feat(backend/chat): Allow Read/Write/Edit/Glob/Grep in SDK within workspace

Move these tools from fully-blocked to workspace-scoped: they are now
allowed when the file path stays within the SDK working directory
(/tmp/copilot-<session>/) or the tool-results directory
(~/.claude/projects/…/tool-results/). This enables the SDK's built-in
oversized tool result handling and workspace file operations.

- Add _validate_workspace_path() with normpath-based path validation
- Pass sdk_cwd from service.py into create_security_hooks()
- Add 20 unit tests covering allowed/denied paths, traversal attacks
This commit is contained in:
Zamil Majdy
2026-02-11 20:39:00 +04:00
parent e95fadbb86
commit 920a4c5f15
3 changed files with 226 additions and 26 deletions

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ ensuring multi-user isolation and preventing unauthorized operations.
"""
import logging
import os
import re
from typing import Any, cast
@@ -20,13 +21,13 @@ BLOCKED_TOOLS = {
"exec",
"terminal",
"command",
"Read", # Block raw file read - use workspace tools instead
"Write", # Block raw file write - use workspace tools instead
"Edit", # Block raw file edit - use workspace tools instead
"Glob", # Block raw file glob - use workspace tools instead
"Grep", # Block raw file grep - use workspace tools instead
}
# Tools allowed only when their path argument stays within the SDK workspace.
# The SDK uses these to handle oversized tool results (writes to tool-results/
# files, then reads them back) and for workspace file operations.
WORKSPACE_SCOPED_TOOLS = {"Read", "Write", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep"}
# Dangerous patterns in tool inputs
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
r"sudo",
@@ -45,7 +46,55 @@ DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
]
def _validate_tool_access(tool_name: str, tool_input: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _deny(reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return a hook denial response."""
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": reason,
}
}
def _validate_workspace_path(
tool_name: str, tool_input: dict[str, Any], sdk_cwd: str | None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate that a workspace-scoped tool only accesses allowed paths.
Allowed directories:
- The SDK working directory (``/tmp/copilot-<session>/``)
- The SDK tool-results directory (``~/.claude/projects/…/tool-results/``)
"""
path = tool_input.get("file_path") or tool_input.get("path") or ""
if not path:
# Glob/Grep without a path default to cwd which is already sandboxed
return {}
resolved = os.path.normpath(os.path.expanduser(path))
# Allow access within the SDK working directory
if sdk_cwd:
norm_cwd = os.path.normpath(sdk_cwd)
if resolved.startswith(norm_cwd + os.sep) or resolved == norm_cwd:
return {}
# Allow access to ~/.claude/projects/*/tool-results/ (big tool results)
claude_dir = os.path.normpath(os.path.expanduser("~/.claude/projects"))
if resolved.startswith(claude_dir + os.sep) and "tool-results" in resolved:
return {}
logger.warning(
f"Blocked {tool_name} outside workspace: {path} (resolved={resolved})"
)
return _deny(
f"Tool '{tool_name}' can only access files within the workspace directory."
)
def _validate_tool_access(
tool_name: str, tool_input: dict[str, Any], sdk_cwd: str | None = None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Validate that a tool call is allowed.
Returns:
@@ -54,16 +103,14 @@ def _validate_tool_access(tool_name: str, tool_input: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[st
# Block forbidden tools
if tool_name in BLOCKED_TOOLS:
logger.warning(f"Blocked tool access attempt: {tool_name}")
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": (
f"Tool '{tool_name}' is not available. "
"Use the CoPilot-specific tools instead."
),
}
}
return _deny(
f"Tool '{tool_name}' is not available. "
"Use the CoPilot-specific tools instead."
)
# Workspace-scoped tools: allowed only within the SDK workspace directory
if tool_name in WORKSPACE_SCOPED_TOOLS:
return _validate_workspace_path(tool_name, tool_input, sdk_cwd)
# Check for dangerous patterns in tool input
input_str = str(tool_input)
@@ -73,13 +120,7 @@ def _validate_tool_access(tool_name: str, tool_input: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[st
logger.warning(
f"Blocked dangerous pattern in tool input: {pattern} in {tool_name}"
)
return {
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": "Input contains blocked pattern",
}
}
return _deny("Input contains blocked pattern")
return {}
@@ -108,7 +149,9 @@ def _validate_user_isolation(
return {}
def create_security_hooks(user_id: str | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
def create_security_hooks(
user_id: str | None, sdk_cwd: str | None = None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Create the security hooks configuration for Claude Agent SDK.
Includes security validation and observability hooks:
@@ -119,6 +162,7 @@ def create_security_hooks(user_id: str | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
Args:
user_id: Current user ID for isolation validation
sdk_cwd: SDK working directory for workspace-scoped tool validation
Returns:
Hooks configuration dict for ClaudeAgentOptions
@@ -144,7 +188,7 @@ def create_security_hooks(user_id: str | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
# Only block non-CoPilot tools; our MCP-registered tools
# (including Read for oversized results) are already sandboxed.
if not is_copilot_tool:
result = _validate_tool_access(clean_name, tool_input)
result = _validate_tool_access(clean_name, tool_input, sdk_cwd)
if result:
return cast(SyncHookJSONOutput, result)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
"""Unit tests for SDK security hooks."""
import os
from .security_hooks import _validate_tool_access, _validate_user_isolation
SDK_CWD = "/tmp/copilot-abc123"
def _is_denied(result: dict) -> bool:
hook = result.get("hookSpecificOutput", {})
return hook.get("permissionDecision") == "deny"
# -- Blocked tools -----------------------------------------------------------
def test_blocked_tools_denied():
for tool in ("Bash", "bash", "shell", "exec", "terminal", "command"):
result = _validate_tool_access(tool, {})
assert _is_denied(result), f"{tool} should be blocked"
def test_unknown_tool_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access("SomeCustomTool", {})
assert result == {}
# -- Workspace-scoped tools --------------------------------------------------
def test_read_within_workspace_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Read", {"file_path": f"{SDK_CWD}/file.txt"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD
)
assert result == {}
def test_write_within_workspace_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Write", {"file_path": f"{SDK_CWD}/output.json"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD
)
assert result == {}
def test_edit_within_workspace_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Edit", {"file_path": f"{SDK_CWD}/src/main.py"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD
)
assert result == {}
def test_glob_within_workspace_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access("Glob", {"path": f"{SDK_CWD}/src"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD)
assert result == {}
def test_grep_within_workspace_allowed():
result = _validate_tool_access("Grep", {"path": f"{SDK_CWD}/src"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD)
assert result == {}
def test_read_outside_workspace_denied():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Read", {"file_path": "/etc/passwd"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD
)
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_write_outside_workspace_denied():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Write", {"file_path": "/home/user/secrets.txt"}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD
)
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_traversal_attack_denied():
result = _validate_tool_access(
"Read",
{"file_path": f"{SDK_CWD}/../../etc/passwd"},
sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD,
)
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_no_path_allowed():
"""Glob/Grep without a path argument defaults to cwd — should pass."""
result = _validate_tool_access("Glob", {}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD)
assert result == {}
def test_read_no_cwd_denies_absolute():
"""If no sdk_cwd is set, absolute paths are denied."""
result = _validate_tool_access("Read", {"file_path": "/tmp/anything"})
assert _is_denied(result)
# -- Tool-results directory --------------------------------------------------
def test_read_tool_results_allowed():
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
path = f"{home}/.claude/projects/-tmp-copilot-abc123/tool-results/12345.txt"
result = _validate_tool_access("Read", {"file_path": path}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD)
assert result == {}
def test_read_claude_projects_without_tool_results_denied():
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
path = f"{home}/.claude/projects/-tmp-copilot-abc123/settings.json"
result = _validate_tool_access("Read", {"file_path": path}, sdk_cwd=SDK_CWD)
assert _is_denied(result)
# -- Dangerous patterns ------------------------------------------------------
def test_dangerous_pattern_blocked():
result = _validate_tool_access("SomeTool", {"cmd": "sudo rm -rf /"})
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_subprocess_pattern_blocked():
result = _validate_tool_access("SomeTool", {"code": "subprocess.run(...)"})
assert _is_denied(result)
# -- User isolation ----------------------------------------------------------
def test_workspace_path_traversal_blocked():
result = _validate_user_isolation(
"workspace_read", {"path": "../../../etc/shadow"}, user_id="user-1"
)
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_workspace_absolute_path_blocked():
result = _validate_user_isolation(
"workspace_read", {"path": "/etc/passwd"}, user_id="user-1"
)
assert _is_denied(result)
def test_workspace_normal_path_allowed():
result = _validate_user_isolation(
"workspace_read", {"path": "src/main.py"}, user_id="user-1"
)
assert result == {}
def test_non_workspace_tool_passes_isolation():
result = _validate_user_isolation(
"find_agent", {"query": "email"}, user_id="user-1"
)
assert result == {}

View File

@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ async def stream_chat_completion_sdk(
system_prompt=system_prompt,
mcp_servers={"copilot": mcp_server}, # type: ignore[arg-type]
allowed_tools=COPILOT_TOOL_NAMES,
hooks=create_security_hooks(user_id), # type: ignore[arg-type]
hooks=create_security_hooks(user_id, sdk_cwd=sdk_cwd), # type: ignore[arg-type]
cwd=sdk_cwd,
)