refactor(security): centralize dangerous tool lists

src/acp/client.ts

@@ -10,24 +10,7 @@ import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
 import * as readline from "node:readline";
 import { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream";
 import { ensureOpenClawCliOnPath } from "../infra/path-env.js";
-
-/**
- * Tools that require explicit user approval in ACP sessions.
- * These tools can execute arbitrary code, modify the filesystem,
- * or access sensitive resources.
- */
-const DANGEROUS_ACP_TOOLS = new Set([
-  "exec",
-  "spawn",
-  "shell",
-  "sessions_spawn",
-  "sessions_send",
-  "gateway",
-  "fs_write",
-  "fs_delete",
-  "fs_move",
-  "apply_patch",
-]);
+import { DANGEROUS_ACP_TOOLS } from "../security/dangerous-tools.js";
 
 const SAFE_AUTO_APPROVE_KINDS = new Set(["read", "search"]);
 

src/gateway/tools-invoke-http.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import { logWarn } from "../logger.js";
 import { isTestDefaultMemorySlotDisabled } from "../plugins/config-state.js";
 import { getPluginToolMeta } from "../plugins/tools.js";
 import { isSubagentSessionKey } from "../routing/session-key.js";
+import { DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY } from "../security/dangerous-tools.js";
 import { normalizeMessageChannel } from "../utils/message-channel.js";
 import { authorizeGatewayConnect, type ResolvedGatewayAuth } from "./auth.js";
 import {
@@ -36,22 +37,6 @@ import { getBearerToken, getHeader } from "./http-utils.js";
 const DEFAULT_BODY_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
 const MEMORY_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(["memory_search", "memory_get"]);
 
-/**
- * Tools denied via HTTP /tools/invoke regardless of session policy.
- * Prevents RCE and privilege escalation from HTTP API surface.
- * Configurable via gateway.tools.{deny,allow} in openclaw.json.
- */
-const DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY = [
-  // Session orchestration — spawning agents remotely is RCE
-  "sessions_spawn",
-  // Cross-session injection — message injection across sessions
-  "sessions_send",
-  // Gateway control plane — prevents gateway reconfiguration via HTTP
-  "gateway",
-  // Interactive setup — requires terminal QR scan, hangs on HTTP
-  "whatsapp_login",
-];
-
 type ToolsInvokeBody = {
   tool?: unknown;
   action?: unknown;

src/security/audit.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import {
   formatPermissionRemediation,
   inspectPathPermissions,
 } from "./audit-fs.js";
+import { DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY } from "./dangerous-tools.js";
 
 export type SecurityAuditSeverity = "info" | "warn" | "critical";
 
@@ -269,8 +270,9 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(
       .map((v) => (typeof v === "string" ? v.trim().toLowerCase() : ""))
       .filter(Boolean),
   );
-  const defaultHttpDeniedTools = ["sessions_spawn", "sessions_send", "gateway", "whatsapp_login"];
-  const reenabledOverHttp = defaultHttpDeniedTools.filter((name) => gatewayToolsAllow.has(name));
+  const reenabledOverHttp = DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY.filter((name) =>
+    gatewayToolsAllow.has(name),
+  );
   if (reenabledOverHttp.length > 0) {
     const extraRisk = bind !== "loopback" || tailscaleMode === "funnel";
     findings.push({

src/security/dangerous-tools.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Shared tool-risk constants.
+// Keep these centralized so gateway HTTP restrictions, security audits, and ACP prompts don't drift.
+
+/**
+ * Tools denied via Gateway HTTP `POST /tools/invoke` by default.
+ * These are high-risk because they enable session orchestration, control-plane actions,
+ * or interactive flows that don't make sense over a non-interactive HTTP surface.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY = [
+  // Session orchestration — spawning agents remotely is RCE
+  "sessions_spawn",
+  // Cross-session injection — message injection across sessions
+  "sessions_send",
+  // Gateway control plane — prevents gateway reconfiguration via HTTP
+  "gateway",
+  // Interactive setup — requires terminal QR scan, hangs on HTTP
+  "whatsapp_login",
+] as const;
+
+/**
+ * ACP tools that should always require explicit user approval.
+ * ACP is an automation surface; we never want "silent yes" for mutating/execution tools.
+ */
+export const DANGEROUS_ACP_TOOL_NAMES = [
+  "exec",
+  "spawn",
+  "shell",
+  "sessions_spawn",
+  "sessions_send",
+  "gateway",
+  "fs_write",
+  "fs_delete",
+  "fs_move",
+  "apply_patch",
+] as const;
+
+export const DANGEROUS_ACP_TOOLS = new Set<string>(DANGEROUS_ACP_TOOL_NAMES);