Merge branch 'main' into new-everything-server

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ jobs:
     if: ${{ needs.create-metadata.outputs.npm_packages != '[]' || needs.create-metadata.outputs.pypi_packages != '[]' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     environment: release
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
     outputs:
       changes_made: ${{ steps.commit.outputs.changes_made }}
     steps:
@@ -130,7 +132,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Install dependencies
         working-directory: src/${{ matrix.package }}
-        run: uv sync --locked --all-extras --dev
+        run: uv sync --frozen --all-extras --dev
 
       - name: Run pyright
         working-directory: src/${{ matrix.package }}

scripts/release.py

@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ class PyPiPackage:
         with open(self.path / "pyproject.toml", "w") as f:
             f.write(tomlkit.dumps(data))
 
+        # Regenerate uv.lock to match the updated pyproject.toml
+        subprocess.run(["uv", "lock"], cwd=self.path, check=True)
+
 
 def has_changes(path: Path, git_hash: GitHash) -> bool:
     """Check if any files changed between current state and git hash"""

src/git/src/mcp_server_git/server.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from mcp.types import (
 )
 from enum import Enum
 import git
+from git.exc import BadName
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
 # Default number of context lines to show in diff output
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ def git_diff(repo: git.Repo, target: str, context_lines: int = DEFAULT_CONTEXT_L
     # Defense in depth: reject targets starting with '-' to prevent flag injection,
     # even if a malicious ref with that name exists (e.g. via filesystem manipulation)
     if target.startswith("-"):
-        raise git.exc.BadName(f"Invalid target: '{target}' - cannot start with '-'")
+        raise BadName(f"Invalid target: '{target}' - cannot start with '-'")
     repo.rev_parse(target)  # Validates target is a real git ref, throws BadName if not
     return repo.git.diff(f"--unified={context_lines}", target)
 
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ def git_checkout(repo: git.Repo, branch_name: str) -> str:
     # Defense in depth: reject branch names starting with '-' to prevent flag injection,
     # even if a malicious ref with that name exists (e.g. via filesystem manipulation)
     if branch_name.startswith("-"):
-        raise git.exc.BadName(f"Invalid branch name: '{branch_name}' - cannot start with '-'")
+        raise BadName(f"Invalid branch name: '{branch_name}' - cannot start with '-'")
     repo.rev_parse(branch_name)  # Validates branch_name is a real git ref, throws BadName if not
     repo.git.checkout(branch_name)
     return f"Switched to branch '{branch_name}'"

src/git/tests/test_server.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import pytest
 from pathlib import Path
 import git
+from git.exc import BadName
 from mcp_server_git.server import (
     git_checkout,
     git_branch,
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ def test_git_checkout_existing_branch(test_repository):
 
 def test_git_checkout_nonexistent_branch(test_repository):
 
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_checkout(test_repository, "nonexistent-branch")
 
 def test_git_branch_local(test_repository):
@@ -316,25 +317,25 @@ def test_validate_repo_path_symlink_escape(tmp_path: Path):
 
 def test_git_diff_rejects_flag_injection(test_repository):
     """git_diff should reject flags that could be used for argument injection."""
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_diff(test_repository, "--output=/tmp/evil")
 
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_diff(test_repository, "--help")
 
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_diff(test_repository, "-p")
 
 
 def test_git_checkout_rejects_flag_injection(test_repository):
     """git_checkout should reject flags that could be used for argument injection."""
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_checkout(test_repository, "--help")
 
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_checkout(test_repository, "--orphan=evil")
 
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_checkout(test_repository, "-f")
 
 
@@ -398,7 +399,7 @@ def test_git_diff_rejects_malicious_refs(test_repository):
     malicious_ref_path.write_text(sha)
 
     # Even though the ref exists, it should be rejected
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_diff(test_repository, "--output=evil.txt")
 
     # Verify no file was created (the attack was blocked)
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ def test_git_checkout_rejects_malicious_refs(test_repository):
     malicious_ref_path.write_text(sha)
 
     # Even though the ref exists, it should be rejected
-    with pytest.raises(git.exc.BadName):
+    with pytest.raises(BadName):
         git_checkout(test_repository, "--orphan=evil")
 
     # Cleanup