Files
sim/apps/sim/app/api/chat/utils.ts
Waleed e37b4a926d feat(audit-log): add persistent audit log system with comprehensive route instrumentation (#3242)
* feat(audit-log): add persistent audit log system with comprehensive route instrumentation

* fix(audit-log): address PR review — nullable workspaceId, enum usage, remove redundant queries

- Make audit_log.workspace_id nullable with ON DELETE SET NULL (logs survive workspace/user deletion)
- Make audit_log.actor_id nullable with ON DELETE SET NULL
- Replace all 53 routes' string literal action/resourceType with AuditAction.X and AuditResourceType.X enums
- Fix empty workspaceId ('') → null for OAuth, form, and org routes to avoid FK violations
- Remove redundant DB queries in chat manage route (use checkChatAccess return data)
- Fix organization routes to pass workspaceId: null instead of organizationId

* fix(audit-log): replace remaining workspaceId '' fallbacks with null

* fix(audit-log): credential-set org IDs, workspace deletion FK, actorId fallback, string literal action

* reran migrations

* fix(mcp,audit): tighten env var domain bypass, add post-resolution check, form workspaceId

- Only bypass MCP domain check when env var is in hostname/authority, not path/query
- Add post-resolution validateMcpDomain call in test-connection endpoint
- Match client-side isDomainAllowed to same hostname-only bypass logic
- Return workspaceId from checkFormAccess, use in form audit logs
- Add 49 comprehensive domain-check tests covering all edge cases

* fix(mcp): stateful regex lastIndex bug, RFC 3986 authority parsing

- Remove /g flag from module-level ENV_VAR_PATTERN to avoid lastIndex state
- Create fresh regex instances per call in server-side hasEnvVarInHostname
- Fix authority extraction to terminate at /, ?, or # per RFC 3986
- Prevents bypass via https://evil.com?token={{SECRET}} (no path)
- Add test cases for query-only and fragment-only env var URLs (53 total)

* fix(audit-log): try/catch for never-throw contract, accept null actorName/Email, fix misleading action

- Wrap recordAudit body in try/catch so nanoid() or header extraction can't throw
- Accept string | null for actorName and actorEmail (session.user.name can be null)
- Normalize null -> undefined before insert to match DB column types
- Fix org members route: ORG_MEMBER_ADDED -> ORG_INVITATION_CREATED (sends invite, not adds member)

* improvement(audit-log): add resource names and specific invitation actions

* fix(audit-log): use validated chat record, add mock sync tests
2026-02-18 00:54:52 -08:00

232 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { db } from '@sim/db'
import { chat, workflow } from '@sim/db/schema'
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
import type { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import {
isEmailAllowed,
setDeploymentAuthCookie,
validateAuthToken,
} from '@/lib/core/security/deployment'
import { decryptSecret } from '@/lib/core/security/encryption'
import { authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission } from '@/lib/workflows/utils'
const logger = createLogger('ChatAuthUtils')
export function setChatAuthCookie(
response: NextResponse,
chatId: string,
type: string,
encryptedPassword?: string | null
): void {
setDeploymentAuthCookie(response, 'chat', chatId, type, encryptedPassword)
}
/**
* Check if user has permission to create a chat for a specific workflow
*/
export async function checkWorkflowAccessForChatCreation(
workflowId: string,
userId: string
): Promise<{ hasAccess: boolean; workflow?: any }> {
const authorization = await authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission({
workflowId,
userId,
action: 'admin',
})
if (!authorization.workflow) {
return { hasAccess: false }
}
if (authorization.allowed) {
return { hasAccess: true, workflow: authorization.workflow }
}
return { hasAccess: false }
}
/**
* Check if user has access to view/edit/delete a specific chat
*/
export async function checkChatAccess(
chatId: string,
userId: string
): Promise<{ hasAccess: boolean; chat?: any; workspaceId?: string }> {
const chatData = await db
.select({
chat: chat,
workflowWorkspaceId: workflow.workspaceId,
})
.from(chat)
.innerJoin(workflow, eq(chat.workflowId, workflow.id))
.where(eq(chat.id, chatId))
.limit(1)
if (chatData.length === 0) {
return { hasAccess: false }
}
const { chat: chatRecord, workflowWorkspaceId } = chatData[0]
if (!workflowWorkspaceId) {
return { hasAccess: false }
}
const authorization = await authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission({
workflowId: chatRecord.workflowId,
userId,
action: 'admin',
})
return authorization.allowed
? { hasAccess: true, chat: chatRecord, workspaceId: workflowWorkspaceId }
: { hasAccess: false }
}
export async function validateChatAuth(
requestId: string,
deployment: any,
request: NextRequest,
parsedBody?: any
): Promise<{ authorized: boolean; error?: string }> {
const authType = deployment.authType || 'public'
if (authType === 'public') {
return { authorized: true }
}
const cookieName = `chat_auth_${deployment.id}`
const authCookie = request.cookies.get(cookieName)
if (authCookie && validateAuthToken(authCookie.value, deployment.id, deployment.password)) {
return { authorized: true }
}
if (authType === 'password') {
if (request.method === 'GET') {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_password' }
}
try {
if (!parsedBody) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Password is required' }
}
const { password, input } = parsedBody
if (input && !password) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_password' }
}
if (!password) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Password is required' }
}
if (!deployment.password) {
logger.error(`[${requestId}] No password set for password-protected chat: ${deployment.id}`)
return { authorized: false, error: 'Authentication configuration error' }
}
const { decrypted } = await decryptSecret(deployment.password)
if (password !== decrypted) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Invalid password' }
}
return { authorized: true }
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[${requestId}] Error validating password:`, error)
return { authorized: false, error: 'Authentication error' }
}
}
if (authType === 'email') {
if (request.method === 'GET') {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_email' }
}
try {
if (!parsedBody) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Email is required' }
}
const { email, input } = parsedBody
if (input && !email) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_email' }
}
if (!email) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Email is required' }
}
const allowedEmails = deployment.allowedEmails || []
if (isEmailAllowed(email, allowedEmails)) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'otp_required' }
}
return { authorized: false, error: 'Email not authorized' }
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[${requestId}] Error validating email:`, error)
return { authorized: false, error: 'Authentication error' }
}
}
if (authType === 'sso') {
if (request.method === 'GET') {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_sso' }
}
try {
if (!parsedBody) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'SSO authentication is required' }
}
const { email, input, checkSSOAccess } = parsedBody
if (input && !checkSSOAccess) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_sso' }
}
if (checkSSOAccess) {
if (!email) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'Email is required' }
}
const allowedEmails = deployment.allowedEmails || []
if (isEmailAllowed(email, allowedEmails)) {
return { authorized: true }
}
return { authorized: false, error: 'Email not authorized for SSO access' }
}
const { getSession } = await import('@/lib/auth')
const session = await getSession()
if (!session || !session.user) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'auth_required_sso' }
}
const userEmail = session.user.email
if (!userEmail) {
return { authorized: false, error: 'SSO session does not contain email' }
}
const allowedEmails = deployment.allowedEmails || []
if (isEmailAllowed(userEmail, allowedEmails)) {
return { authorized: true }
}
return { authorized: false, error: 'Your email is not authorized to access this chat' }
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[${requestId}] Error validating SSO:`, error)
return { authorized: false, error: 'SSO authentication error' }
}
}
return { authorized: false, error: 'Unsupported authentication type' }
}