chore: harden GitHub Actions against script injection patterns (#50708)

chore: harden GitHub Actions against script injection patterns (#50512)

* fix: harden GitHub Actions against script injection vulnerabilities

Replace direct ${{ }} expression interpolation in run: blocks with
environment variables to prevent script injection attacks. Changes:

- archaeologist-dig.yml: move clone_url, head.sha, base.ref to env vars
- non-maintainer-dependency-change.yml: move user.login to env var
- issue-unlabeled.yml: move toJSON(labels) to env var
- issue-labeled.yml: move issue.number to env var
- pipeline-electron-lint.yml: validate chromium_revision format
- cipd-install/action.yml: move all inputs to env vars and quote them
- set-chromium-cookie/action.yml: reference secrets via $ENV_VAR
- Add security comments to all 5 pull_request_target workflows

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UUWmLxn5hyyxrhK8rGxU2s

* fix: allow version strings in chromium_revision validation

The previous regex `^[a-f0-9]+$` only matched git SHAs but
chromium_revision is a version string like `148.0.7741.0`.
Broaden to `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$` which still blocks shell
metacharacters.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UUWmLxn5hyyxrhK8rGxU2s

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Samuel Attard
2026-04-06 10:04:05 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3d743a6ef7
commit ca1522385c
9 changed files with 71 additions and 25 deletions

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@@ -22,30 +22,50 @@ runs:
steps:
- name: Delete wrong ${{ inputs.dependency }}
shell: bash
env:
CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}
INSTALLATION_DIR: ${{ inputs.installation-dir }}
run : |
rm -rf ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}${{ inputs.installation-dir }}
rm -rf "${CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX}${INSTALLATION_DIR}"
- name: Create ensure file for ${{ inputs.dependency }}
if: ${{ inputs.dependency-version == '' }}
shell: bash
env:
PACKAGE: ${{ inputs.package }}
DEPS_FILE: ${{ inputs.deps-file }}
INSTALLATION_DIR: ${{ inputs.installation-dir }}
DEPENDENCY: ${{ inputs.dependency }}
run: |
echo '${{ inputs.package }}' `e d gclient getdep --deps-file=${{ inputs.deps-file }} -r '${{ inputs.installation-dir }}:${{ inputs.package }}'` > ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
cat ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
echo "$PACKAGE" $(e d gclient getdep --deps-file="$DEPS_FILE" -r "${INSTALLATION_DIR}:${PACKAGE}") > "${DEPENDENCY}_ensure_file"
cat "${DEPENDENCY}_ensure_file"
- name: Create ensure file for ${{ inputs.dependency }} from dependency-version
if: ${{ inputs.dependency-version != '' }}
shell: bash
env:
PACKAGE: ${{ inputs.package }}
DEPENDENCY_VERSION: ${{ inputs.dependency-version }}
DEPENDENCY: ${{ inputs.dependency }}
run: |
echo '${{ inputs.package }} ${{ inputs.dependency-version }}' > ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
cat ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
echo "$PACKAGE $DEPENDENCY_VERSION" > "${DEPENDENCY}_ensure_file"
cat "${DEPENDENCY}_ensure_file"
- name: CIPD installation of ${{ inputs.dependency }} (macOS)
if: ${{ inputs.target-platform != 'win' }}
shell: bash
env:
CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}
INSTALLATION_DIR: ${{ inputs.installation-dir }}
DEPENDENCY: ${{ inputs.dependency }}
run: |
echo "ensuring ${{ inputs.dependency }}"
e d cipd ensure --root ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}${{ inputs.installation-dir }} -ensure-file ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
echo "ensuring $DEPENDENCY"
e d cipd ensure --root "${CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX}${INSTALLATION_DIR}" -ensure-file "${DEPENDENCY}_ensure_file"
- name: CIPD installation of ${{ inputs.dependency }} (Windows)
if: ${{ inputs.target-platform == 'win' }}
shell: powershell
env:
CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}
INSTALLATION_DIR: ${{ inputs.installation-dir }}
DEPENDENCY: ${{ inputs.dependency }}
run: |
echo "ensuring ${{ inputs.dependency }} on Windows"
e d cipd ensure --root ${{ inputs.cipd-root-prefix-path }}${{ inputs.installation-dir }} -ensure-file ${{ inputs.dependency }}_ensure_file
echo "ensuring $env:DEPENDENCY on Windows"
e d cipd ensure --root "$env:CIPD_ROOT_PREFIX$env:INSTALLATION_DIR" -ensure-file "$($env:DEPENDENCY)_ensure_file"

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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ runs:
if: ${{ runner.os != 'Windows' }}
shell: bash
run: |
if [[ -z "${{ env.CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE }}" ]]; then
if [[ -z "$CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE" ]]; then
echo "CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE is not set - cannot authenticate."
exit 0
fi
@@ -18,9 +18,7 @@ runs:
git config --global http.cookiefile ~/.gitcookies
tr , \\t <<\__END__ >>~/.gitcookies
${{ env.CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE }}
__END__
echo "$CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE" | tr , \\t >>~/.gitcookies
eval 'set -o history' 2>/dev/null || unsetopt HIST_IGNORE_SPACE 2>/dev/null
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -b ~/.gitcookies https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/a/accounts/self)
@@ -42,7 +40,7 @@ runs:
)
git config --global http.cookiefile "%USERPROFILE%\.gitcookies"
powershell -noprofile -nologo -command Write-Output "${{ env.CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE_WINDOWS_STRING }}" >>"%USERPROFILE%\.gitcookies"
powershell -noprofile -nologo -command Write-Output $env:CHROMIUM_GIT_COOKIE_WINDOWS_STRING >>"%USERPROFILE%\.gitcookies"
curl -s -b "%USERPROFILE%\.gitcookies" https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/a/accounts/self > response.txt

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@@ -21,17 +21,21 @@ jobs:
with:
node-version: 24.12.x
- name: Setting Up Dig Site
env:
CLONE_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.clone_url }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
BASE_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
run: |
echo "remote: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.clone_url }}"
echo "sha ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
echo "base ref ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}"
git clone https://github.com/electron/electron.git electron
echo "remote: $CLONE_URL"
echo "sha $HEAD_SHA"
echo "base ref $BASE_REF"
git clone https://github.com/electron/electron.git electron
cd electron
mkdir -p artifacts
git remote add fork ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.clone_url }} && git fetch fork
git checkout ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
git merge-base origin/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }} HEAD > .dig-old
echo ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} > .dig-new
git remote add fork "$CLONE_URL" && git fetch fork
git checkout "$HEAD_SHA"
git merge-base "origin/$BASE_REF" HEAD > .dig-old
echo "$HEAD_SHA" > .dig-new
cp .dig-old artifacts
- name: Generating Types for SHA in .dig-new

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@@ -61,9 +61,10 @@ jobs:
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: electron/electron
ISSUE_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
run: |
set -eo pipefail
COMMENT_COUNT=$(gh issue view ${{ github.event.issue.number }} --comments --json comments | jq '[ .comments[] | select(.author.login == "electron-issue-triage" or .authorAssociation == "OWNER" or .authorAssociation == "MEMBER") | select(.body | startswith("<!-- blocked/need-repro -->")) ] | length')
COMMENT_COUNT=$(gh issue view "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --comments --json comments | jq '[ .comments[] | select(.author.login == "electron-issue-triage" or .authorAssociation == "OWNER" or .authorAssociation == "MEMBER") | select(.body | startswith("<!-- blocked/need-repro -->")) ] | length')
if [[ $COMMENT_COUNT -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "SHOULD_COMMENT=1" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi

View File

@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Check for any blocked labels
id: check-for-blocked-labels
env:
LABELS_JSON: ${{ toJSON(github.event.issue.labels.*.name) }}
run: |
set -eo pipefail
BLOCKED_LABEL_COUNT=$(echo '${{ toJSON(github.event.issue.labels.*.name) }}' | jq '[ .[] | select(startswith("blocked/")) ] | length')
BLOCKED_LABEL_COUNT=$(echo "$LABELS_JSON" | jq '[ .[] | select(startswith("blocked/")) ] | length')
if [[ $BLOCKED_LABEL_COUNT -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "NOT_BLOCKED=1" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ on:
- '.yarn/**'
- '.yarnrc.yml'
# SECURITY: This workflow uses pull_request_target and has access to secrets.
# Do NOT checkout or run code from the PR head. All code execution must use
# the base branch only. Adding a ref to PR head would expose secrets to
# untrusted code.
permissions: {}
jobs:
@@ -45,5 +49,6 @@ jobs:
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
PR_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.html_url }}
PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
run: |
printf "<!-- disallowed-non-maintainer-change -->\n\nHello @${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}! It looks like this pull request touches one of our dependency or CI files, and per [our contribution policy](https://github.com/electron/electron/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependencies-upgrades-policy) we do not accept these types of changes in PRs." | gh pr review $PR_URL -r --body-file=-
printf "<!-- disallowed-non-maintainer-change -->\n\nHello @${PR_AUTHOR}! It looks like this pull request touches one of our dependency or CI files, and per [our contribution policy](https://github.com/electron/electron/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependencies-upgrades-policy) we do not accept these types of changes in PRs." | gh pr review $PR_URL -r --body-file=-

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@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ jobs:
shell: bash
run: |
chromium_revision="$(grep -A1 chromium_version src/electron/DEPS | tr -d '\n' | cut -d\' -f4)"
if [[ ! "$chromium_revision" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Invalid chromium_revision: $chromium_revision"
exit 1
fi
gn_version="$(curl -sL -b ~/.gitcookies "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/${chromium_revision}/DEPS?format=TEXT" | base64 -d | grep gn_version | head -n1 | cut -d\' -f4)"
cipd ensure -ensure-file - -root . <<-CIPD
@@ -60,6 +64,10 @@ jobs:
shell: bash
run: |
chromium_revision="$(grep -A1 chromium_version src/electron/DEPS | tr -d '\n' | cut -d\' -f4)"
if [[ ! "$chromium_revision" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$ ]]; then
echo "::error::Invalid chromium_revision: $chromium_revision"
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p src/buildtools
curl -sL -b ~/.gitcookies "https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/${chromium_revision}/buildtools/DEPS?format=TEXT" | base64 -d > src/buildtools/DEPS

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@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ on:
pull_request_target:
types: [labeled]
# SECURITY: This workflow uses pull_request_target and has access to secrets.
# Do NOT checkout or run code from the PR head. All code execution must use
# the base branch only. Adding a ref to PR head would expose secrets to
# untrusted code.
permissions: {}
jobs:

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize]
# SECURITY: This workflow uses pull_request_target and has access to secrets.
# Do NOT checkout or run code from the PR head. All code execution must use
# the base branch only. Adding a ref to PR head would expose secrets to
# untrusted code.
permissions: {}
jobs: