefore, new schemes are required. [This blog](https://blog.aayushg.com/posts/nullifier) contains a more detailed exploration of the problem, including a solution called PLUME.

The [PLUME nullifier](https://github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig) is the only existing candidate solution for this problem. There is some work required to get these into wallets, and the circuits (for which [I wrote](https://github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig/pull/7) the initial implementation as part of this grant) are not yet audited or production ready. PLUME's circom implementation currently has ~6.5 million constraints, and even with optimisation, I suspect it will always be more expensive than efficient-ecdsa or spartan-ecdsa, as the verification equations are inherently longer.

## My Work

My grant ended up being a fairly meandering path toward the state of the art in zk-ECDSA. My main contribution, as I see it, is the [circuit for the PLUME nullifier](https://github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig/pull/7), as well as transmitting understanding zk-ECDSA in house, and now hopefully to the outside world.

The initial exploratory work included a Merkle tree based membership and non-membership proofs, and public key validation in circom using [circom-ecdsa](https://github.com/0xPARC/circom-ecdsa) (which is the founding project in this space). About halfway through the grant I realised how critical nullifiers are for most applications, and pivoted to working on the PLUME nullifiers.

### Membership/Non-membership proofs

The first task was to make a basic circuit that proves membership in an address set. I used a [modified version](https://github.com/ChihChengLiang/poseidon-tornado) of tornado cash for the Merkle proof, and circom-ecdsa for the signature verification (because I wasn't yet aware of efficient-ecdsa or spartan-ecdsa).

We were also interested in non-membership proofs for use cases like the [gated mixer](https://mirror.xyz/privacy-scaling-explorations.eth/djxf2g9VzUcss1e-gWIL2DSRD4stWggtTOcgsv1RlxY#blacklists) above. [I did this](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/e2e-zk-ecdsa/pull/76) with a simple sorted Merkle tree, and two adjacent Merkle proofs showing that the proof is not between them. I have since been [convinced](https://alinush.github.io/2023/02/05/Why-you-should-probably-never-sort-your-Merkle-trees-leaves.html) that sparse Merkle trees are a more robust solution, and we intend to implement this.

### Public Key Validation

Part of the signature verification algorithm involves validating that the public key is in fact a valid point on an elliptic curve ([Johnson et al 2001](https://www.cs.miami.edu/home/burt/learning/Csc609.142/ecdsa-cert.pdf) section 6.2). In previous applications this was done outside the circuit, which was possible because the full public key set was known ahead of time.

However, we were interested in use cases where developers would be able to generate arbitrary address lists, such as [gated web content](https://mirror.xyz/privacy-scaling-explorations.eth/djxf2g9VzUcss1e-gWIL2DSRD4stWggtTOcgsv1RlxY#gated-content). The problem is, it's non-trivial to go from an address list to a public key list, as not all addresses have some associated signature from which we can deduce the public key. This means that the developers would not necessarily be able to validate the public keys for every address in the list.

The solution was to [implement public key verification inside the circuit](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/e2e-zk-ecdsa/blob/a5f7d6908faac1aab47e0c705bc91d4bccea1a73/circuits/circom/membership.circom#L138-L177) using primitives from circom-ecdsa. This means that any ZKP purporting to prove membership also must be done with a valid public key.

It is not exactly clear how important this check is, and you should think about it on a case-by-case basis for your use case. It is probably not necessary for an anonymous message board, for example, since the worst attack one could possibly achieve with an invalid public key is falsifying an anonymous signature. However, in order to do that, one has to know the SHA256 preimage of some address, in which case they, in practice, hold secret information (the public key) which is somewhat equivalent to a private key.

More work needs to be done to characterise the cases where we need to verify the public key.

### Plume Nullifiers

Having improved our understanding, we brainstormed use cases, and found (as can be seen [above](https://mirror.xyz/privacy-scaling-explorations.eth/djxf2g9VzUcss1e-gWIL2DSRD4stWggtTOcgsv1RlxY#use-cases)) that the lack of nullifiers was blocking many interesting applications.

The PLUME nullifier scheme had not been implemented yet in a zero-knowledge circuit, and since I now had some experience with circom-ecdsa, I was well situated for the job. I wrote it in circom, with circom-ecdsa, ultimately ending up with 6.5 million constraints (about 2M in hashing, and 4.5M in elliptic curve operations).

This was by far the most challenging part of the grant (future grantees be warned - don't be too optimistic about what you can fit in one milestone).

One interesting bug demonstrates that difficulties of a low level language like circom, was when I simply wasn't getting the right final hash result out. It turned out (after many log statements) that part of the algorithm implicitly compresses a particular elliptic curve point before hashing it. This compression is so trivial in JS you barely notice it, but I ended up having to write it from scratch in [these two rather nice subcircuits](https://github.com/zk-nullifier-sig/zk-nullifier-sig/pull/7/files#diff-f59503380952aa2926ad22e3f7fcfb442043dd90242d81f70ffff91094f46d8fR243-R294).

Another subtlety was that an elliptic curve equation calculating _a/b^c_ inexplicably started giving the wrong result on ~50% of inputs for _c_. It turned out that my circom code was right, but the JS that I was comparing against took a wrong modulus, using `CURVE.p` rather than `CURVE.n`, which essentially confuses the base and scalar fields of the elliptic curve. And, since `CURVE.p` is still rather large, and the value whose modulus was being taken was quite small, the result was usually the same, which accounts for the confusing irregularity of the bug!

### Proving Server

For on-chain nullifiers especially, the proving time is very high, so we wanted to create a trusted server which would generate the proof for you. However, this server must be trusted with your privacy, so it will be deprecated as proving times improve.

## Conclusion

The frontier for private applications on Ethereum is about to burst wide open. The cryptography and optimisations are almost solved. Now we need a new wave of projects with sleek UX focused on solving real problems for Ethereum's users. If you want to make any of the use cases above a reality, check out [our repo](https://github.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/e2e-zk-ecdsa) to get started.
