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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zamil Majdy
2d9975f09a feat(backend/sdk): enable WebSearch, block WebFetch, consolidate tool constants
- Add WebSearch (Brave Search via Anthropic API) to allowed SDK built-in tools
- Explicitly block WebFetch (SSRF risk) via SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS
- Consolidate all tool security constants into tool_adapter.py (single source of truth)
2026-02-13 21:48:59 +04:00
8 changed files with 53 additions and 228 deletions

View File

@@ -11,45 +11,15 @@ import re
from collections.abc import Callable
from typing import Any, cast
from backend.api.features.chat.sdk.tool_adapter import MCP_TOOL_PREFIX
from backend.api.features.chat.sdk.tool_adapter import (
BLOCKED_TOOLS,
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS,
MCP_TOOL_PREFIX,
WORKSPACE_SCOPED_TOOLS,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Tools that are blocked entirely (CLI/system access).
# "Bash" (capital) is the SDK built-in — it's NOT in allowed_tools but blocked
# here as defence-in-depth. The agent uses mcp__copilot__bash_exec instead,
# which has kernel-level network isolation (unshare --net).
BLOCKED_TOOLS = {
"Bash",
"bash",
"shell",
"exec",
"terminal",
"command",
}
# Tools allowed only when their path argument stays within the SDK workspace.
# The SDK uses these to handle oversized tool results (writes to tool-results/
# files, then reads them back) and for workspace file operations.
WORKSPACE_SCOPED_TOOLS = {"Read", "Write", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep"}
# Dangerous patterns in tool inputs
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
r"sudo",
r"rm\s+-rf",
r"dd\s+if=",
r"/etc/passwd",
r"/etc/shadow",
r"chmod\s+777",
r"curl\s+.*\|.*sh",
r"wget\s+.*\|.*sh",
r"eval\s*\(",
r"exec\s*\(",
r"__import__",
r"os\.system",
r"subprocess",
]
def _deny(reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return a hook denial response."""

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@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ from .response_adapter import SDKResponseAdapter
from .security_hooks import create_security_hooks
from .tool_adapter import (
COPILOT_TOOL_NAMES,
SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS,
LongRunningCallback,
create_copilot_mcp_server,
set_execution_context,
@@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ async def stream_chat_completion_sdk(
"system_prompt": system_prompt,
"mcp_servers": {"copilot": mcp_server},
"allowed_tools": COPILOT_TOOL_NAMES,
"disallowed_tools": ["Bash"],
"disallowed_tools": SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS,
"hooks": security_hooks,
"cwd": sdk_cwd,
"max_buffer_size": config.claude_agent_max_buffer_size,

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@@ -310,7 +310,48 @@ def create_copilot_mcp_server():
# Bash is NOT included — use the sandboxed MCP bash_exec tool instead,
# which provides kernel-level network isolation via unshare --net.
# Task allows spawning sub-agents (rate-limited by security hooks).
_SDK_BUILTIN_TOOLS = ["Read", "Write", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep", "Task"]
# WebSearch uses Brave Search via Anthropic's API — safe, no SSRF risk.
_SDK_BUILTIN_TOOLS = ["Read", "Write", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep", "Task", "WebSearch"]
# SDK built-in tools that must be explicitly blocked.
# Bash: dangerous — agent uses mcp__copilot__bash_exec with kernel-level
# network isolation (unshare --net) instead.
# WebFetch: SSRF risk — can reach internal network (localhost, 10.x, etc.).
# Agent uses the SSRF-protected mcp__copilot__web_fetch tool instead.
SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS = ["Bash", "WebFetch"]
# Tools that are blocked entirely in security hooks (defence-in-depth).
# Includes SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS plus common aliases/synonyms.
BLOCKED_TOOLS = {
*SDK_DISALLOWED_TOOLS,
"bash",
"shell",
"exec",
"terminal",
"command",
}
# Tools allowed only when their path argument stays within the SDK workspace.
# The SDK uses these to handle oversized tool results (writes to tool-results/
# files, then reads them back) and for workspace file operations.
WORKSPACE_SCOPED_TOOLS = {"Read", "Write", "Edit", "Glob", "Grep"}
# Dangerous patterns in tool inputs
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
r"sudo",
r"rm\s+-rf",
r"dd\s+if=",
r"/etc/passwd",
r"/etc/shadow",
r"chmod\s+777",
r"curl\s+.*\|.*sh",
r"wget\s+.*\|.*sh",
r"eval\s*\(",
r"exec\s*\(",
r"__import__",
r"os\.system",
r"subprocess",
]
# List of tool names for allowed_tools configuration
# Include MCP tools, the MCP Read tool for oversized results,

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@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ from backend.blocks.jina._auth import (
from backend.blocks.search import GetRequest
from backend.data.model import SchemaField
from backend.util.exceptions import BlockExecutionError
from backend.util.request import HTTPClientError, HTTPServerError, validate_url
class SearchTheWebBlock(Block, GetRequest):
@@ -111,12 +110,7 @@ class ExtractWebsiteContentBlock(Block, GetRequest):
self, input_data: Input, *, credentials: JinaCredentials, **kwargs
) -> BlockOutput:
if input_data.raw_content:
try:
parsed_url, _, _ = await validate_url(input_data.url, [])
url = parsed_url.geturl()
except ValueError as e:
yield "error", f"Invalid URL: {e}"
return
url = input_data.url
headers = {}
else:
url = f"https://r.jina.ai/{input_data.url}"
@@ -125,20 +119,5 @@ class ExtractWebsiteContentBlock(Block, GetRequest):
"Authorization": f"Bearer {credentials.api_key.get_secret_value()}",
}
try:
content = await self.get_request(url, json=False, headers=headers)
except HTTPClientError as e:
yield "error", f"Client error ({e.status_code}) fetching {input_data.url}: {e}"
return
except HTTPServerError as e:
yield "error", f"Server error ({e.status_code}) fetching {input_data.url}: {e}"
return
except Exception as e:
yield "error", f"Failed to fetch {input_data.url}: {e}"
return
if not content:
yield "error", f"No content returned for {input_data.url}"
return
content = await self.get_request(url, json=False, headers=headers)
yield "content", content

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@@ -867,67 +867,9 @@ class GraphModel(Graph, GraphMeta):
return node_errors
@staticmethod
def prune_invalid_links(graph: BaseGraph) -> int:
"""
Remove invalid/orphan links from the graph.
This removes links that:
- Reference non-existent source or sink nodes
- Reference invalid block IDs
Note: Pin name validation is handled separately in _validate_graph_structure.
Returns the number of links pruned.
"""
node_map = {v.id: v for v in graph.nodes}
original_count = len(graph.links)
valid_links = []
for link in graph.links:
source_node = node_map.get(link.source_id)
sink_node = node_map.get(link.sink_id)
# Skip if either node doesn't exist
if not source_node or not sink_node:
logger.warning(
f"Pruning orphan link: source={link.source_id}, sink={link.sink_id} "
f"- node(s) not found"
)
continue
# Skip if source block doesn't exist
source_block = get_block(source_node.block_id)
if not source_block:
logger.warning(
f"Pruning link with invalid source block: {source_node.block_id}"
)
continue
# Skip if sink block doesn't exist
sink_block = get_block(sink_node.block_id)
if not sink_block:
logger.warning(
f"Pruning link with invalid sink block: {sink_node.block_id}"
)
continue
valid_links.append(link)
graph.links = valid_links
pruned_count = original_count - len(valid_links)
if pruned_count > 0:
logger.info(f"Pruned {pruned_count} invalid link(s) from graph {graph.id}")
return pruned_count
@staticmethod
def _validate_graph_structure(graph: BaseGraph):
"""Validate graph structure (links, connections, etc.)"""
# First, prune invalid links to clean up orphan edges
GraphModel.prune_invalid_links(graph)
node_map = {v.id: v for v in graph.nodes}
def is_static_output_block(nid: str) -> bool:

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@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
from typing import cast
import pytest
from backend.blocks.jina._auth import (
TEST_CREDENTIALS,
TEST_CREDENTIALS_INPUT,
JinaCredentialsInput,
)
from backend.blocks.jina.search import ExtractWebsiteContentBlock
from backend.util.request import HTTPClientError
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_extract_website_content_returns_content(monkeypatch):
block = ExtractWebsiteContentBlock()
input_data = block.Input(
url="https://example.com",
credentials=cast(JinaCredentialsInput, TEST_CREDENTIALS_INPUT),
raw_content=True,
)
async def fake_get_request(url, json=False, headers=None):
assert url == "https://example.com"
assert headers == {}
return "page content"
monkeypatch.setattr(block, "get_request", fake_get_request)
results = [
output
async for output in block.run(
input_data=input_data, credentials=TEST_CREDENTIALS
)
]
assert ("content", "page content") in results
assert all(key != "error" for key, _ in results)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_extract_website_content_handles_http_error(monkeypatch):
block = ExtractWebsiteContentBlock()
input_data = block.Input(
url="https://example.com",
credentials=cast(JinaCredentialsInput, TEST_CREDENTIALS_INPUT),
raw_content=False,
)
async def fake_get_request(url, json=False, headers=None):
raise HTTPClientError("HTTP 400 Error: Bad Request", 400)
monkeypatch.setattr(block, "get_request", fake_get_request)
results = [
output
async for output in block.run(
input_data=input_data, credentials=TEST_CREDENTIALS
)
]
assert ("content", "page content") not in results
error_messages = [value for key, value in results if key == "error"]
assert error_messages
assert "Client error (400)" in error_messages[0]
assert "https://example.com" in error_messages[0]

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@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import { Graph } from "@/app/api/__generated__/models/graph";
import { useNodeStore } from "../stores/nodeStore";
import { useEdgeStore } from "../stores/edgeStore";
import { graphsEquivalent } from "../components/NewControlPanel/NewSaveControl/helpers";
import { linkToCustomEdge } from "../components/helper";
import { useGraphStore } from "../stores/graphStore";
import { useShallow } from "zustand/react/shallow";
import {
@@ -22,18 +21,6 @@ import {
getTempFlowId,
} from "@/services/builder-draft/draft-service";
/**
* Sync the edge store with the authoritative backend state.
* This ensures the frontend matches what the backend accepted after save.
*/
function syncEdgesWithBackend(links: GraphModel["links"]) {
if (links !== undefined) {
// Replace all edges with the authoritative backend state
const newEdges = links.map(linkToCustomEdge);
useEdgeStore.getState().setEdges(newEdges);
}
}
export type SaveGraphOptions = {
showToast?: boolean;
onSuccess?: (graph: GraphModel) => void;
@@ -77,9 +64,6 @@ export const useSaveGraph = ({
flowVersion: data.version,
});
// Sync edge store with authoritative backend state
syncEdgesWithBackend(data.links);
const tempFlowId = getTempFlowId();
if (tempFlowId) {
await draftService.deleteDraft(tempFlowId);
@@ -117,9 +101,6 @@ export const useSaveGraph = ({
flowVersion: data.version,
});
// Sync edge store with authoritative backend state
syncEdgesWithBackend(data.links);
// Clear the draft for this flow after successful save
if (data.id) {
await draftService.deleteDraft(data.id);

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@@ -120,33 +120,10 @@ export const useEdgeStore = create<EdgeStore>((set, get) => ({
isOutputConnected: (nodeId, handle) =>
get().edges.some((e) => e.source === nodeId && e.sourceHandle === handle),
getBackendLinks: () => {
// Filter out edges referencing non-existent nodes before converting to links
const nodeIds = new Set(useNodeStore.getState().nodes.map((n) => n.id));
const validEdges = get().edges.filter((edge) => {
const isValid = nodeIds.has(edge.source) && nodeIds.has(edge.target);
if (!isValid) {
console.warn(
`[EdgeStore] Filtering out invalid edge during save: source=${edge.source}, target=${edge.target}`,
);
}
return isValid;
});
return validEdges.map(customEdgeToLink);
},
getBackendLinks: () => get().edges.map(customEdgeToLink),
addLinks: (links) => {
// Get current node IDs to validate links
const nodeIds = new Set(useNodeStore.getState().nodes.map((n) => n.id));
links.forEach((link) => {
// Skip invalid links (orphan edges referencing non-existent nodes)
if (!nodeIds.has(link.source_id) || !nodeIds.has(link.sink_id)) {
console.warn(
`[EdgeStore] Skipping invalid link: source=${link.source_id}, sink=${link.sink_id} - node(s) not found`,
);
return;
}
get().addEdge(linkToCustomEdge(link));
});
},