mirror of
https://github.com/simstudioai/sim.git
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* improvement(collab): do not refetch active workflow id * progress on files * more integrations * separate server and client logic * consolidate more code * fix integrations * fix types * consolidate more code * fix tests * fix more bugbot comments * fix type check * fix circular impport * address more bugbot comments * fix ocr integrations * fix typing * remove leftover type * address bugbot comment * fix file block adv mode * fix * normalize file input * fix v2 blocmks for ocr * fix for v2 versions * fix more v2 blocks * update single file blocks * make interface simpler * cleanup fireflies * remove file only annotation * accept all types * added wand to ssh block * user files should be passed through * improve docs * fix slack to include successful execs * fix dropbox upload file * fix sendgrid * fix dropbox * fix * fix * update skills * fix uploaded file --------- Co-authored-by: waleed <walif6@gmail.com>
313 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
313 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript
import dns from 'dns/promises'
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import http from 'http'
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import https from 'https'
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import type { LookupFunction } from 'net'
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import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
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import * as ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js'
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import { type ValidationResult, validateExternalUrl } from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation'
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const logger = createLogger('InputValidation')
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/**
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* Result type for async URL validation with resolved IP
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*/
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export interface AsyncValidationResult extends ValidationResult {
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resolvedIP?: string
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originalHostname?: string
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}
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/**
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* Checks if an IP address is private or reserved (not routable on the public internet)
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* Uses ipaddr.js for robust handling of all IP formats including:
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* - Octal notation (0177.0.0.1)
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* - Hex notation (0x7f000001)
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* - IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:127.0.0.1)
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* - Various edge cases that regex patterns miss
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*/
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function isPrivateOrReservedIP(ip: string): boolean {
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try {
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if (!ipaddr.isValid(ip)) {
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return true
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}
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const addr = ipaddr.process(ip)
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const range = addr.range()
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return range !== 'unicast'
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} catch {
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return true
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}
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}
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/**
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* Validates a URL and resolves its DNS to prevent SSRF via DNS rebinding
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*
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* This function:
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* 1. Performs basic URL validation (protocol, format)
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* 2. Resolves the hostname to an IP address
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* 3. Validates the resolved IP is not private/reserved
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* 4. Returns the resolved IP for use in the actual request
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*
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* @param url - The URL to validate
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* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
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* @returns AsyncValidationResult with resolved IP for DNS pinning
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*/
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export async function validateUrlWithDNS(
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url: string | null | undefined,
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paramName = 'url'
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): Promise<AsyncValidationResult> {
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const basicValidation = validateExternalUrl(url, paramName)
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if (!basicValidation.isValid) {
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return basicValidation
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}
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const parsedUrl = new URL(url!)
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const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname
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try {
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const { address } = await dns.lookup(hostname)
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if (isPrivateOrReservedIP(address)) {
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logger.warn('URL resolves to blocked IP address', {
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paramName,
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hostname,
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resolvedIP: address,
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})
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return {
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isValid: false,
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error: `${paramName} resolves to a blocked IP address`,
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}
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}
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return {
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isValid: true,
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resolvedIP: address,
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originalHostname: hostname,
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}
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} catch (error) {
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logger.warn('DNS lookup failed for URL', {
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paramName,
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hostname,
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error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
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})
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return {
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isValid: false,
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error: `${paramName} hostname could not be resolved`,
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}
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}
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}
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export interface SecureFetchOptions {
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method?: string
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headers?: Record<string, string>
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body?: string | Buffer | Uint8Array
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timeout?: number
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maxRedirects?: number
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}
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export class SecureFetchHeaders {
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private headers: Map<string, string>
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constructor(headers: Record<string, string>) {
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this.headers = new Map(Object.entries(headers).map(([k, v]) => [k.toLowerCase(), v]))
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}
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get(name: string): string | null {
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return this.headers.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null
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}
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toRecord(): Record<string, string> {
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const record: Record<string, string> = {}
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for (const [key, value] of this.headers) {
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record[key] = value
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}
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return record
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}
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[Symbol.iterator]() {
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return this.headers.entries()
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}
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}
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export interface SecureFetchResponse {
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ok: boolean
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status: number
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statusText: string
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headers: SecureFetchHeaders
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text: () => Promise<string>
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json: () => Promise<unknown>
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arrayBuffer: () => Promise<ArrayBuffer>
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}
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const DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
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function isRedirectStatus(status: number): boolean {
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return status >= 300 && status < 400 && status !== 304
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}
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function resolveRedirectUrl(baseUrl: string, location: string): string {
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try {
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return new URL(location, baseUrl).toString()
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} catch {
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throw new Error(`Invalid redirect location: ${location}`)
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}
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}
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/**
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* Performs a fetch with IP pinning to prevent DNS rebinding attacks.
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* Uses the pre-resolved IP address while preserving the original hostname for TLS SNI.
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* Follows redirects securely by validating each redirect target.
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*/
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export async function secureFetchWithPinnedIP(
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url: string,
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resolvedIP: string,
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options: SecureFetchOptions = {},
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redirectCount = 0
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): Promise<SecureFetchResponse> {
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const maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const parsed = new URL(url)
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const isHttps = parsed.protocol === 'https:'
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const defaultPort = isHttps ? 443 : 80
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const port = parsed.port ? Number.parseInt(parsed.port, 10) : defaultPort
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const isIPv6 = resolvedIP.includes(':')
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const family = isIPv6 ? 6 : 4
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const lookup: LookupFunction = (_hostname, options, callback) => {
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if (options.all) {
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callback(null, [{ address: resolvedIP, family }])
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} else {
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callback(null, resolvedIP, family)
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}
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}
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const agentOptions: http.AgentOptions = { lookup }
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const agent = isHttps ? new https.Agent(agentOptions) : new http.Agent(agentOptions)
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// Remove accept-encoding since Node.js http/https doesn't auto-decompress
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// Headers are lowercase due to Web Headers API normalization in executeToolRequest
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const { 'accept-encoding': _, ...sanitizedHeaders } = options.headers ?? {}
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const requestOptions: http.RequestOptions = {
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hostname: parsed.hostname,
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port,
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path: parsed.pathname + parsed.search,
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method: options.method || 'GET',
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headers: sanitizedHeaders,
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agent,
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timeout: options.timeout || 300000, // Default 5 minutes
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}
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const protocol = isHttps ? https : http
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const req = protocol.request(requestOptions, (res) => {
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const statusCode = res.statusCode || 0
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const location = res.headers.location
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if (isRedirectStatus(statusCode) && location && redirectCount < maxRedirects) {
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res.resume()
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const redirectUrl = resolveRedirectUrl(url, location)
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validateUrlWithDNS(redirectUrl, 'redirectUrl')
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.then((validation) => {
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if (!validation.isValid) {
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reject(new Error(`Redirect blocked: ${validation.error}`))
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return
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}
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return secureFetchWithPinnedIP(
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redirectUrl,
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validation.resolvedIP!,
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options,
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redirectCount + 1
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)
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})
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.then((response) => {
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if (response) resolve(response)
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})
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.catch(reject)
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return
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}
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if (isRedirectStatus(statusCode) && location && redirectCount >= maxRedirects) {
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res.resume()
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reject(new Error(`Too many redirects (max: ${maxRedirects})`))
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return
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}
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const chunks: Buffer[] = []
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res.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk))
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res.on('error', (error) => {
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reject(error)
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})
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res.on('end', () => {
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const bodyBuffer = Buffer.concat(chunks)
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const body = bodyBuffer.toString('utf-8')
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const headersRecord: Record<string, string> = {}
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(res.headers)) {
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if (typeof value === 'string') {
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headersRecord[key.toLowerCase()] = value
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} else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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headersRecord[key.toLowerCase()] = value.join(', ')
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}
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}
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resolve({
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ok: statusCode >= 200 && statusCode < 300,
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status: statusCode,
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statusText: res.statusMessage || '',
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headers: new SecureFetchHeaders(headersRecord),
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text: async () => body,
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json: async () => JSON.parse(body),
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arrayBuffer: async () =>
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bodyBuffer.buffer.slice(
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bodyBuffer.byteOffset,
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bodyBuffer.byteOffset + bodyBuffer.byteLength
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),
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})
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})
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})
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req.on('error', (error) => {
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reject(error)
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})
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req.on('timeout', () => {
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req.destroy()
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reject(new Error(`Request timed out after ${requestOptions.timeout}ms`))
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})
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if (options.body) {
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req.write(options.body)
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}
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req.end()
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})
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}
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/**
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* Validates a URL and performs a secure fetch with DNS pinning in one call.
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* Combines validateUrlWithDNS and secureFetchWithPinnedIP for convenience.
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*
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* @param url - The URL to fetch
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* @param options - Fetch options (method, headers, body, etc.)
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* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages (default: 'url')
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* @returns SecureFetchResponse
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* @throws Error if URL validation fails
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*/
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export async function secureFetchWithValidation(
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url: string,
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options: SecureFetchOptions = {},
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paramName = 'url'
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): Promise<SecureFetchResponse> {
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const validation = await validateUrlWithDNS(url, paramName)
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if (!validation.isValid) {
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throw new Error(validation.error)
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}
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return secureFetchWithPinnedIP(url, validation.resolvedIP!, options)
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}
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