replyToMode "first"/"all" only filters replyToId but never generates
it — that required the LLM to emit [[reply_to_current]] tags. Inject
replyToCurrent:true on all payloads so applyReplyTagsToPayload sets
replyToId=currentMessageId, then let the existing mode filter decide
which replies keep threading (first only, all, or off).
Covers both final reply path (reply-payloads.ts) and block streaming
path (agent-runner-execution.ts).
Adds thread_ts and parent_user_id to the Slack message footer for thread
replies, giving agents awareness of thread context. Top-level messages
remain unchanged.
Includes tests verifying:
- Thread replies include thread_ts and parent_user_id in footer
- Top-level messages exclude thread metadata
* fix: replace file-based session store lock with in-process Promise chain mutex
Node.js is single-threaded, so file-based locking (open('wx') + polling +
stale eviction) is unnecessary and causes timeouts under heavy session load.
Replace with a simple per-storePath Promise chain that serializes access
without any filesystem overhead.
In a 1159-session environment over 3 hours:
- Lock timeouts: 25
- Stuck sessions: 157 (max 1031s, avg 388s)
- Slow listeners: 39 (max 265s, avg 70s)
Root cause: during sessions.json file I/O, await yields control and other
lock requests hit the 10s timeout waiting for the .lock file to be released.
* test: add comprehensive tests for Promise chain mutex lock
- Concurrent access serialization (10 parallel writers, counter integrity)
- Error resilience (single & multiple consecutive throws don't poison queue)
- Independent storePath parallelism (different paths run concurrently)
- LOCK_QUEUES cleanup after completion and after errors
- No .lock file created on disk
Also fix: store caught promise in LOCK_QUEUES to avoid unhandled rejection
warnings when queued fn() throws.
* fix: add timeout to Promise chain mutex to prevent infinite hangs on Windows
* fix(session-store): enforce strict queue timeout + cross-process lock
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* fix(security): distinguish webhooks from internal hooks in audit summary
The attack surface summary reported a single 'hooks: disabled/enabled' line
that only checked the external webhook endpoint (hooks.enabled), ignoring
internal hooks (hooks.internal.enabled). Users who enabled internal hooks
(session-memory, command-logger, etc.) saw 'hooks: disabled' and thought
something was broken.
Split into two separate lines:
- hooks.webhooks: disabled/enabled
- hooks.internal: disabled/enabled
Fixes#13466
* test(security): move attack surface tests to focused test file
Move the 3 new hook-distinction tests from the monolithic audit.test.ts
(1,511 lines) into a dedicated audit-extra.sync.test.ts that tests
collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings directly. Avoids growing the
already-large test file and keeps tests focused on the changed unit.
* fix: add changelog entry for security audit hook split (#13474) (thanks @mcaxtr)
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
The newly added 'resolved' field contains secrets after ${ENV}
substitution. This commit ensures redactConfigSnapshot also redacts
the resolved field to prevent credential leaks in config.get responses.
The initial fix using snapshot.parsed broke configs with $include directives.
This commit adds a new 'resolved' field to ConfigFileSnapshot that contains
the config after $include and ${ENV} substitution but BEFORE runtime defaults
are applied. This is now used by config set/unset to avoid:
1. Breaking configs with $include directives
2. Leaking runtime defaults into the written config file
Also removes applyModelDefaults from writeConfigFile since runtime defaults
should only be applied when loading, not when writing.
Fixes#6070
The config set/unset commands were using snapshot.config (which contains
runtime-merged defaults) instead of snapshot.parsed (the raw user config).
This caused runtime defaults like agents.defaults to leak into the written
config file when any value was set or unset.
Changed both set and unset commands to use structuredClone(snapshot.parsed)
to preserve only user-specified config values.
* fix(security): prevent String(undefined) coercion in credential inputs
When a prompter returns undefined (due to cancel, timeout, or bug),
String(undefined).trim() produces the literal string "undefined" instead
of "". This truthy string prevents secure fallbacks from triggering,
allowing predictable credential values (e.g., gateway password = "undefined").
Fix all 8 occurrences by using String(value ?? "").trim(), which correctly
yields "" for null/undefined inputs and triggers downstream validation or
fallback logic.
Fixes#8054
* fix(security): also fix String(undefined) in api-provider credential inputs
Address codex review feedback: 4 additional occurrences of the unsafe
String(variable).trim() pattern in auth-choice.apply.api-providers.ts
(Cloudflare Account ID, Gateway ID, synthetic API key inputs + validators).
* fix(test): strengthen password coercion test per review feedback
* fix(security): harden credential prompt coercion
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
