Files
sim/apps/sim/lib/core/security/input-validation.ts
Waleed ff2a1527ab fix(security): add SSRF protection to database tools and webhook delivery (#3500)
* fix(security): add SSRF protection to database tools and webhook delivery

* fix(security): address review comments on SSRF PR

- Remove Promise.race timeout pattern to avoid unhandled rejections
  (http.request timeout is sufficient for webhook delivery)
- Use safeCompare in verifyCronAuth instead of inline HMAC logic
- Strip IPv6 brackets before validateDatabaseHost in Redis route

* fix(security): allow HTTP webhooks and fix misleading MCP error docs

- Add allowHttp option to validateExternalUrl, validateUrlWithDNS,
  and secureFetchWithValidation to support HTTP webhook URLs
- Pass allowHttp: true for webhook delivery and test endpoints
- Fix misleading JSDoc on createMcpErrorResponse (doesn't log errors)
- Mark unused error param with underscore prefix

* fix(security): forward allowHttp option through redirect validation

Pass allowHttp to validateUrlWithDNS in the redirect handler of
secureFetchWithPinnedIP so HTTP-to-HTTP redirects work when allowHttp
is enabled for webhook delivery.

* fix(security): block localhost when allowHttp is enabled

When allowHttp is true (user-supplied webhook URLs), explicitly block
localhost/loopback in both validateExternalUrl and validateUrlWithDNS
to prevent SSRF against internal services.

* fix(security): always strip multi-line content in sanitizeConnectionError

Take the first line of the error message regardless of length to
prevent leaking sensitive data from multi-line error messages.
2026-03-09 20:28:28 -07:00

1172 lines
31 KiB
TypeScript

import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
import * as ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js'
const logger = createLogger('InputValidation')
export interface ValidationResult {
isValid: boolean
error?: string
sanitized?: string
}
export interface PathSegmentOptions {
/** Name of the parameter for error messages */
paramName?: string
/** Maximum length allowed (default: 255) */
maxLength?: number
/** Allow hyphens (default: true) */
allowHyphens?: boolean
/** Allow underscores (default: true) */
allowUnderscores?: boolean
/** Allow dots (default: false, to prevent directory traversal) */
allowDots?: boolean
/** Custom regex pattern to match */
customPattern?: RegExp
}
/**
* Validates a path segment to prevent path traversal and SSRF attacks
*
* This function ensures that user-provided input used in URL paths or file paths
* cannot be used for directory traversal attacks or SSRF.
*
* Default behavior:
* - Allows: letters (a-z, A-Z), numbers (0-9), hyphens (-), underscores (_)
* - Blocks: dots (.), slashes (/, \), null bytes, URL encoding, and special characters
*
* @param value - The path segment to validate
* @param options - Validation options
* @returns ValidationResult with isValid flag and optional error message
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validatePathSegment(itemId, { paramName: 'itemId' })
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validatePathSegment(
value: string | null | undefined,
options: PathSegmentOptions = {}
): ValidationResult {
const {
paramName = 'path segment',
maxLength = 255,
allowHyphens = true,
allowUnderscores = true,
allowDots = false,
customPattern,
} = options
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (value.length > maxLength) {
logger.warn('Path segment exceeds maximum length', {
paramName,
length: value.length,
maxLength,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} exceeds maximum length of ${maxLength} characters`,
}
}
if (value.includes('\0') || value.includes('%00')) {
logger.warn('Path segment contains null bytes', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid characters`,
}
}
const pathTraversalPatterns = [
'..',
'./',
'.\\.',
'%2e%2e',
'%252e%252e',
'..%2f',
'..%5c',
'%2e%2e%2f',
'%2e%2e/',
'..%252f',
]
const lowerValue = value.toLowerCase()
for (const pattern of pathTraversalPatterns) {
if (lowerValue.includes(pattern.toLowerCase())) {
logger.warn('Path traversal attempt detected', {
paramName,
pattern,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid path traversal sequences`,
}
}
}
if (value.includes('/') || value.includes('\\')) {
logger.warn('Path segment contains directory separators', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot contain directory separators`,
}
}
if (customPattern) {
if (!customPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Path segment failed custom pattern validation', {
paramName,
pattern: customPattern.toString(),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} format is invalid`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
let pattern = '^[a-zA-Z0-9'
if (allowHyphens) pattern += '\\-'
if (allowUnderscores) pattern += '_'
if (allowDots) pattern += '\\.'
pattern += ']+$'
const regex = new RegExp(pattern)
if (!regex.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Path segment contains disallowed characters', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} can only contain alphanumeric characters${allowHyphens ? ', hyphens' : ''}${allowUnderscores ? ', underscores' : ''}${allowDots ? ', dots' : ''}`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates an alphanumeric ID (letters, numbers, hyphens, underscores only)
*
* @param value - The ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @param maxLength - Maximum length (default: 100)
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateAlphanumericId(userId, 'userId')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateAlphanumericId(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'ID',
maxLength = 100
): ValidationResult {
return validatePathSegment(value, {
paramName,
maxLength,
allowHyphens: true,
allowUnderscores: true,
allowDots: false,
})
}
/**
* Validates a numeric ID
*
* @param value - The ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @param options - Additional options (min, max)
* @returns ValidationResult with sanitized number as string
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateNumericId(pageNumber, 'pageNumber', { min: 1, max: 1000 })
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateNumericId(
value: string | number | null | undefined,
paramName = 'ID',
options: { min?: number; max?: number } = {}
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
const num = typeof value === 'number' ? value : Number(value)
if (Number.isNaN(num) || !Number.isFinite(num)) {
logger.warn('Invalid numeric ID', { paramName, value })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a valid number`,
}
}
if (options.min !== undefined && num < options.min) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be at least ${options.min}`,
}
}
if (options.max !== undefined && num > options.max) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be at most ${options.max}`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: num.toString() }
}
/**
* Validates an integer value (from JSON body or other sources)
*
* This is stricter than validateNumericId - it requires:
* - Value must already be a number type (not string)
* - Must be an integer (no decimals)
* - Must be finite (not NaN or Infinity)
*
* @param value - The value to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @param options - Additional options (min, max)
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateInteger(failedCount, 'failedCount', { min: 0 })
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateInteger(
value: unknown,
paramName = 'value',
options: { min?: number; max?: number } = {}
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (typeof value !== 'number') {
logger.warn('Value is not a number', { paramName, valueType: typeof value })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a number`,
}
}
if (Number.isNaN(value) || !Number.isFinite(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid number value', { paramName, value })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a valid number`,
}
}
if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {
logger.warn('Value is not an integer', { paramName, value })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be an integer`,
}
}
if (options.min !== undefined && value < options.min) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be at least ${options.min}`,
}
}
if (options.max !== undefined && value > options.max) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be at most ${options.max}`,
}
}
return { isValid: true }
}
/**
* Validates that a value is in an allowed list (enum validation)
*
* @param value - The value to validate
* @param allowedValues - Array of allowed values
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateEnum(type, ['note', 'contact', 'task'], 'type')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateEnum<T extends string>(
value: string | null | undefined,
allowedValues: readonly T[],
paramName = 'value'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (!allowedValues.includes(value as T)) {
logger.warn('Value not in allowed list', {
paramName,
value,
allowedValues,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be one of: ${allowedValues.join(', ')}`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates a hostname to prevent SSRF attacks
*
* This function checks that a hostname is not a private IP, localhost, or other reserved address.
* It complements the validateProxyUrl function by providing hostname-specific validation.
*
* @param hostname - The hostname to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateHostname(webhookDomain, 'webhook domain')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateHostname(
hostname: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'hostname'
): ValidationResult {
if (hostname === null || hostname === undefined || hostname === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
const lowerHostname = hostname.toLowerCase()
if (lowerHostname === 'localhost') {
logger.warn('Hostname is localhost', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot be a private IP address or localhost`,
}
}
if (ipaddr.isValid(lowerHostname)) {
if (isPrivateOrReservedIP(lowerHostname)) {
logger.warn('Hostname matches blocked IP range', {
paramName,
hostname: hostname.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot be a private IP address or localhost`,
}
}
}
const hostnamePattern =
/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?)*$/i
if (!hostnamePattern.test(hostname)) {
logger.warn('Invalid hostname format', {
paramName,
hostname: hostname.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is not a valid hostname`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: hostname }
}
/**
* Validates a file extension
*
* @param extension - The file extension (with or without leading dot)
* @param allowedExtensions - Array of allowed extensions (without dots)
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateFileExtension(ext, ['jpg', 'png', 'gif'], 'file extension')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateFileExtension(
extension: string | null | undefined,
allowedExtensions: readonly string[],
paramName = 'file extension'
): ValidationResult {
if (extension === null || extension === undefined || extension === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
const ext = extension.startsWith('.') ? extension.slice(1) : extension
const normalizedExt = ext.toLowerCase()
if (!allowedExtensions.map((e) => e.toLowerCase()).includes(normalizedExt)) {
logger.warn('File extension not in allowed list', {
paramName,
extension: ext,
allowedExtensions,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be one of: ${allowedExtensions.join(', ')}`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: normalizedExt }
}
/**
* Validates Microsoft Graph API resource IDs
*
* Microsoft Graph IDs can be complex - for example, SharePoint site IDs can include:
* - "root" (literal string)
* - GUIDs
* - Hostnames with colons and slashes (e.g., "hostname:/sites/sitename")
* - Group paths (e.g., "groups/{guid}/sites/root")
*
* This function allows these legitimate patterns while blocking path traversal.
*
* @param value - The Microsoft Graph ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateMicrosoftGraphId(siteId, 'siteId')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateMicrosoftGraphId(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'ID'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
const pathTraversalPatterns = [
'../',
'..\\',
'%2e%2e%2f',
'%2e%2e/',
'..%2f',
'%2e%2e%5c',
'%2e%2e\\',
'..%5c',
'%252e%252e%252f',
]
const lowerValue = value.toLowerCase()
for (const pattern of pathTraversalPatterns) {
if (lowerValue.includes(pattern)) {
logger.warn('Path traversal attempt in Microsoft Graph ID', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid path traversal sequence`,
}
}
}
if (/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(value) || value.includes('%00')) {
logger.warn('Control characters in Microsoft Graph ID', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid control characters`,
}
}
if (value.includes('\n') || value.includes('\r')) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid newline characters`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates SharePoint site IDs used in Microsoft Graph API.
*
* Site IDs are compound identifiers: `hostname,spsite-guid,spweb-guid`
* (e.g. `contoso.sharepoint.com,2C712604-1370-44E7-A1F5-426573FDA80A,2D2244C3-251A-49EA-93A8-39E1C3A060FE`).
* The API also accepts partial forms like a single GUID or just a hostname.
*
* Allowed characters: alphanumeric, periods, hyphens, and commas.
*
* @param value - The SharePoint site ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*/
export function validateSharePointSiteId(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'siteId'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (value.length > 512) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} exceeds maximum length`,
}
}
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9.\-,]+$/.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid characters in SharePoint site ID', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid characters`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates Jira Cloud IDs (typically UUID format)
*
* @param value - The Jira Cloud ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateJiraCloudId(cloudId, 'cloudId')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateJiraCloudId(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'cloudId'
): ValidationResult {
return validatePathSegment(value, {
paramName,
allowHyphens: true,
allowUnderscores: false,
allowDots: false,
maxLength: 100,
})
}
/**
* Validates Jira issue keys (format: PROJECT-123 or PROJECT-KEY-123)
*
* @param value - The Jira issue key to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateJiraIssueKey(issueKey, 'issueKey')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateJiraIssueKey(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'issueKey'
): ValidationResult {
return validatePathSegment(value, {
paramName,
allowHyphens: true,
allowUnderscores: false,
allowDots: false,
maxLength: 255,
})
}
/**
* Validates a URL to prevent SSRF attacks
*
* This function checks that URLs:
* - Use https:// protocol only
* - Do not point to private IP ranges or localhost
* - Do not use suspicious ports
*
* @param url - The URL to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateExternalUrl(url, 'fileUrl')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateExternalUrl(
url: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'url',
options: { allowHttp?: boolean } = {}
): ValidationResult {
if (!url || typeof url !== 'string') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required and must be a string`,
}
}
let parsedUrl: URL
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(url)
} catch {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a valid URL`,
}
}
const protocol = parsedUrl.protocol
const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname.toLowerCase()
const cleanHostname =
hostname.startsWith('[') && hostname.endsWith(']') ? hostname.slice(1, -1) : hostname
let isLocalhost = cleanHostname === 'localhost'
if (ipaddr.isValid(cleanHostname)) {
const processedIP = ipaddr.process(cleanHostname).toString()
if (processedIP === '127.0.0.1' || processedIP === '::1') {
isLocalhost = true
}
}
if (options.allowHttp) {
if (protocol !== 'https:' && protocol !== 'http:') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must use http:// or https:// protocol`,
}
}
if (isLocalhost) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot point to localhost`,
}
}
} else if (protocol !== 'https:' && !(protocol === 'http:' && isLocalhost)) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must use https:// protocol`,
}
}
if (!isLocalhost && ipaddr.isValid(cleanHostname)) {
if (isPrivateOrReservedIP(cleanHostname)) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot point to private IP addresses`,
}
}
}
// Block suspicious ports commonly used for internal services
const port = parsedUrl.port
const blockedPorts = [
'22', // SSH
'23', // Telnet
'25', // SMTP
'3306', // MySQL
'5432', // PostgreSQL
'6379', // Redis
'27017', // MongoDB
'9200', // Elasticsearch
]
if (port && blockedPorts.includes(port)) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} uses a blocked port`,
}
}
return { isValid: true }
}
/**
* Validates an image URL to prevent SSRF attacks
* Alias for validateExternalUrl for backward compatibility
*/
export function validateImageUrl(
url: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'imageUrl'
): ValidationResult {
return validateExternalUrl(url, paramName)
}
/**
* Validates a proxy URL to prevent SSRF attacks
* Alias for validateExternalUrl for backward compatibility
*/
export function validateProxyUrl(
url: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'proxyUrl'
): ValidationResult {
return validateExternalUrl(url, paramName)
}
/**
* Checks if an IP address is private or reserved (not routable on the public internet)
* Uses ipaddr.js for robust handling of all IP formats including:
* - Octal notation (0177.0.0.1)
* - Hex notation (0x7f000001)
* - IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:127.0.0.1)
* - Various edge cases that regex patterns miss
*/
function isPrivateOrReservedIP(ip: string): boolean {
try {
if (!ipaddr.isValid(ip)) {
return true
}
const addr = ipaddr.process(ip)
const range = addr.range()
return range !== 'unicast'
} catch {
return true
}
}
/**
* Validates an Airtable ID (base, table, or webhook ID)
*
* Airtable IDs have specific prefixes:
* - Base IDs: "app" + 14 alphanumeric characters (e.g., appXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)
* - Table IDs: "tbl" + 14 alphanumeric characters
* - Webhook IDs: "ach" + 14 alphanumeric characters
*
* @param value - The ID to validate
* @param expectedPrefix - The expected prefix ('app', 'tbl', or 'ach')
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateAirtableId(baseId, 'app', 'baseId')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* throw new Error(result.error)
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateAirtableId(
value: string | null | undefined,
expectedPrefix: 'app' | 'tbl' | 'ach',
paramName = 'ID'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
// Airtable IDs: prefix (3 chars) + 14 alphanumeric characters = 17 chars total
const airtableIdPattern = new RegExp(`^${expectedPrefix}[a-zA-Z0-9]{14}$`)
if (!airtableIdPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid Airtable ID format', {
paramName,
expectedPrefix,
value: value.substring(0, 20),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a valid Airtable ID starting with "${expectedPrefix}"`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates an AWS region identifier
*
* Supported region formats:
* - Standard: us-east-1, eu-west-2, ap-southeast-1, sa-east-1, af-south-1
* - GovCloud: us-gov-east-1, us-gov-west-1
* - China: cn-north-1, cn-northwest-1
* - Israel: il-central-1
* - ISO partitions: us-iso-east-1, us-isob-east-1
*
* @param value - The AWS region to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateAwsRegion(region, 'region')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateAwsRegion(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'region'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
// AWS region patterns:
// - Standard: af|ap|ca|eu|me|sa|us|il followed by direction and number
// - GovCloud: us-gov-east-1, us-gov-west-1
// - China: cn-north-1, cn-northwest-1
// - ISO: us-iso-east-1, us-iso-west-1, us-isob-east-1
const awsRegionPattern =
/^(af|ap|ca|cn|eu|il|me|sa|us|us-gov|us-iso|us-isob)-(central|north|northeast|northwest|south|southeast|southwest|east|west)-\d{1,2}$/
if (!awsRegionPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid AWS region format', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 50),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be a valid AWS region (e.g., us-east-1, eu-west-2, us-gov-west-1)`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates an S3 bucket name according to AWS naming rules
*
* S3 bucket names must:
* - Be 3-63 characters long
* - Start and end with a letter or number
* - Contain only lowercase letters, numbers, and hyphens
* - Not contain consecutive periods
* - Not be formatted as an IP address
*
* @param value - The S3 bucket name to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateS3BucketName(bucket, 'bucket')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateS3BucketName(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'bucket'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (value.length < 3 || value.length > 63) {
logger.warn('S3 bucket name length invalid', {
paramName,
length: value.length,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must be between 3 and 63 characters`,
}
}
const bucketNamePattern = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]*[a-z0-9]$|^[a-z0-9]$/
if (!bucketNamePattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid S3 bucket name format', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 63),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} must start and end with a letter or number, and contain only lowercase letters, numbers, hyphens, and periods`,
}
}
if (value.includes('..')) {
logger.warn('S3 bucket name contains consecutive periods', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot contain consecutive periods`,
}
}
const ipPattern = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/
if (ipPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('S3 bucket name formatted as IP address', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} cannot be formatted as an IP address`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates a Google Calendar ID
*
* Google Calendar IDs can be:
* - "primary" (literal string for the user's primary calendar)
* - Email addresses (for user calendars)
* - Alphanumeric strings with hyphens, underscores, and dots (for other calendars)
*
* This validator allows these legitimate formats while blocking path traversal and injection attempts.
*
* @param value - The calendar ID to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const result = validateGoogleCalendarId(calendarId, 'calendarId')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* ```
*/
export function validateGoogleCalendarId(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'calendarId'
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (value === 'primary') {
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
const pathTraversalPatterns = [
'../',
'..\\',
'%2e%2e%2f',
'%2e%2e/',
'..%2f',
'%2e%2e%5c',
'%2e%2e\\',
'..%5c',
'%252e%252e%252f',
]
const lowerValue = value.toLowerCase()
for (const pattern of pathTraversalPatterns) {
if (lowerValue.includes(pattern)) {
logger.warn('Path traversal attempt in Google Calendar ID', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid path traversal sequence`,
}
}
}
if (/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(value) || value.includes('%00')) {
logger.warn('Control characters in Google Calendar ID', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid control characters`,
}
}
if (value.includes('\n') || value.includes('\r')) {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid newline characters`,
}
}
const emailPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$/
if (emailPattern.test(value)) {
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
const calendarIdPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._@%#+-]+$/
if (!calendarIdPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Invalid Google Calendar ID format', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} format is invalid. Must be "primary", an email address, or an alphanumeric ID`,
}
}
if (value.length > 255) {
logger.warn('Google Calendar ID exceeds maximum length', {
paramName,
length: value.length,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} exceeds maximum length of 255 characters`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}
/**
* Validates a pagination cursor token
*
* Pagination cursors are opaque tokens returned by APIs (e.g., Confluence, Jira)
* and passed back to get the next page. They are typically base64-encoded or
* URL-safe strings. This validator ensures the cursor cannot contain characters
* that could alter URL structure.
*
* @param value - The cursor token to validate
* @param paramName - Name of the parameter for error messages
* @param maxLength - Maximum length (default: 1024)
* @returns ValidationResult
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* if (cursor) {
* const result = validatePaginationCursor(cursor, 'cursor')
* if (!result.isValid) {
* return NextResponse.json({ error: result.error }, { status: 400 })
* }
* }
* ```
*/
export function validatePaginationCursor(
value: string | null | undefined,
paramName = 'cursor',
maxLength = 1024
): ValidationResult {
if (value === null || value === undefined || value === '') {
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} is required`,
}
}
if (value.length > maxLength) {
logger.warn('Pagination cursor exceeds maximum length', {
paramName,
length: value.length,
maxLength,
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} exceeds maximum length of ${maxLength} characters`,
}
}
if (/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(value) || value.includes('%00')) {
logger.warn('Pagination cursor contains control characters', { paramName })
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid characters`,
}
}
// Allow alphanumeric, base64 chars (+, /, =), and URL-safe chars (-, _, ., ~, %)
const cursorPattern = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=\-_.~%]+$/
if (!cursorPattern.test(value)) {
logger.warn('Pagination cursor contains disallowed characters', {
paramName,
value: value.substring(0, 100),
})
return {
isValid: false,
error: `${paramName} contains invalid characters`,
}
}
return { isValid: true, sanitized: value }
}