chore(gpu): correct pfail in readme

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Guillermo Oyarzun
2025-07-25 15:19:47 +02:00
parent b5a7199c15
commit 3621dd1ae7

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@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ When a new update is published in the Lattice Estimator, we update parameters ac
By default, the parameter sets used in the High-Level API with the x86 CPU backend have a failure probability $\le 2^{128}$ to securely work in the IND-CPA^D model using the algorithmic techniques provided in our code base [1].
If you want to work within the IND-CPA security model, which is less strict than the IND-CPA-D model, the parameter sets can easily be changed and would have slightly better performance. More details can be found in the [TFHE-rs documentation](https://docs.zama.ai/tfhe-rs).
The default parameters used in the High-Level API with the GPU backend are chosen considering the IND-CPA security model, and are selected with a bootstrapping failure probability fixed at $p_{error} \le 2^{-64}$. In particular, it is assumed that the results of decrypted computations are not shared by the secret key owner with any third parties, as such an action can lead to leakage of the secret encryption key. If you are designing an application where decryptions must be shared, you will need to craft custom encryption parameters which are chosen in consideration of the IND-CPA^D security model [2].
The default parameters used in the High-Level API with the GPU backend are chosen considering the IND-CPA security model, and are selected with a bootstrapping failure probability fixed at $p_{error} \le 2^{-128}$. In particular, it is assumed that the results of decrypted computations are not shared by the secret key owner with any third parties, as such an action can lead to leakage of the secret encryption key. If you are designing an application where decryptions must be shared, you will need to craft custom encryption parameters which are chosen in consideration of the IND-CPA^D security model [2].
[1] Bernard, Olivier, et al. "Drifting Towards Better Error Probabilities in Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes". https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1718.pdf