Zamil Majdy 57a06f7088 fix(blocks, security): Fixes for various DoS vulnerabilities (#10798) ...

This PR addresses multiple critical and medium security vulnerabilities
that could lead to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. All fixes implement
defense-in-depth strategies with comprehensive testing.

### Changes 🏗️

#### **Critical Security Fixes:**

1. **GHSA-m2wr-7m3r-p52c - ReDoS in CodeExtractionBlock** 
- Fixed catastrophic backtracking in regex patterns `\s+[\s\S]*?` and
`\s+(.*?)`
   - Replaced with safer patterns: `[ \t]*\n([^\s\S]*?)`
   - Files: `backend/blocks/code_extraction_block.py`

2. **GHSA-955p-gpfx-r66j - AITextSummarizerBlock Memory Amplification**
   - Added 1MB text size limit and 100 chunk maximum
   - Prevents 10K input → 50G memory amplification attacks
   - Files: `backend/blocks/llm.py`

3. **GHSA-5cqw-g779-9f9x - RSS Feed XML Bomb DoS**
   - Added 10MB feed size limit and 30s timeout
   - Prevents deep XML parsing memory exhaustion
   - Files: `backend/blocks/rss.py`

4. **GHSA-7g34-7fvq-xxq6 - File Storage Disk Exhaustion**
   - Added 100MB per file and 1GB per execution directory limits
   - Prevents disk space exhaustion from file uploads
   - Files: `backend/util/file.py`

5. **GHSA-pppq-xx2w-7jpq - ExtractTextInformationBlock ReDoS**
   - Added 1MB text limit, 1000 match limit, and 5s timeout protection
   - Prevents lookahead pattern memory exhaustion
   - Files: `backend/blocks/text.py`

6. **GHSA-vw3v-whvp-33v5 - Docker Logging Disk Exhaustion**
- Added log rotation limits at Docker (10MB × 3 files) and application
levels
   - Prevents unbounded log growth causing disk exhaustion
- Files: `docker-compose.platform.yml`,
`autogpt_libs/autogpt_libs/logging/config.py`

#### **Additional Security Improvements:**

7. **StepThroughItemsBlock DoS Prevention**
   - Added 10,000 item limit and 1MB input size limit
   - Prevents large iteration DoS attacks
   - Files: `backend/blocks/iteration.py`

8. **XMLParserBlock XML Bomb Prevention**
   - Added 10MB XML input size limit
   - Files: `backend/blocks/xml_parser.py`

#### **Code Quality:**
- Fixed Python 3.10 typing compatibility issues
- Added comprehensive security test suite
- All code formatted and linted

### Checklist 📋

#### For code changes:
- [x] I have clearly listed my changes in the PR description
- [x] I have made a test plan
- [x] I have tested my changes according to the test plan:
- [x] Created comprehensive security test suite covering all
vulnerabilities
  - [x] Verified ReDoS patterns are fixed and don't cause timeouts
  - [x] Confirmed memory limits prevent amplification attacks
  - [x] Tested file size limits prevent disk exhaustion
  - [x] Validated log rotation prevents unbounded growth
  - [x] Ensured backward compatibility for normal usage

#### For configuration changes:
- [x] `docker-compose.yml` is updated with logging limits
- [x] I have included a list of my configuration changes in the PR
description (under **Changes**)

### Test Plan 🧪

**Security Tests:**
1. **ReDoS Protection**: Tested with malicious regex inputs (large
spaces) - completes without hanging
2. **Memory Limits**: Verified 2MB text input gets truncated to 1MB,
chunk limits enforced
3. **File Size Limits**: Confirmed 200MB files rejected, directory size
limits enforced
4. **Iteration Limits**: Tested 20K item arrays rejected, large JSON
strings rejected
5. **Timeout Protection**: Dangerous regex patterns timeout after 5s
instead of hanging

**Compatibility Tests:**
- Normal functionality preserved for all blocks
- Existing tests pass with new security limits
- Performance impact minimal for typical usage

### Security Impact 🛡️

**Before:** Multiple attack vectors could cause:
- CPU exhaustion (ReDoS attacks)
- Memory exhaustion (amplification attacks)  
- Disk exhaustion (file/log bombs)
- Service unavailability

**After:** All attack vectors mitigated with:
- Input validation and size limits
- Timeout protections
- Resource quotas
- Defense-in-depth approach

All fixes maintain backward compatibility while preventing DoS attacks.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)

<!-- CURSOR_SUMMARY -->
---

> [!NOTE]
> Adds robust DoS protections across blocks (regex, memory, iteration,
XML/RSS, file I/O) and enables app/Docker log rotation with
comprehensive tests.
> 
> - **Security hardening**:
> - Replace unsafe regex in `backend/blocks/code_extraction_block.py` to
prevent ReDoS; add safer extraction/removal patterns.
> - Constrain LLM summarizer chunking in `backend/blocks/llm.py` (1MB
cap, chunk/overlap validation, chunk count limit).
> - Limit RSS fetching in `backend/blocks/rss.py` (scheme validation,
10MB cap, timeout, bounded read) and return empty on failure.
>   - Impose XML size limit (10MB) in `backend/blocks/xml_parser.py`.
> - Add file upload/download limits in `backend/util/file.py`
(100MB/file, 1GB dir quota) and enforce scanning before write.
> - Enable rotating file logs in `autogpt_libs/logging/config.py` (size
+ backups) and Docker json-file log rotation in
`docker-compose.platform.yml`.
> - **Iteration block**:
> - Add item count/string size limits; fix yielded key for dicts; cap
iterations in `backend/blocks/iteration.py`.
> - **Tests**:
> - New `backend/blocks/test/test_security_fixes.py` covering ReDoS,
timeouts, memory/size and iteration limits, XML/file constraints.
> - **Misc**:
> - Typing fallback for `NotRequired` in `activity_status_generator.py`.
>   - Dependency updates in `backend/poetry.lock`.
> 
> <sup>Written by [Cursor
Bugbot](https://cursor.com/dashboard?tab=bugbot) for commit
500e1578b1. This will update automatically
on new commits. Configure
[here](https://cursor.com/dashboard?tab=bugbot).</sup>
<!-- /CURSOR_SUMMARY -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicholas Tindle <nicholas.tindle@agpt.co>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicholas Tindle <ntindle@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Zamil Majdy <majdyz@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Reinier van der Leer <Pwuts@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Reinier van der Leer <pwuts@agpt.co>

2025-10-02 12:55:55 +00:00

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