github/concrete
1
1
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/zama-ai/concrete.git synced 2026-02-15 07:05:09 -05:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

chore: remove old files

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Quentin Bourgerie
2022-12-19 15:28:12 +01:00
parent c8a23f02f5
commit 8927c9d792
48 changed files with 0 additions and 6480 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

19
estimator_new/__init__.py
View File

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from .nd import NoiseDistribution as ND # noqa
from .io import Logging # noqa
from . import reduction as RC # noqa
from . import simulator as Simulator # noqa
from . import lwe as LWE # noqa
from .schemes import ( # noqa
Kyber512,
Kyber768,
Kyber1024,
LightSaber,
Saber,
FireSaber,
NTRUHPS2048509Enc,
NTRUHPS2048677Enc,
NTRUHPS4096821Enc,
NTRUHRSS701Enc,
)

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/__init__.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/conf.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/cost.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/errors.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/gb.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/io.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe_bkw.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe_dual.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe_guess.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe_parameters.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/lwe_primal.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/nd.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/prob.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/reduction.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/schemes.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/simulator.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

BIN
estimator_new/__pycache__/util.cpython-38.pyc
View File

Binary file not shown.

13
estimator_new/conf.py
View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Default values.
"""
from .reduction import Kyber, ABLR21
from .simulator import GSA
red_cost_model = Kyber
red_cost_model_classical_poly_space = ABLR21
red_shape_model = "gsa"
red_simulator = GSA
mitm_opt = "analytical"

258
estimator_new/cost.py
View File

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from sage.all import round, log, oo
from dataclasses import dataclass
@dataclass
class Cost:
"""
Algorithms costs.
"""
rop: float = oo
tag: str = None
# An entry is "impermanent" if it grows when we run the algorithm again. For example, `δ`
# would not scale with the number of operations but `rop` would. This check is strict such that
# unknown entries raise an error. This is to enforce a decision on whether an entry should be
# scaled.
impermanents = {
"rop": True,
"repetitions": False,
"tag": False,
"problem": False,
}
@classmethod
def register_impermanent(cls, data=None, **kwds):
if data is not None:
for k, v in data.items():
if cls.impermanents.get(k, v) != v:
raise ValueError(f"Attempting to overwrite {k}:{cls.impermanents[k]} with {v}")
cls.impermanents[k] = v
for k, v in kwds.items():
if cls.impermanents.get(k, v) != v:
raise ValueError(f"Attempting to overwrite {k}:{cls.impermanents[k]} with {v}")
cls.impermanents[k] = v
key_map = {
"delta": "δ",
"beta": "β",
"eta": "η",
"epsilon": "ε",
"zeta": "ζ",
"ell": "ℓ",
"repetitions": "↻",
}
val_map = {"beta": "%8d", "d": "%8d", "delta": "%8.6f"}
def __init__(self, **kwds):
for k, v in kwds.items():
setattr(self, k, v)
def str(self, keyword_width=None, newline=None, round_bound=2048, compact=False): # noqa C901
"""
:param keyword_width: keys are printed with this width
:param newline: insert a newline
:param round_bound: values beyond this bound are represented as powers of two
:param compact: do not add extra whitespace to align entries
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> s = Cost(delta=5, bar=2)
>>> s
δ: 5.000000, bar: 2
"""
def wfmtf(k):
if keyword_width:
fmt = "%%%ss" % keyword_width
else:
fmt = "%s"
return fmt % k
d = self.__dict__
s = []
for k, v in d.items():
if k == "problem": # we store the problem instance in a cost object for reference
continue
kk = wfmtf(self.key_map.get(k, k))
try:
if (1 / round_bound < abs(v) < round_bound) or (not v) or (k in self.val_map):
if abs(v % 1) < 0.0000001:
vv = self.val_map.get(k, "%8d") % round(v)
else:
vv = self.val_map.get(k, "%8.3f") % v
else:
vv = "%7s" % ("≈2^%.1f" % log(v, 2))
except TypeError: # strings and such
vv = "%8s" % v
if compact:
kk = kk.strip()
vv = vv.strip()
s.append(f"{kk}: {vv}")
if not newline:
return ", ".join(s)
else:
return "\n".join(s)
def reorder(self, *args):
"""
Return a new ordered dict from the key:value pairs in dictinonary but reordered such that the
keys given to this function come first.
:param args: keys which should come first (in order)
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> d = Cost(a=1,b=2,c=3); d
a: 1, b: 2, c: 3
>>> d.reorder("b","c","a")
b: 2, c: 3, a: 1
"""
keys = list(self.__dict__.keys())
for key in args:
keys.pop(keys.index(key))
keys = list(args) + keys
r = dict()
for key in keys:
r[key] = self.__dict__[key]
return Cost(**r)
def filter(self, **keys):
"""
Return new ordered dictinonary from dictionary restricted to the keys.
:param dictionary: input dictionary
:param keys: keys which should be copied (ordered)
"""
r = dict()
for key in keys:
r[key] = self.__dict__[key]
return Cost(**r)
def repeat(self, times, select=None):
"""
Return a report with all costs multiplied by ``times``.
:param times: the number of times it should be run
:param select: toggle which fields ought to be repeated and which should not
:returns: a new cost estimate
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> c0 = Cost(a=1, b=2)
>>> c0.register_impermanent(a=True, b=False)
>>> c0.repeat(1000)
a: 1000, b: 2, ↻: 1000
TESTS::
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> Cost(rop=1).repeat(1000).repeat(1000)
rop: ≈2^19.9, ↻: ≈2^19.9
"""
impermanents = dict(self.impermanents)
if select is not None:
for key in select:
impermanents[key] = select[key]
ret = dict()
for key in self.__dict__:
try:
if impermanents[key]:
ret[key] = times * self.__dict__[key]
else:
ret[key] = self.__dict__[key]
except KeyError:
raise NotImplementedError(
f"You found a bug, this function does not know about '{key}' but should."
)
ret["repetitions"] = times * ret.get("repetitions", 1)
return Cost(**ret)
def __rmul__(self, times):
return self.repeat(times)
def combine(self, right, base=None):
"""Combine ``left`` and ``right``.
:param left: cost dictionary
:param right: cost dictionary
:param base: add entries to ``base``
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> c0 = Cost(a=1)
>>> c1 = Cost(b=2)
>>> c2 = Cost(c=3)
>>> c0.combine(c1)
a: 1, b: 2
>>> c0.combine(c1, base=c2)
c: 3, a: 1, b: 2
"""
if base is None:
cost = dict()
else:
cost = base.__dict__
for key in self.__dict__:
cost[key] = self.__dict__[key]
for key in right:
cost[key] = right.__dict__[key]
return Cost(**cost)
def __bool__(self):
return self.__dict__.get("rop", oo) < oo
def __add__(self, other):
return self.combine(self, other)
def __getitem__(self, key):
return self.__dict__[key]
def __delitem__(self, key):
del self.__dict__[key]
def get(self, key, default):
return self.__dict__.get(key, default)
def __setitem__(self, key, value):
self.__dict__[key] = value
def __iter__(self):
return iter(self.__dict__)
def values(self):
return self.__dict__.values()
def __repr__(self):
return self.str(compact=True)
def __str__(self):
return self.str(newline=True, keyword_width=12)
def __lt__(self, other):
try:
return self["rop"] < other["rop"]
except AttributeError:
return self["rop"] < other
def __le__(self, other):
try:
return self["rop"] <= other["rop"]
except AttributeError:
return self["rop"] <= other

15
estimator_new/errors.py
View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
class OutOfBoundsError(ValueError):
"""
Used to indicate a wrong value, for example δ < 1.
"""
pass
class InsufficientSamplesError(ValueError):
"""
Used to indicate the number of samples given is too small.
"""
pass

252
estimator_new/gb.py
View File

@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE using Gröbner bases.
See :ref:`Arora-GB` for an overview.
"""
from sage.all import (
PowerSeriesRing,
QQ,
RR,
oo,
binomial,
sqrt,
ceil,
floor,
exp,
log,
pi,
RealField,
)
from .cost import Cost
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
from .io import Logging
def gb_cost(n, D, omega=2, prec=None):
"""
Estimate the complexity of computing a Gröbner basis.
:param n: Number of variables n > 0.
:param D: Tuple of `(d,m)` pairs where `m` is number polynomials and `d` is a degree.
:param omega: Linear algebra exponent, i.e. matrix-multiplication costs `O(n^ω)` operations.
:param prec: Compute power series up to this precision (default: `2n`).
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.gb import gb_cost
>>> gb_cost(128, [(2, 256)])
rop: ≈2^144.6, dreg: 17, mem: ≈2^144.6
"""
prec = 2 * n if prec is None else prec
R = PowerSeriesRing(QQ, "z", prec)
z = R.gen()
z = z.add_bigoh(prec)
s = R(1)
s = s.add_bigoh(prec)
for d, m in D:
s *= (1 - z ** d) ** m
s /= (1 - z) ** n
retval = Cost(rop=oo, dreg=oo)
retval.register_impermanent({"rop": True, "dreg": False, "mem": False})
for dreg in range(prec):
if s[dreg] < 0:
break
else:
return retval
retval["dreg"] = dreg
retval["rop"] = binomial(n + dreg, dreg) ** omega
retval["mem"] = binomial(n + dreg, dreg) ** 2
return retval
class AroraGB:
@staticmethod
def ps_single(C):
"""
Probability that a Gaussian is within `C` standard deviations.
"""
RR = RealField(256)
C = RR(C)
return RR(1 - (RR(2) / (C * RR(sqrt(2 * pi))) * exp(-(C ** 2) / RR(2)))) # noqa
@classmethod
def cost_bounded(cls, params, success_probability=0.99, omega=2, log_level=1, **kwds):
"""
Estimate cost using absolute bounds for secrets and noise.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param success_probability: target success probability
:param omega: linear algebra constant.
"""
d = params.Xe.bounds[1] - params.Xe.bounds[0] + 1
dn = cls.equations_for_secret(params)
cost = gb_cost(params.n, [(d, params.m)] + dn)
cost["t"] = (d - 1) // 2
if cost["dreg"] < oo and binomial(params.n + cost["dreg"], cost["dreg"]) < params.m:
cost["m"] = binomial(params.n + cost["dreg"], cost["dreg"])
else:
cost["m"] = params.m
cost.register_impermanent(t=False, m=True)
return cost
@classmethod
def cost_Gaussian_like(cls, params, success_probability=0.99, omega=2, log_level=1, **kwds):
"""
Estimate cost using absolute bounds for secrets and Gaussian tail bounds for noise.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param success_probability: target success probability
:param omega: linear algebra constant.
"""
dn = cls.equations_for_secret(params)
best, stuck = None, 0
for t in range(ceil(params.Xe.stddev), params.n):
d = 2 * t + 1
C = RR(t / params.Xe.stddev)
assert C >= 1 # if C is too small, we ignore it
# Pr[success]^m = Pr[overall success]
single_prob = AroraGB.ps_single(C)
m_req = log(success_probability, 2) / log(single_prob, 2)
m_req = floor(m_req)
if m_req > params.m:
break
current = gb_cost(params.n, [(d, m_req)] + dn, omega)
if current["dreg"] == oo:
continue
current["t"] = t
current["m"] = m_req
current.register_impermanent(t=False, m=True)
current = current.reorder("rop", "m", "dreg", "t")
Logging.log("repeat", log_level + 1, f"{repr(current)}")
if best is None:
best = current
else:
if best > current:
best = current
stuck = 0
else:
stuck += 1
if stuck >= 5:
break
if best is None:
best = Cost(rop=oo, dreg=oo)
return best
@classmethod
def equations_for_secret(cls, params):
"""
Return ``(d,n)`` tuple to encode that `n` equations of degree `d` are available from the LWE secret.
:param params: LWE parameters.
"""
if params.Xs <= params.Xe:
a, b = params.Xs.bounds
if b - a < oo:
d = b - a + 1
elif params.Xs.is_Gaussian_like:
d = 2 * ceil(3 * params.Xs.stddev) + 1
else:
raise NotImplementedError(f"Do not know how to handle {params.Xs}.")
dn = [(d, params.n)]
else:
dn = []
return dn
def __call__(
self, params: LWEParameters, success_probability=0.99, omega=2, log_level=1, **kwds
):
"""
Arora-GB as described in [ICALP:AroGe11]_, [EPRINT:ACFP14]_.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param success_probability: targeted success probability < 1.
:param omega: linear algebra constant.
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``m``: Number of samples consumed.
- ``dreg``: The degree of regularity or "solving degree".
- ``t``: Polynomials of degree 2t + 1 are considered.
- ``mem``: Total memory usage.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=64, q=7681, Xs=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0), m=2**50)
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params)
rop: ≈2^307.1, m: ≈2^46.8, dreg: 99, t: 25, mem: ≈2^307.1, tag: arora-gb
TESTS::
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params.updated(m=2**120))
rop: ≈2^282.6, m: ≈2^101.1, dreg: 83, t: 36, mem: ≈2^282.6, tag: arora-gb
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params.updated(Xe=ND.UniformMod(7)))
rop: ≈2^60.6, dreg: 7, mem: ≈2^60.6, t: 3, m: ≈2^30.3, tag: arora-gb
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params.updated(Xe=ND.CenteredBinomial(8)))
rop: ≈2^122.3, dreg: 19, mem: ≈2^122.3, t: 8, m: ≈2^50.0, tag: arora-gb
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params.updated(Xs=ND.UniformMod(5), Xe=ND.CenteredBinomial(4), m=1024))
rop: ≈2^227.2, dreg: 54, mem: ≈2^227.2, t: 4, m: 1024, tag: arora-gb
>>> LWE.arora_gb(params.updated(Xs=ND.UniformMod(3), Xe=ND.CenteredBinomial(4), m=1024))
rop: ≈2^189.9, dreg: 39, mem: ≈2^189.9, t: 4, m: 1024, tag: arora-gb
.. [EPRINT:ACFP14] Martin R. Albrecht, Carlos Cid, Jean-Charles Faugère & Ludovic Perret. (2014).
Algebraic algorithms for LWE. https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/1018
.. [ICALP:AroGe11] Sanjeev Aror & Rong Ge. (2011). New algorithms for learning in presence of
errors. In L. Aceto, M. Henzinger, & J. Sgall, ICALP 2011, Part I (pp. 403–415).:
Springer, Heidelberg.
"""
params = params.normalize()
best = Cost(rop=oo, dreg=oo)
if params.Xe.is_bounded:
cost = self.cost_bounded(
params,
success_probability=success_probability,
omega=omega,
log_level=log_level,
)
Logging.log("gb", log_level, f"b: {repr(cost)}")
best = min(best, cost, key=lambda x: x["dreg"])
if params.Xe.is_Gaussian_like:
cost = self.cost_Gaussian_like(
params,
success_probability=success_probability,
omega=omega,
log_level=log_level,
)
Logging.log("gb", log_level, f"G: {repr(cost)}")
best = min(best, cost, key=lambda x: x["dreg"])
best["tag"] = "arora-gb"
best["problem"] = params
return best
__name__ = "arora_gb"
arora_gb = AroraGB()

57
estimator_new/io.py
View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import logging
class Logging:
"""
Control level of detail being printed.
"""
plain_logger = logging.StreamHandler()
plain_logger.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(message)s"))
detail_logger = logging.StreamHandler()
detail_logger.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("[%(name)8s] %(message)s"))
logging.getLogger("estimator").handlers = [plain_logger]
logging.getLogger("estimator").setLevel(logging.INFO)
loggers = ("batch", "bdd", "usvp", "bkw", "gb", "repeat", "guess", "bins", "dual")
CRITICAL = logging.CRITICAL
ERROR = logging.ERROR
WARNING = logging.WARNING
INFO = logging.INFO
LEVEL0 = logging.INFO
LEVEL1 = logging.INFO - 2
LEVEL2 = logging.INFO - 4
LEVEL3 = logging.INFO - 6
LEVEL4 = logging.INFO - 8
LEVEL5 = logging.DEBUG
DEBUG = logging.DEBUG
NOTSET = logging.NOTSET
for logger in loggers:
logging.getLogger(logger).handlers = [detail_logger]
logging.getLogger(logger).setLevel(logging.INFO)
@staticmethod
def set_level(lvl, loggers=None):
"""Set logging level
:param lvl: one of `CRITICAL`, `ERROR`, `WARNING`, `INFO`, `LEVELX`, `DEBUG`, `NOTSET` with `X` ∈ [0,5]
:param loggers: one of `Logging.loggers`, if `None` all loggers are used.
"""
if loggers is None:
loggers = Logging.loggers
for logger in loggers:
logging.getLogger(logger).setLevel(lvl)
@classmethod
def log(cls, logger, level, msg, *args, **kwds):
level = int(level)
return logging.getLogger(logger).log(
cls.INFO - 2 * level, f"{{{level}}} " + msg, *args, **kwds
)

169
estimator_new/lwe.py
View File

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
High-level LWE interface
"""
from .lwe_primal import primal_usvp, primal_bdd, primal_hybrid
from .lwe_bkw import coded_bkw
from .lwe_guess import exhaustive_search, mitm, distinguish # noqa
from .lwe_dual import dual, dual_hybrid
from .lwe_guess import guess_composition
from .gb import arora_gb # noqa
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters as Parameters # noqa
class Estimate:
@classmethod
def rough(cls, params, jobs=1):
"""
This function makes the following somewhat routine assumptions:
- The GSA holds.
- The Core-SVP model holds.
This function furthermore assumes the following heuristics:
- The primal hybrid attack only applies to sparse secrets.
- The dual hybrid MITM attack only applies to sparse secrets.
- Arora-GB only applies to bounded noise with at least `n^2` samples.
- BKW is not competitive.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param jobs: Use multiple threads in parallel.
EXAMPLE ::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> _ = lwe.estimate.rough(Kyber512)
usvp :: rop: ≈2^118.6, red: ≈2^118.6, δ: 1.003941, β: 406, d: 998, tag: usvp
dual_hybrid :: rop: ≈2^127.2, mem: ≈2^123.3, m: 512, red: ≈2^127.0, δ: 1.003756, β: 435, ...
"""
# NOTE: Don't import these at the top-level to avoid circular imports
from functools import partial
from .reduction import ADPS16
from .util import batch_estimate, f_name
algorithms = {}
algorithms["usvp"] = partial(primal_usvp, red_cost_model=ADPS16, red_shape_model="gsa")
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
algorithms["hybrid"] = partial(
primal_hybrid, red_cost_model=ADPS16, red_shape_model="gsa"
)
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
algorithms["dual_mitm_hybrid"] = partial(
dual_hybrid, red_cost_model=ADPS16, mitm_optimization=True
)
else:
algorithms["dual_hybrid"] = partial(
dual_hybrid, red_cost_model=ADPS16, mitm_optimization=False
)
if params.m > params.n ** 2 and params.Xe.is_bounded:
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
algorithms["arora-gb"] = guess_composition(arora_gb.cost_bounded)
else:
algorithms["arora-gb"] = arora_gb.cost_bounded
res = batch_estimate(params, algorithms.values(), log_level=1, jobs=jobs)
res = res[params]
for algorithm in algorithms:
for k, v in res.items():
if f_name(algorithms[algorithm]) == k:
print(f"{algorithm:20s} :: {repr(v)}")
return res
def __call__(
self,
params,
red_cost_model=None,
red_shape_model=None,
deny_list=("arora-gb",),
add_list=tuple(),
jobs=1,
):
"""
Run all estimates.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction.
:param red_shape_model: How to model the shape of a reduced basis (applies to primal attacks)
:param deny_list: skip these algorithms
:param add_list: add these ``(name, function)`` pairs to the list of algorithms to estimate.a
:param jobs: Use multiple threads in parallel.
EXAMPLE ::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> _ = lwe.estimate(Kyber512)
bkw :: rop: ≈2^178.8, m: ≈2^166.8, mem: ≈2^167.8, b: 14, t1: 0, t2: 16, ℓ: 13, #cod: 448...
usvp :: rop: ≈2^148.0, red: ≈2^148.0, δ: 1.003941, β: 406, d: 998, tag: usvp
bdd :: rop: ≈2^144.5, red: ≈2^143.8, svp: ≈2^143.0, β: 391, η: 421, d: 1013, tag: bdd
dual :: rop: ≈2^169.9, mem: ≈2^130.0, m: 512, red: ≈2^169.7, δ: 1.003484, β: 484, d: 1024...
dual_hybrid :: rop: ≈2^166.8, mem: ≈2^161.9, m: 512, red: ≈2^166.6, δ: 1.003541, β: 473, d: 1011...
"""
from sage.all import oo
from functools import partial
from .conf import red_cost_model as red_cost_model_default
from .conf import red_shape_model as red_shape_model_default
from .util import batch_estimate, f_name
if red_cost_model is None:
red_cost_model = red_cost_model_default
if red_shape_model is None:
red_shape_model = red_shape_model_default
algorithms = {}
algorithms["arora-gb"] = guess_composition(arora_gb)
algorithms["bkw"] = coded_bkw
algorithms["usvp"] = partial(
primal_usvp, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, red_shape_model=red_shape_model
)
algorithms["bdd"] = partial(
primal_bdd, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, red_shape_model=red_shape_model
)
algorithms["hybrid"] = partial(
primal_hybrid, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, red_shape_model=red_shape_model
)
algorithms["dual"] = partial(dual, red_cost_model=red_cost_model)
algorithms["dual_hybrid"] = partial(
dual_hybrid, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, mitm_optimization=False
)
algorithms["dual_mitm_hybrid"] = partial(
dual_hybrid, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, mitm_optimization=True
)
for k in deny_list:
del algorithms[k]
for k, v in add_list:
algorithms[k] = v
res_raw = batch_estimate(params, algorithms.values(), log_level=1, jobs=jobs)
res_raw = res_raw[params]
res = {}
for algorithm in algorithms:
for k, v in res_raw.items():
if f_name(algorithms[algorithm]) == k:
res[algorithm] = v
for algorithm in algorithms:
for k, v in res.items():
if algorithm == k:
if v["rop"] == oo:
continue
if k == "hybrid" and res["bdd"]["rop"] < v["rop"]:
continue
if k == "dual_mitm_hybrid" and res["dual_hybrid"]["rop"] < v["rop"]:
continue
print(f"{algorithm:20s} :: {repr(v)}")
return res
estimate = Estimate()

304
estimator_new/lwe_bkw.py
View File

@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
See :ref:`Coded-BKW for LWE` for what is available.
"""
from sage.all import ceil, log, floor, sqrt, var, find_root, erf, oo
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
from .util import local_minimum
from .cost import Cost
from .errors import InsufficientSamplesError
from .prob import amplify_sigma
from .nd import sigmaf
from .io import Logging
cfft = 1 # convolutions mod q
class CodedBKW:
@staticmethod
def N(i, sigma_set, b, q):
"""
Return `N_i` for the `i`-th `[N_i, b]` linear code.
:param i: index
:param sigma_set: target noise level
"""
return floor(b / (1 - log(12 * sigma_set ** 2 / 2 ** i, q) / 2))
@staticmethod
def ntest(n, ell, t1, t2, b, q): # noqa
"""
If the parameter ``ntest`` is not provided, we use this function to estimate it.
:param n: LWE dimension > 0.
:param ell: Table size for hypothesis testing.
:param t1: Number of normal BKW steps.
:param t2: Number of coded BKW steps.
:param b: Table size for BKW steps.
"""
# there is no hypothesis testing because we have enough normal BKW
# tables to cover all of of n
if t1 * b >= n:
return 0
# solve for nest by aiming for ntop == 0
ntest = var("ntest")
sigma_set = sqrt(q ** (2 * (1 - ell / ntest)) / 12)
ncod = sum([CodedBKW.N(i, sigma_set, b, q) for i in range(1, t2 + 1)])
ntop = n - ncod - ntest - t1 * b
try:
start = max(int(round(find_root(ntop, 2, n - t1 * b + 1, rtol=0.1))) - 1, 2)
except RuntimeError:
start = 2
ntest_min = 1
for ntest in range(start, n - t1 * b + 1):
if abs(ntop(ntest=ntest).n()) < abs(ntop(ntest=ntest_min).n()):
ntest_min = ntest
else:
break
return int(ntest_min)
def t1(params: LWEParameters, ell, t2, b, ntest=None):
"""
We compute t1 from N_i by observing that any N_i ≤ b gives no advantage over vanilla
BKW, but the estimates for coded BKW always assume quantisation noise, which is too
pessimistic for N_i ≤ b.
"""
t1 = 0
if ntest is None:
ntest = CodedBKW.ntest(params.n, ell, t1, t2, b, params.q)
sigma_set = sqrt(params.q ** (2 * (1 - ell / ntest)) / 12)
Ni = [CodedBKW.N(i, sigma_set, b, params.q) for i in range(1, t2 + 1)]
t1 = len([e for e in Ni if e <= b])
# there is no point in having more tables than needed to cover n
if b * t1 > params.n:
t1 = params.n // b
return t1
@staticmethod
def cost(
t2: int,
b: int,
ntest: int,
params: LWEParameters,
success_probability=0.99,
log_level=1,
):
"""
Coded-BKW cost.
:param t2: Number of coded BKW steps (≥ 0).
:param b: Table size (≥ 1).
:param success_probability: Targeted success probability < 1.
:param ntest: Number of coordinates to hypothesis test.
"""
cost = Cost()
# Our cost is mainly determined by q^b, on the other hand there are expressions in q^(ℓ+1)
# below, hence, we set ℓ = b - 1. This allows to achieve the performance reported in
# [C:GuoJohSta15].
cost["b"] = b
ell = b - 1 # noqa
cost["ell"] = ell
secret_bounds = params.Xs.bounds
if params.Xs.is_Gaussian_like and params.Xs.mean == 0:
secret_bounds = (
max(secret_bounds[0], -3 * params.Xs.stddev),
min(secret_bounds[1], 3 * params.Xs.stddev),
)
# base of the table size.
zeta = secret_bounds[1] - secret_bounds[0] + 1
t1 = CodedBKW.t1(params, ell, t2, b, ntest)
t2 -= t1
cost["t1"] = t1
cost["t2"] = t2
cost.register_impermanent(t1=False, t2=False)
# compute ntest with the t1 just computed
if ntest is None:
ntest = CodedBKW.ntest(params.n, ell, t1, t2, b, params.q)
# if there's no ntest then there's no `σ_{set}` and hence no ncod
if ntest:
sigma_set = sqrt(params.q ** (2 * (1 - ell / ntest)) / 12)
ncod = sum([CodedBKW.N(i, sigma_set, b, params.q) for i in range(1, t2 + 1)])
else:
ncod = 0
ntot = ncod + ntest
ntop = max(params.n - ncod - ntest - t1 * b, 0)
cost["#cod"] = ncod # coding step
cost["#top"] = ntop # guessing step, typically zero
cost["#test"] = ntest # hypothesis testing
cost.register_impermanent({"#cod": False, "#top": False, "#test": False})
# Theorem 1: quantization noise + addition noise
coding_variance = params.Xs.stddev ** 2 * sigma_set ** 2 * ntot
sigma_final = float(sqrt(2 ** (t1 + t2) * params.Xe.stddev ** 2 + coding_variance))
M = amplify_sigma(success_probability, sigmaf(sigma_final), params.q)
if M is oo:
cost["rop"] = oo
cost["m"] = oo
return cost
m = (t1 + t2) * (params.q ** b - 1) / 2 + M
cost["m"] = float(m)
cost.register_impermanent(m=True)
if not params.Xs <= params.Xe:
# Equation (7)
n = params.n - t1 * b
C0 = (m - n) * (params.n + 1) * ceil(n / (b - 1))
assert C0 >= 0
else:
C0 = 0
# Equation (8)
C1 = sum(
[(params.n + 1 - i * b) * (m - i * (params.q ** b - 1) / 2) for i in range(1, t1 + 1)]
)
assert C1 >= 0
# Equation (9)
C2_ = sum(
[
4 * (M + i * (params.q ** b - 1) / 2) * CodedBKW.N(i, sigma_set, b, params.q)
for i in range(1, t2 + 1)
]
)
C2 = float(C2_)
for i in range(1, t2 + 1):
C2 += float(
ntop + ntest + sum([CodedBKW.N(j, sigma_set, b, params.q) for j in range(1, i + 1)])
) * (M + (i - 1) * (params.q ** b - 1) / 2)
assert C2 >= 0
# Equation (10)
C3 = M * ntop * (2 * zeta + 1) ** ntop
assert C3 >= 0
# Equation (11)
C4_ = 4 * M * ntest
C4 = C4_ + (2 * zeta + 1) ** ntop * (
cfft * params.q ** (ell + 1) * (ell + 1) * log(params.q, 2) + params.q ** (ell + 1)
)
assert C4 >= 0
C = (C0 + C1 + C2 + C3 + C4) / (
erf(zeta / sqrt(2 * params.Xe.stddev)) ** ntop
) # TODO don't ignore success probability
cost["rop"] = float(C)
cost["mem"] = (t1 + t2) * params.q ** b
cost = cost.reorder("rop", "m", "mem", "b", "t1", "t2")
cost["tag"] = "coded-bkw"
cost["problem"] = params
Logging.log("bkw", log_level + 1, f"{repr(cost)}")
return cost
@classmethod
def b(
cls,
params: LWEParameters,
ntest=None,
log_level=1,
):
def sf(x, best):
return (x["rop"] <= best["rop"]) and (best["m"] > params.m or x["m"] <= params.m)
# the outer search is over b, which determines the size of the tables: q^b
b_max = 3 * ceil(log(params.q, 2))
with local_minimum(2, b_max, smallerf=sf) as it_b:
for b in it_b:
# the inner search is over t2, the number of coded steps
t2_max = min(params.n // b, ceil(3 * log(params.q, 2)))
with local_minimum(2, t2_max, smallerf=sf) as it_t2:
for t2 in it_t2:
y = cls.cost(b=b, t2=t2, ntest=ntest, params=params)
it_t2.update(y)
it_b.update(it_t2.y)
best = it_b.y
# the search cannot fail. It just outputs some X with X["oracle"]>m.
if best["m"] > params.m:
raise InsufficientSamplesError(
f"Got m≈2^{float(log(params.m, 2.0)):.1f} samples, but require ≈2^{float(log(best['m'],2.0)):.1f}.",
best["m"],
)
return best
def __call__(
self,
params: LWEParameters,
ntest=None,
log_level=1,
):
"""
Coded-BKW as described in [C:GuoJohSta15]_.
:param params: LWE parameters
:param ntest: Number of coordinates to hypothesis test.
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``b``: BKW tables have size `q^b`.
- ``t1``: Number of plain BKW tables.
- ``t2``: Number of Coded-BKW tables.
- ``ℓ``: Hypothesis testing has tables of size `q^{ℓ+1}`
- ``#cod``: Number of coding steps.
- ``#top``: Number of guessing steps (typically zero)
- ``#test``: Number of coordinates to do hypothesis testing on.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from sage.all import oo
>>> from estimator import *
>>> LWE.coded_bkw(LightSaber.updated(m=oo))
rop: ≈2^171.7, m: ≈2^159.4, mem: ≈2^160.4, b: 12, t1: 3, t2: 18, ℓ: 11, #cod: 423, #top: 1...
We may need to amplify the number of samples, which modifies the noise distribution::
>>> from sage.all import oo
>>> from estimator import *
>>> LightSaber
LWEParameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=D(σ=1.58), Xe=D(σ=2.00), m=512, tag='LightSaber')
>>> cost = LWE.coded_bkw(LightSaber); cost
rop: ≈2^184.3, m: ≈2^172.2, mem: ≈2^173.2, b: 13, t1: 0, t2: 18, ℓ: 12, #cod: 456, #top: 0...
>>> cost["problem"]
LWEParameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=D(σ=1.58), Xe=D(σ=10.39), m=..., tag='LightSaber')
.. note :: See also [C:KirFou15]_.
"""
params = LWEParameters.normalize(params)
try:
cost = self.b(params, ntest=ntest, log_level=log_level)
except InsufficientSamplesError as e:
m = e.args[1]
while True:
params_ = params.amplify_m(m)
try:
cost = self.b(params_, ntest=ntest, log_level=log_level)
break
except InsufficientSamplesError as e:
m = e.args[1]
return cost
coded_bkw = CodedBKW()

526
estimator_new/lwe_dual.py
View File

@@ -1,526 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE using dial attacks.
See :ref:`LWE Dual Attacks` for an introduction what is available.
"""
from functools import partial
from dataclasses import replace
from sage.all import oo, ceil, sqrt, log, cached_function, exp
from .reduction import delta as deltaf
from .reduction import cost as costf
from .reduction import ADPS16, BDGL16
from .reduction import LLL
from .util import local_minimum
from .cost import Cost
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
from .prob import drop as prob_drop
from .prob import amplify as prob_amplify
from .io import Logging
from .conf import red_cost_model as red_cost_model_default
from .conf import mitm_opt as mitm_opt_default
from .errors import OutOfBoundsError
from .nd import NoiseDistribution
from .lwe_guess import exhaustive_search, mitm, distinguish
class DualHybrid:
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE using dual attacks.
"""
full_sieves = [ADPS16.__name__, BDGL16.__name__]
@staticmethod
@cached_function
def dual_reduce(
delta: float,
params: LWEParameters,
zeta: int = 0,
h1: int = 0,
rho: float = 1.0,
log_level=None,
):
"""
Produce new LWE sample using a dual vector on first `n-ζ` coordinates of the secret. The
length of the dual vector is given by `δ` in root Hermite form and using a possible
scaling factor, i.e. `|v| = ρ ⋅ δ^d * q^((n-ζ)/d)`.
:param delta: Length of the vector in root Hermite form
:param params: LWE parameters
:param zeta: Dimension ζ ≥ 0 of new LWE instance
:param h1: Number of non-zero components of the secret of the new LWE instance
:param rho: Factor introduced by obtaining multiple dual vectors
:returns: new ``LWEParameters`` and ``m``
.. note :: This function assumes that the instance is normalized.
"""
if not 0 <= zeta <= params.n:
raise OutOfBoundsError(
f"Splitting dimension {zeta} must be between 0 and n={params.n}."
)
# Compute new secret distribution
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
h = params.Xs.get_hamming_weight(params.n)
if not 0 <= h1 <= h:
raise OutOfBoundsError(f"Splitting weight {h1} must be between 0 and h={h}.")
# assuming the non-zero entries are uniform
p = h1 / 2
red_Xs = NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(params.n - zeta, h / 2 - p)
slv_Xs = NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(zeta, p)
if h1 == h:
# no reason to do lattice reduction if we assume
# that the hw on the reduction part is 0
return replace(params, Xs=slv_Xs, m=oo), 1
else:
# distribution is i.i.d. for each coordinate
red_Xs = replace(params.Xs, n=params.n - zeta)
slv_Xs = replace(params.Xs, n=zeta)
c = red_Xs.stddev * params.q / params.Xe.stddev
# see if we have optimally many samples (as in [INDOCRYPT:EspJouKha20]) available
m_ = max(1, ceil(sqrt(red_Xs.n * log(c) / log(delta))) - red_Xs.n)
m_ = min(params.m, m_)
# Compute new noise as in [INDOCRYPT:EspJouKha20]
sigma_ = rho * red_Xs.stddev * delta ** (m_ + red_Xs.n) / c ** (m_ / (m_ + red_Xs.n))
slv_Xe = NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(params.q * sigma_)
slv_params = LWEParameters(
n=zeta,
q=params.q,
Xs=slv_Xs,
Xe=slv_Xe,
)
# The m_ we compute there is the optimal number of samples that we pick from the input LWE
# instance. We then need to return it because it determines the lattice dimension for the
# reduction.
return slv_params, m_
@staticmethod
@cached_function
def cost(
solver,
params: LWEParameters,
beta: int,
zeta: int = 0,
h1: int = 0,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
log_level=None,
):
"""
Computes the cost of the dual hybrid attack that dual reduces the LWE instance and then
uses the given solver to solve the reduced instance.
:param solver: Algorithm for solving the reduced instance
:param params: LWE parameters
:param beta: Block size used to produce short dual vectors for dual reduction
:param zeta: Dimension ζ ≥ 0 of new LWE instance
:param h1: Number of non-zero components of the secret of the new LWE instance
:param success_probability: The success probability to target
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction
:param use_lll: Use LLL calls to produce more small vectors
.. note :: This function assumes that the instance is normalized. It runs no optimization,
it merely reports costs.
"""
Logging.log("dual", log_level, f"β={beta}, ζ={zeta}, h1={h1}")
delta = deltaf(beta)
if red_cost_model.__name__ in DualHybrid.full_sieves:
rho = 4.0 / 3
elif use_lll:
rho = 2.0
else:
rho = 1.0
params_slv, m_ = DualHybrid.dual_reduce(
delta, params, zeta, h1, rho, log_level=log_level + 1
)
Logging.log("dual", log_level + 1, f"red LWE instance: {repr(params_slv)}")
cost_slv = solver(params_slv, success_probability)
Logging.log("dual", log_level + 2, f"solve: {repr(cost_slv)}")
d = m_ + params.n - zeta
cost_red = costf(red_cost_model, beta, d)
if red_cost_model.__name__ in DualHybrid.full_sieves:
# if we use full sieving, we get many short vectors
# we compute in logs to avoid overflows in case m
# or beta happen to be large
try:
log_rep = max(0, log(cost_slv["m"]) - (beta / 2) * log(4 / 3))
if log_rep > 10 ** 10:
# sage's ceil function seems to completely freak out for large
# inputs, but then m is huge, so unlikely to be relevant
raise OverflowError()
cost_red = cost_red.repeat(ceil(exp(log_rep)))
except OverflowError:
# if we get an overflow, m must be huge
# so we can probably approximate the cost with
# oo for our purposes
return Cost(rop=oo)
elif use_lll:
cost_red["rop"] += cost_slv["m"] * LLL(d, log(params.q, 2))
cost_red["repetitions"] = cost_slv["m"]
else:
cost_red = cost_red.repeat(cost_slv["m"])
Logging.log("dual", log_level + 2, f"red: {repr(cost_red)}")
total_cost = cost_slv.combine(cost_red)
total_cost["m"] = m_
total_cost["rop"] = cost_red["rop"] + cost_slv["rop"]
total_cost["mem"] = cost_slv["mem"]
if d < params.n - zeta:
raise RuntimeError(f"{d} < {params.n - zeta}, {params.n}, {zeta}, {m_}")
total_cost["d"] = d
Logging.log("dual", log_level, f"{repr(total_cost)}")
rep = 1
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
h = params.Xs.get_hamming_weight(params.n)
probability = prob_drop(params.n, h, zeta, h1)
rep = prob_amplify(success_probability, probability)
# don't need more samples to re-run attack, since we may
# just guess different components of the secret
return total_cost.repeat(times=rep, select={"m": False})
@staticmethod
def optimize_blocksize(
solver,
params: LWEParameters,
zeta: int = 0,
h1: int = 0,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
log_level=5,
opt_step=2,
):
"""
Optimizes the cost of the dual hybrid attack over the block size β.
:param solver: Algorithm for solving the reduced instance
:param params: LWE parameters
:param zeta: Dimension ζ ≥ 0 of new LWE instance
:param h1: Number of non-zero components of the secret of the new LWE instance
:param success_probability: The success probability to target
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction
:param use_lll: Use LLL calls to produce more small vectors
:param opt_step: control robustness of optimizer
.. note :: This function assumes that the instance is normalized. ζ and h1 are fixed.
"""
f = partial(
DualHybrid.cost,
solver=solver,
params=params,
zeta=zeta,
h1=h1,
success_probability=success_probability,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
use_lll=use_lll,
log_level=log_level,
)
# don't have a reliable upper bound for beta
# we choose n - k arbitrarily and adjust later if
# necessary
beta_upper = max(params.n - zeta, 40)
beta = beta_upper
while beta == beta_upper:
beta_upper *= 2
with local_minimum(2, beta_upper, opt_step) as it:
for beta in it:
it.update(f(beta=beta))
for beta in it.neighborhood:
it.update(f(beta=beta))
cost = it.y
beta = cost["beta"]
cost["zeta"] = zeta
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
cost["h1"] = h1
return cost
def __call__(
self,
solver,
params: LWEParameters,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
opt_step=2,
log_level=1,
):
"""
Optimizes the cost of the dual hybrid attack (using the given solver) over
all attack parameters: block size β, splitting dimension ζ, and
splitting weight h1 (in case the secret distribution is sparse). Since
the cost function for the dual hybrid might only be convex in an approximate
sense, the parameter ``opt_step`` allows to make the optimization procedure more
robust against local irregularities (higher value) at the cost of a longer
running time. In a nutshell, if the cost of the dual hybrid seems suspiciosly
high, try a larger ``opt_step`` (e.g. 4 or 8).
:param solver: Algorithm for solving the reduced instance
:param params: LWE parameters
:param success_probability: The success probability to target
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction
:param use_lll: use LLL calls to produce more small vectors
:param opt_step: control robustness of optimizer
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: Total amount of memory used by solver (in elements mod q).
- ``red``: Number of word operations in lattice reduction.
- ``δ``: Root-Hermite factor targeted by lattice reduction.
- ``β``: BKZ block size.
- ``ζ``: Number of guessed coordinates.
- ``h1``: Number of non-zero components among guessed coordinates (if secret distribution is sparse)
- ``prob``: Probability of success in guessing.
- ``repetitions``: How often we are required to repeat the attack.
- ``d``: Lattice dimension.
- When ζ = 1 this function essentially estimates the dual attack.
- When ζ > 1 and ``solver`` is ``exhaustive_search`` this function estimates
the hybrid attack as given in [INDOCRYPT:EspJouKha20]_
- When ζ > 1 and ``solver`` is ``mitm`` this function estimates the dual MITM
hybrid attack roughly following [EPRINT:CHHS19]_
EXAMPLES::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q = 2**32, Xs=ND.Uniform(0,1), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0))
>>> LWE.dual(params)
rop: ≈2^115.5, mem: ≈2^68.0, m: 1018, red: ≈2^115.4, δ: 1.005021, β: 284, d: 2042, ↻: ≈2^68.0, tag: dual
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params)
rop: ≈2^111.3, mem: ≈2^106.4, m: 983, red: ≈2^111.2, δ: 1.005204, β: 269, d: 1957, ↻: ≈2^56.4, ζ: 50...
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params, mitm_optimization=True)
rop: ≈2^141.1, mem: ≈2^139.1, m: 1189, k: 132, ↻: 139, red: ≈2^140.8, δ: 1.004164, β: 375, d: 2021...
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params, mitm_optimization="numerical")
rop: ≈2^140.6, m: 1191, k: 128, mem: ≈2^136.0, ↻: 133, red: ≈2^140.2, δ: 1.004179, β: 373, d: 2052...
>>> params = params.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(params.n, 32))
>>> LWE.dual(params)
rop: ≈2^111.7, mem: ≈2^66.0, m: 950, red: ≈2^111.5, δ: 1.005191, β: 270, d: 1974, ↻: ≈2^66.0, tag: dual
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params)
rop: ≈2^97.8, mem: ≈2^81.9, m: 730, red: ≈2^97.4, δ: 1.006813, β: 175, d: 1453, ↻: ≈2^36.3, ζ: 301...
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params, mitm_optimization=True)
rop: ≈2^103.4, mem: ≈2^81.5, m: 724, k: 310, ↻: ≈2^27.3, red: ≈2^102.7, δ: 1.006655, β: 182...
>>> params = params.updated(Xs=ND.CenteredBinomial(8))
>>> LWE.dual(params)
rop: ≈2^123.1, mem: ≈2^75.4, m: 1151, red: ≈2^123.0, δ: 1.004727, β: 311, d: 2175, ↻: ≈2^75.4, tag: dual
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params)
rop: ≈2^122.4, mem: ≈2^116.6, m: 1143, red: ≈2^122.2, δ: 1.004758, β: 308, d: 2157, ↻: ≈2^75.8, ζ: 10...
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params, mitm_optimization=True)
rop: ≈2^181.7, mem: ≈2^179.2, m: 1554, k: 42, ↻: 179, red: ≈2^181.4, δ: 1.003315, β: 519, d: 2513...
>>> params = params.updated(Xs=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0))
>>> LWE.dual(params)
rop: ≈2^125.4, mem: ≈2^78.0, m: 1190, red: ≈2^125.3, δ: 1.004648, β: 319, d: 2214, ↻: ≈2^78.0, tag: dual
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params)
rop: ≈2^125.1, mem: ≈2^117.7, m: 1187, red: ≈2^125.0, δ: 1.004657, β: 318, d: 2204, ↻: ≈2^75.9, ζ: 7...
>>> LWE.dual_hybrid(params, mitm_optimization=True)
rop: ≈2^175.0, mem: ≈2^168.9, m: 1547, k: 27, ↻: 169, red: ≈2^175.0, δ: 1.003424, β: 496, d: 2544, ζ: 27...
"""
Cost.register_impermanent(
rop=True,
mem=False,
red=True,
beta=False,
delta=False,
m=True,
d=False,
zeta=False,
)
Logging.log("dual", log_level, f"costing LWE instance: {repr(params)}")
params = params.normalize()
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
Cost.register_impermanent(h1=False)
def _optimize_blocksize(
solver,
params: LWEParameters,
zeta: int = 0,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
log_level=None,
):
h = params.Xs.get_hamming_weight(params.n)
h1_min = max(0, h - (params.n - zeta))
h1_max = min(zeta, h)
Logging.log("dual", log_level, f"h1 ∈ [{h1_min},{h1_max}] (zeta={zeta})")
with local_minimum(h1_min, h1_max, log_level=log_level + 1) as it:
for h1 in it:
cost = self.optimize_blocksize(
h1=h1,
solver=solver,
params=params,
zeta=zeta,
success_probability=success_probability,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
use_lll=use_lll,
log_level=log_level + 2,
)
it.update(cost)
return it.y
else:
_optimize_blocksize = self.optimize_blocksize
f = partial(
_optimize_blocksize,
solver=solver,
params=params,
success_probability=success_probability,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
use_lll=use_lll,
log_level=log_level + 1,
)
with local_minimum(1, params.n - 1, opt_step) as it:
for zeta in it:
it.update(f(zeta=zeta))
for zeta in it.neighborhood:
it.update(f(zeta=zeta))
cost = it.y
cost["problem"] = params
return cost
DH = DualHybrid()
def dual(
params: LWEParameters,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
):
"""
Dual hybrid attack as in [PQCBook:MicReg09]_.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param success_probability: The success probability to target.
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction.
:param use_lll: use LLL calls to produce more small vectors.
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: Total amount of memory used by solver (in elements mod q).
- ``red``: Number of word operations in lattice reduction.
- ``δ``: Root-Hermite factor targeted by lattice reduction.
- ``β``: BKZ block size.
- ``prob``: Probability of success in guessing.
- ``repetitions``: How often we are required to repeat the attack.
- ``d``: Lattice dimension.
"""
Cost.register_impermanent(
rop=True,
mem=False,
red=True,
beta=False,
delta=False,
m=True,
d=False,
)
ret = DH.optimize_blocksize(
solver=distinguish,
params=params,
zeta=0,
h1=0,
success_probability=success_probability,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
use_lll=use_lll,
log_level=1,
)
del ret["zeta"]
if hasattr(ret, "h1"):
del ret["h1"]
ret["tag"] = "dual"
return ret
def dual_hybrid(
params: LWEParameters,
success_probability: float = 0.99,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
use_lll=True,
mitm_optimization=False,
opt_step=2,
):
"""
Dual hybrid attack from [INDOCRYPT:EspJouKha20]_.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param success_probability: The success probability to target.
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction.
:param use_lll: Use LLL calls to produce more small vectors.
:param mitm_optimization: One of "analytical" or "numerical". If ``True`` a default from the
``conf`` module is picked, ``False`` disables MITM.
:param opt_step: Control robustness of optimizer.
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: Total amount of memory used by solver (in elements mod q).
- ``red``: Number of word operations in lattice reduction.
- ``δ``: Root-Hermite factor targeted by lattice reduction.
- ``β``: BKZ block size.
- ``ζ``: Number of guessed coordinates.
- ``h1``: Number of non-zero components among guessed coordinates (if secret distribution is sparse)
- ``prob``: Probability of success in guessing.
- ``repetitions``: How often we are required to repeat the attack.
- ``d``: Lattice dimension.
"""
if mitm_optimization is True:
mitm_optimization = mitm_opt_default
if mitm_optimization:
solver = partial(mitm, optimization=mitm_optimization)
else:
solver = exhaustive_search
ret = DH(
solver=solver,
params=params,
success_probability=success_probability,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
use_lll=use_lll,
opt_step=opt_step,
)
if mitm_optimization:
ret["tag"] = "dual_mitm_hybrid"
else:
ret["tag"] = "dual_hybrid"
return ret

417
estimator_new/lwe_guess.py
View File

@@ -1,417 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Generic multiplicative composition of guessing some components of the LWE secret and some LWE solving algorithm.
By "multiplicative" we mean that costs multiply rather than add. It is often possible to achieve
some form of additive composition, i.e. this strategy is rarely the most efficient.
"""
from sage.all import log, floor, ceil, binomial
from sage.all import sqrt, pi, exp, RR, ZZ, oo, round, e
from .conf import mitm_opt
from .cost import Cost
from .errors import InsufficientSamplesError, OutOfBoundsError
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
from .prob import amplify as prob_amplify
from .prob import drop as prob_drop
from .prob import amplify_sigma
from .util import local_minimum
from .nd import sigmaf
def log2(x):
return log(x, 2)
class guess_composition:
def __init__(self, f):
"""
Create a generic composition of guessing and `f`.
"""
self.f = f
self.__name__ = f"{f.__name__}+guessing"
@classmethod
def dense_solve(cls, f, params, log_level=5, **kwds):
"""
Guess components of a dense secret then call `f`.
:param f: Some object consuming `params` and outputting some `cost`
:param params: LWE parameters.
"""
base = params.Xs.bounds[1] - params.Xs.bounds[0] + 1
baseline_cost = f(params, **kwds)
max_zeta = min(floor(log(baseline_cost["rop"], base)), params.n)
with local_minimum(0, max_zeta, log_level=log_level) as it:
for zeta in it:
search_space = base ** zeta
cost = f(params.updated(n=params.n - zeta), log_level=log_level + 1, **kwds)
repeated_cost = cost.repeat(search_space)
repeated_cost["zeta"] = zeta
it.update(repeated_cost)
return it.y
@classmethod
def gammaf(cls, n, h, zeta, base, g=lambda x: x):
"""
Find optimal hamming weight for sparse guessing.
Let `s` be a vector of dimension `n` where we expect `h` non-zero entries. We are ignoring `η-γ`
components and are guessing `γ`. This succeeds with some probability given by ``prob_drop(n, h,
ζ, γ)``. Exhaustively searching the guesses takes `binomial(n, γ) ⋅ b^γ` steps where `b` is the
number of non-zero values in a component of `s`. We call a `γ` optimal if it minimizes the
overall number of repetitions that need to be performed to succeed with probability 99%.
:param n: vector dimension
:param h: hamming weight of the vector
:param zeta: number of ignored + guesses components
:param base: number of possible non-zero scalars
:param g: We do not consider search space directly by `g()` applied to it (think time-memory
trade-offs).
:returns: (number of repetitions, γ, size of the search space, probability of success)
"""
if not zeta:
return 1, 0, 0, 1.0
search_space = 0
gamma = 0
probability = 0
best = None, None, None, None
while gamma < min(h, zeta):
probability += prob_drop(n, h, zeta, fail=gamma)
search_space += binomial(zeta, gamma) * base ** gamma
repeat = prob_amplify(0.99, probability) * g(search_space)
if best[0] is None or repeat < best[0]:
best = repeat, gamma, search_space, probability
gamma += 1
else:
break
return best
@classmethod
def sparse_solve(cls, f, params, log_level=5, **kwds):
"""
Guess components of a sparse secret then call `f`.
:param f: Some object consuming `params` and outputting some `cost`
:param params: LWE parameters.
"""
base = params.Xs.bounds[1] - params.Xs.bounds[0] # we exclude zero
h = ceil(len(params.Xs) * params.Xs.density) # nr of non-zero entries
with local_minimum(0, params.n - 40, log_level=log_level) as it:
for zeta in it:
single_cost = f(params.updated(n=params.n - zeta), log_level=log_level + 1, **kwds)
repeat, gamma, search_space, probability = cls.gammaf(params.n, h, zeta, base)
cost = single_cost.repeat(repeat)
cost["zeta"] = zeta
cost["|S|"] = search_space
cost["prop"] = probability
it.update(cost)
return it.y
def __call__(self, params, log_level=5, **kwds):
"""
Guess components of a secret then call `f`.
:param params: LWE parameters.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> from estimator.lwe_guess import guess_composition
>>> guess_composition(LWE.primal_usvp)(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)))
rop: ≈2^102.8, red: ≈2^102.8, δ: 1.008705, β: 113, d: 421, tag: usvp, ↻: ≈2^37.5, ζ: 265, |S|: 1, ...
Compare::
>>> LWE.primal_hybrid(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)))
rop: ≈2^86.6, red: ≈2^85.7, svp: ≈2^85.6, β: 104, η: 2, ζ: 371, |S|: ≈2^91.1, d: 308, prob: ≈2^-21.3, ...
"""
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
return self.sparse_solve(self.f, params, log_level, **kwds)
else:
return self.dense_solve(self.f, params, log_level, **kwds)
class ExhaustiveSearch:
def __call__(self, params: LWEParameters, success_probability=0.99, quantum: bool = False):
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE via exhaustive search.
:param params: LWE parameters
:param success_probability: the targeted success probability
:param quantum: use estimate for quantum computer (we simply take the square root of the search space)
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: memory requirement in integers mod q.
- ``m``: Required number of samples to distinguish the correct solution with high probability.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=64, q=2**40, Xs=ND.UniformMod(2), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.2))
>>> exhaustive_search(params)
rop: ≈2^73.6, mem: ≈2^72.6, m: 397.198
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2**40, Xs=ND.SparseTernary(n=1024, p=32), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.2))
>>> exhaustive_search(params)
rop: ≈2^417.3, mem: ≈2^416.3, m: ≈2^11.2
"""
params = LWEParameters.normalize(params)
# there are two stages: enumeration and distinguishing, so we split up the success_probability
probability = sqrt(success_probability)
try:
size = params.Xs.support_size(n=params.n, fraction=probability)
except NotImplementedError:
# not achieving required probability with search space
# given our settings that means the search space is huge
# so we approximate the cost with oo
return Cost(rop=oo, mem=oo, m=1)
if quantum:
size = size.sqrt()
# set m according to [ia.cr/2020/515]
sigma = params.Xe.stddev / params.q
m_required = RR(
8 * exp(4 * pi * pi * sigma * sigma) * (log(size) - log(log(1 / probability)))
)
if params.m < m_required:
raise InsufficientSamplesError(
f"Exhaustive search: Need {m_required} samples but only {params.m} available."
)
else:
m = m_required
# we can compute A*s for all candidate s in time 2*size*m using
# (the generalization [ia.cr/2021/152] of) the recursive algorithm
# from [ia.cr/2020/515]
cost = 2 * size * m
ret = Cost(rop=cost, mem=cost / 2, m=m)
return ret
__name__ = "exhaustive_search"
exhaustive_search = ExhaustiveSearch()
class MITM:
locality = 0.05
def X_range(self, nd):
if nd.is_bounded:
a, b = nd.bounds
return b - a + 1, 1.0
else:
# setting fraction=0 to ensure that support size does not
# throw error. we'll take the probability into account later
rng = nd.support_size(n=1, fraction=0.0)
return rng, nd.gaussian_tail_prob
def local_range(self, center):
return ZZ(floor((1 - self.locality) * center)), ZZ(ceil((1 + self.locality) * center))
def mitm_analytical(self, params: LWEParameters, success_probability=0.99):
nd_rng, nd_p = self.X_range(params.Xe)
delta = nd_rng / params.q # possible error range scaled
sd_rng, sd_p = self.X_range(params.Xs)
# determine the number of elements in the tables depending on splitting dim
n = params.n
k = round(n / (2 - delta))
# we could now call self.cost with this k, but using our model below seems
# about 3x faster and reasonably accurate
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
h = params.Xs.get_hamming_weight(n=params.n)
split_h = round(h * k / n)
success_probability_ = (
binomial(k, split_h) * binomial(n - k, h - split_h) / binomial(n, h)
)
logT = RR(h * (log2(n) - log2(h) + log2(sd_rng - 1) + log2(e))) / (2 - delta)
logT -= RR(log2(h) / 2)
logT -= RR(h * h * log2(e) / (2 * n * (2 - delta) ** 2))
else:
success_probability_ = 1.0
logT = k * log(sd_rng, 2)
m_ = max(1, round(logT + log(logT, 2)))
if params.m < m_:
raise InsufficientSamplesError(
f"MITM: Need {m_} samples but only {params.m} available."
)
# since m = logT + loglogT and rop = T*m, we have rop=2^m
ret = Cost(rop=RR(2 ** m_), mem=2 ** logT * m_, m=m_, k=ZZ(k))
repeat = prob_amplify(success_probability, sd_p ** n * nd_p ** m_ * success_probability_)
return ret.repeat(times=repeat)
def cost(
self,
params: LWEParameters,
k: int,
success_probability=0.99,
):
nd_rng, nd_p = self.X_range(params.Xe)
delta = nd_rng / params.q # possible error range scaled
sd_rng, sd_p = self.X_range(params.Xs)
n = params.n
if params.Xs.is_sparse:
h = params.Xs.get_hamming_weight(n=n)
# we assume the hamming weight to be distributed evenly across the two parts
# if not we can rerandomize on the coordinates and try again -> repeat
split_h = round(h * k / n)
size_tab = RR((sd_rng - 1) ** split_h * binomial(k, split_h))
size_sea = RR((sd_rng - 1) ** (h - split_h) * binomial(n - k, h - split_h))
success_probability_ = (
binomial(k, split_h) * binomial(n - k, h - split_h) / binomial(n, h)
)
else:
size_tab = sd_rng ** k
size_sea = sd_rng ** (n - k)
success_probability_ = 1
# we set m such that it approximately minimizes the search cost per query as
# a reasonable starting point and then optimize around it
m_ = ceil(max(log2(size_tab) + log2(log2(size_tab)), 1))
a, b = self.local_range(m_)
with local_minimum(a, b, smallerf=lambda x, best: x[1] <= best[1]) as it:
for m in it:
# for search we effectively build a second table and for each entry, we expect
# 2^( m * 4 * B / q) = 2^(delta * m) table look ups + a l_oo computation (costing m)
# for every hit in the table (which has probability T/2^m)
cost = (m, size_sea * (2 * m + 2 ** (delta * m) * (1 + size_tab * m / 2 ** m)))
it.update(cost)
m, cost_search = it.y
m = min(m, params.m)
# building the table costs 2*T*m using the generalization [ia.cr/2021/152] of
# the recursive algorithm from [ia.cr/2020/515]
cost_table = size_tab * 2 * m
ret = Cost(rop=(cost_table + cost_search), m=m, k=k)
ret["mem"] = size_tab * (k + m) + size_sea * (n - k + m)
repeat = prob_amplify(success_probability, sd_p ** n * nd_p ** m * success_probability_)
return ret.repeat(times=repeat)
def __call__(self, params: LWEParameters, success_probability=0.99, optimization=mitm_opt):
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE via Meet-In-The-Middle attack.
:param params: LWE parameters
:param success_probability: the targeted success probability
:param model: Either "analytical" (faster, default) or "numerical" (more accurate)
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: memory requirement in integers mod q.
- ``m``: Required number of samples to distinguish the correct solution with high probability.
- ``k``: Splitting dimension.
- ``↻``: Repetitions required to achieve targeted success probability
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=64, q=2**40, Xs=ND.UniformMod(2), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.2))
>>> mitm(params)
rop: ≈2^37.0, mem: ≈2^37.2, m: 37, k: 32, ↻: 1
>>> mitm(params, optimization="numerical")
rop: ≈2^39.2, m: 36, k: 32, mem: ≈2^39.1, ↻: 1
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2**40, Xs=ND.SparseTernary(n=1024, p=32), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.2))
>>> mitm(params)
rop: ≈2^215.4, mem: ≈2^210.2, m: ≈2^13.1, k: 512, ↻: 43
>>> mitm(params, optimization="numerical")
rop: ≈2^216.0, m: ≈2^13.1, k: 512, mem: ≈2^211.4, ↻: 43
"""
Cost.register_impermanent(rop=True, mem=False, m=True, k=False)
params = LWEParameters.normalize(params)
nd_rng, _ = self.X_range(params.Xe)
if nd_rng >= params.q:
# MITM attacks cannot handle an error this large.
return Cost(rop=oo, mem=oo, m=0, k=0)
if "analytical" in optimization:
return self.mitm_analytical(params=params, success_probability=success_probability)
elif "numerical" in optimization:
with local_minimum(1, params.n - 1) as it:
for k in it:
cost = self.cost(k=k, params=params, success_probability=success_probability)
it.update(cost)
ret = it.y
# if the noise is large, the curve might not be convex, so the above minimum
# is not correct. Interestingly, in these cases, it seems that k=1 might be smallest
ret1 = self.cost(k=1, params=params, success_probability=success_probability)
return min(ret, ret1)
else:
raise ValueError("Unknown optimization method for MITM.")
__name__ = "mitm"
mitm = MITM()
class Distinguisher:
def __call__(self, params: LWEParameters, success_probability=0.99):
"""
Estimate cost of distinguishing a 0-dimensional LWE instance from uniformly random,
which is essentially the number of samples required.
:param params: LWE parameters
:param success_probability: the targeted success probability
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``mem``: memory requirement in integers mod q.
- ``m``: Required number of samples to distinguish.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=0, q=2 ** 32, Xs=ND.UniformMod(2), Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(2 ** 32))
>>> distinguish(params)
rop: ≈2^60.0, mem: ≈2^60.0, m: ≈2^60.0
"""
if params.n > 0:
raise OutOfBoundsError("Secret dimension should be 0 for distinguishing. Try exhaustive search for n > 0.")
m = amplify_sigma(success_probability, sigmaf(params.Xe.stddev), params.q)
if (m > params.m):
raise InsufficientSamplesError("Not enough samples to distinguish with target advantage.")
return Cost(rop=m, mem=m, m=m)
__name__ = "distinguish"
distinguish = Distinguisher()

161
estimator_new/lwe_parameters.py
View File

@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from sage.all import oo, binomial, log, sqrt, ceil
from dataclasses import dataclass
from copy import copy
from .nd import NoiseDistribution
from .errors import InsufficientSamplesError
@dataclass
class LWEParameters:
n: int
q: int
Xs: NoiseDistribution
Xe: NoiseDistribution
m: int = oo
tag: str = None
def __post_init__(self, **kwds):
self.Xs = copy(self.Xs)
self.Xs.n = self.n
if self.m < oo:
self.Xe = copy(self.Xe)
self.Xe.n = self.m
def normalize(self):
"""
EXAMPLES:
We perform the normal form transformation if χ_e < χ_s and we got the samples::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> Xs=ND.DiscreteGaussian(2.0)
>>> Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(1.58)
>>> LWE.Parameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=Xs, Xe=Xe).normalize()
LWEParameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=D(σ=1.58), Xe=D(σ=1.58), m=+Infinity, tag=None)
If m = n, we swap the secret and the noise::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> Xs=ND.DiscreteGaussian(2.0)
>>> Xe=ND.DiscreteGaussian(1.58)
>>> LWE.Parameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=Xs, Xe=Xe, m=512).normalize()
LWEParameters(n=512, q=8192, Xs=D(σ=1.58), Xe=D(σ=2.00), m=512, tag=None)
"""
if self.m < 1:
raise InsufficientSamplesError(f"m={self.m} < 1")
# Normal form transformation
if self.Xe < self.Xs and self.m >= 2 * self.n:
return LWEParameters(
n=self.n, q=self.q, Xs=self.Xe, Xe=self.Xe, m=self.m - self.n, tag=self.tag
)
# swap secret and noise
# TODO: this is somewhat arbitrary
if self.Xe < self.Xs and self.m < 2 * self.n:
return LWEParameters(n=self.n, q=self.q, Xs=self.Xe, Xe=self.Xs, m=self.n, tag=self.tag)
# nothing to do
return self
def updated(self, **kwds):
"""
Return a new set of parameters updated according to ``kwds``.
:param kwds: We set ``key`` to ``value`` in the new set of parameters.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> Kyber512
LWEParameters(n=512, q=3329, Xs=D(σ=1.22), Xe=D(σ=1.22), m=512, tag='Kyber 512')
>>> Kyber512.updated(m=1337)
LWEParameters(n=512, q=3329, Xs=D(σ=1.22), Xe=D(σ=1.22), m=1337, tag='Kyber 512')
"""
d = dict(self.__dict__)
d.update(kwds)
return LWEParameters(**d)
def amplify_m(self, m):
"""
Return a LWE instance parameters with ``m`` samples produced from the samples in this instance.
:param m: New number of samples.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from sage.all import binomial, log
>>> from estimator import *
>>> Kyber512
LWEParameters(n=512, q=3329, Xs=D(σ=1.22), Xe=D(σ=1.22), m=512, tag='Kyber 512')
>>> Kyber512.amplify_m(2**100)
LWEParameters(n=512, q=3329, Xs=D(σ=1.22), Xe=D(σ=4.58), m=..., tag='Kyber 512')
We can produce 2^100 samples by random ± linear combinations of 12 vectors::
>>> float(sqrt(12.)), float(log(binomial(1024, 12) , 2.0)) + 12
(3.46..., 103.07...)
"""
if m <= self.m:
return self
if self.m == oo:
return self
d = dict(self.__dict__)
if self.Xe.mean != 0:
raise NotImplementedError("Amplifying for μ≠0 not implemented.")
for k in range(ceil(log(m, 2.0))):
# - binom(n,k) positions
# -two signs per position (+1,-1)
# - all "-" and all "+" are the same
if binomial(self.m, k) * 2 ** k - 1 >= m:
Xe = NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(float(sqrt(k) * self.Xe.stddev))
d["Xe"] = Xe
d["m"] = ceil(m)
return LWEParameters(**d)
else:
raise NotImplementedError(
f"Cannot amplify to ≈2^{log(m,2):1} using {{+1,-1}} additions."
)
def switch_modulus(self):
"""
Apply modulus switching and return new instance.
See [JMC:AlbPlaSco15]_ for details.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> LWE.Parameters(n=128, q=7681, Xs=ND.UniformMod(3), Xe=ND.UniformMod(11)).switch_modulus()
LWEParameters(n=128, q=5289, Xs=D(σ=0.82), Xe=D(σ=3.08), m=+Infinity, tag=None)
"""
n = self.Xs.density * len(self.Xs)
# n uniform in -(0.5,0.5) ± stddev(χ_s)
Xr_stddev = sqrt(n / 12) * self.Xs.stddev # rounding noise
# χ_r == p/q ⋅ χ_e # we want the rounding noise match the scaled noise
p = ceil(Xr_stddev * self.q / self.Xe.stddev)
scale = float(p) / self.q
# there is no point in scaling if the improvement is eaten up by rounding noise
if scale > 1 / sqrt(2):
return self
return LWEParameters(
self.n,
p,
Xs=self.Xs,
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(sqrt(2) * self.Xe.stddev * scale),
m=self.m,
tag=self.tag + ",scaled" if self.tag else None,
)
def __hash__(self):
return hash((self.n, self.q, self.Xs, self.Xe, self.m, self.tag))

596
estimator_new/lwe_primal.py
View File

@@ -1,596 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE using primal attacks.
See :ref:`LWE Primal Attacks` for an introduction what is available.
"""
from functools import partial
from sage.all import oo, ceil, sqrt, log, RR, ZZ, binomial, cached_function
from .reduction import delta as deltaf
from .reduction import cost as costf
from .util import local_minimum
from .cost import Cost
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
from .simulator import normalize as simulator_normalize
from .prob import drop as prob_drop
from .prob import amplify as prob_amplify
from .prob import babai as prob_babai
from .prob import mitm_babai_probability
from .io import Logging
from .conf import red_cost_model as red_cost_model_default
from .conf import red_shape_model as red_shape_model_default
from .conf import red_simulator as red_simulator_default
class PrimalUSVP:
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE via uSVP reduction.
"""
@staticmethod
def _xi_factor(Xs, Xe):
xi = RR(1)
if Xs < Xe:
xi = Xe.stddev / Xs.stddev
return xi
@staticmethod
def _solve_for_d(params, m, beta, tau, xi):
"""
Find smallest d ∈ [n,m] to satisfy uSVP condition.
If no such d exists, return the upper bound m.
"""
# Find the smallest d ∈ [n,m] s.t. a*d^2 + b*d + c >= 0
delta = deltaf(beta)
a = -log(delta)
C = log(params.Xe.stddev ** 2 * (beta - 1) + tau ** 2) / 2.0
b = log(delta) * (2 * beta - 1) + log(params.q) - C
c = log(tau) + params.n * log(xi) - (params.n + 1) * log(params.q)
n = params.n
if a * n * n + b * n + c >= 0: # trivial case
return n
# solve for ad^2 + bd + c == 0
disc = b * b - 4 * a * c # the discriminant
if disc < 0: # no solution, return m
return m
# compute the two solutions
d1 = (-b + sqrt(disc)) / (2 * a)
d2 = (-b - sqrt(disc)) / (2 * a)
if a > 0: # the only possible solution is ceiling(d2)
return min(m, ceil(d2))
# the case a<=0:
# if n is to the left of d1 then the first solution is ceil(d1)
if n <= d1:
return min(m, ceil(d1))
# otherwise, n must be larger than d2 (since an^2+bn+c<0) so no solution
return m
@staticmethod
@cached_function
def cost_gsa(
beta: int,
params: LWEParameters,
m: int = oo,
tau=None,
d=None,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
log_level=None,
):
delta = deltaf(beta)
xi = PrimalUSVP._xi_factor(params.Xs, params.Xe)
m = min(2 * ceil(sqrt(params.n * log(params.q) / log(delta))), m)
tau = params.Xe.stddev if tau is None else tau
d = PrimalUSVP._solve_for_d(params, m, beta, tau, xi) if d is None else d
assert d <= m + 1
lhs = log(sqrt(params.Xe.stddev ** 2 * (beta - 1) + tau ** 2))
rhs = RR(
log(delta) * (2 * beta - d - 1)
+ (log(tau) + log(xi) * params.n + log(params.q) * (d - params.n - 1)) / d
)
return costf(red_cost_model, beta, d, predicate=lhs <= rhs)
@staticmethod
@cached_function
def cost_simulator(
beta: int,
params: LWEParameters,
simulator,
m: int = oo,
tau=None,
d=None,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
log_level=None,
):
delta = deltaf(beta)
if d is None:
d = min(ceil(sqrt(params.n * log(params.q) / log(delta))), m) + 1
xi = PrimalUSVP._xi_factor(params.Xs, params.Xe)
tau = params.Xe.stddev if tau is None else tau
r = simulator(d=d, n=params.n, q=params.q, beta=beta, xi=xi, tau=tau)
lhs = params.Xe.stddev ** 2 * (beta - 1) + tau ** 2
if r[d - beta] > lhs:
cost = costf(red_cost_model, beta, d)
else:
cost = costf(red_cost_model, beta, d, predicate=False)
return cost
def __call__(
self,
params: LWEParameters,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model_default,
optimize_d=True,
log_level=1,
**kwds,
):
"""
Estimate cost of solving LWE via uSVP reduction.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction.
:param red_shape_model: How to model the shape of a reduced basis.
:param optimize_d: Attempt to find minimal d, too.
:return: A cost dictionary.
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``red``: Number of word operations in lattice reduction.
- ``δ``: Root-Hermite factor targeted by lattice reduction.
- ``β``: BKZ block size.
- ``d``: Lattice dimension.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> LWE.primal_usvp(Kyber512)
rop: ≈2^148.0, red: ≈2^148.0, δ: 1.003941, β: 406, d: 998, tag: usvp
>>> params = LWE.Parameters(n=200, q=127, Xs=ND.UniformMod(3), Xe=ND.UniformMod(3))
>>> LWE.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model="cn11")
rop: ≈2^91.2, red: ≈2^91.2, δ: 1.006114, β: 209, d: 388, tag: usvp
>>> LWE.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.CN11)
rop: ≈2^91.2, red: ≈2^91.2, δ: 1.006114, β: 209, d: 388, tag: usvp
>>> LWE.primal_usvp(params, red_shape_model=Simulator.CN11, optimize_d=False)
rop: ≈2^91.3, red: ≈2^91.3, δ: 1.006114, β: 209, d: 400, tag: usvp
The success condition was formulated in [USENIX:ADPS16]_ and studied/verified in
[AC:AGVW17]_, [C:DDGR20]_, [PKC:PosVir21]_. The treatment of small secrets is from
[ACISP:BaiGal14]_.
"""
params = LWEParameters.normalize(params)
# allow for a larger embedding lattice dimension: Bai and Galbraith
m = params.m + params.n if params.Xs <= params.Xe else params.m
if red_shape_model == "gsa":
with local_minimum(40, 2 * params.n) as it:
for beta in it:
cost = self.cost_gsa(
beta=beta, params=params, m=m, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, **kwds
)
it.update(cost)
cost = it.y
cost["tag"] = "usvp"
cost["problem"] = params
return cost
try:
red_shape_model = simulator_normalize(red_shape_model)
except ValueError:
pass
# step 0. establish baseline
cost_gsa = self(
params,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
red_shape_model="gsa",
)
Logging.log("usvp", log_level + 1, f"GSA: {repr(cost_gsa)}")
f = partial(
self.cost_simulator,
simulator=red_shape_model,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
m=m,
params=params,
)
# step 1. find β
with local_minimum(
cost_gsa["beta"] - ceil(0.10 * cost_gsa["beta"]),
cost_gsa["beta"] + ceil(0.20 * cost_gsa["beta"]),
) as it:
for beta in it:
it.update(f(beta=beta, **kwds))
cost = it.y
Logging.log("usvp", log_level, f"Opt-β: {repr(cost)}")
if cost and optimize_d:
# step 2. find d
with local_minimum(params.n, stop=cost["d"] + 1) as it:
for d in it:
it.update(f(d=d, beta=cost["beta"], **kwds))
cost = it.y
Logging.log("usvp", log_level + 1, f"Opt-d: {repr(cost)}")
cost["tag"] = "usvp"
cost["problem"] = params
return cost
__name__ = "primal_usvp"
primal_usvp = PrimalUSVP()
class PrimalHybrid:
@classmethod
def babai_cost(cls, d):
return Cost(rop=max(d, 1) ** 2)
@classmethod
def svp_dimension(cls, r, D):
"""
Return η for a given lattice shape and distance.
:param r: squared Gram-Schmidt norms
"""
from fpylll.util import gaussian_heuristic
d = len(r)
for i, _ in enumerate(r):
if gaussian_heuristic(r[i:]) < D.stddev ** 2 * (d - i):
return ZZ(d - (i - 1))
return ZZ(2)
@staticmethod
@cached_function
def cost(
beta: int,
params: LWEParameters,
zeta: int = 0,
babai=False,
mitm=False,
m: int = oo,
d: int = None,
simulator=red_simulator_default,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
log_level=5,
):
"""
Cost of the hybrid attack.
:param beta: Block size.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param zeta: Guessing dimension ζ ≥ 0.
:param babai: Insist on Babai's algorithm for finding close vectors.
:param mitm: Simulate MITM approach (√ of search space).
:param m: We accept the number of samples to consider from the calling function.
:param d: We optionally accept the dimension to pick.
.. note :: This is the lowest level function that runs no optimization, it merely reports
costs.
"""
if d is None:
delta = deltaf(beta)
d = min(ceil(sqrt(params.n * log(params.q) / log(delta))), m) + 1
d -= zeta
xi = PrimalUSVP._xi_factor(params.Xs, params.Xe)
# 1. Simulate BKZ-β
# TODO: pick τ
r = simulator(d, params.n - zeta, params.q, beta, xi=xi)
bkz_cost = costf(red_cost_model, beta, d)
# 2. Required SVP dimension η
if babai:
eta = 2
svp_cost = PrimalHybrid.babai_cost(d)
else:
# we scaled the lattice so that χ_e is what we want
eta = PrimalHybrid.svp_dimension(r, params.Xe)
svp_cost = costf(red_cost_model, eta, eta)
# when η ≪ β, lifting may be a bigger cost
svp_cost["rop"] += PrimalHybrid.babai_cost(d - eta)["rop"]
# 3. Search
# We need to do one BDD call at least
search_space, probability, hw = 1, 1.0, 0
# MITM or no MITM
# TODO: this is rather clumsy as a model
def ssf(x):
if mitm:
return RR(sqrt(x))
else:
return x
# e.g. (-1, 1) -> two non-zero per entry
base = params.Xs.bounds[1] - params.Xs.bounds[0]
if zeta:
# the number of non-zero entries
h = ceil(len(params.Xs) * params.Xs.density)
probability = RR(prob_drop(params.n, h, zeta))
hw = 1
while hw < min(h, zeta):
new_search_space = binomial(zeta, hw) * base ** hw
if svp_cost.repeat(ssf(search_space + new_search_space))["rop"] < bkz_cost["rop"]:
search_space += new_search_space
probability += prob_drop(params.n, h, zeta, fail=hw)
hw += 1
else:
break
svp_cost = svp_cost.repeat(ssf(search_space))
if mitm and zeta > 0:
if babai:
probability *= mitm_babai_probability(r, params.Xe.stddev, params.q)
else:
# TODO: the probability in this case needs to be analysed
probability *= 1
if eta <= 20 and d >= 0: # NOTE: η: somewhat arbitrary bound, d: we may guess it all
probability *= RR(prob_babai(r, sqrt(d) * params.Xe.stddev))
ret = Cost()
ret["rop"] = bkz_cost["rop"] + svp_cost["rop"]
ret["red"] = bkz_cost["rop"]
ret["svp"] = svp_cost["rop"]
ret["beta"] = beta
ret["eta"] = eta
ret["zeta"] = zeta
ret["|S|"] = search_space
ret["d"] = d
ret["prob"] = probability
ret.register_impermanent(
{"|S|": False},
rop=True,
red=True,
svp=True,
eta=False,
zeta=False,
prob=False,
)
# 4. Repeat whole experiment ~1/prob times
if probability and not RR(probability).is_NaN():
ret = ret.repeat(
prob_amplify(0.99, probability),
)
else:
return Cost(rop=oo)
return ret
@classmethod
def cost_zeta(
cls,
zeta: int,
params: LWEParameters,
red_shape_model=red_simulator_default,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
m: int = oo,
babai: bool = True,
mitm: bool = True,
optimize_d=True,
log_level=5,
**kwds,
):
"""
This function optimizes costs for a fixed guessing dimension ζ.
"""
# step 0. establish baseline
baseline_cost = primal_usvp(
params,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
optimize_d=False,
log_level=log_level + 1,
**kwds,
)
Logging.log("bdd", log_level, f"H0: {repr(baseline_cost)}")
f = partial(
cls.cost,
params=params,
zeta=zeta,
babai=babai,
mitm=mitm,
simulator=red_shape_model,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
m=m,
**kwds,
)
# step 1. optimize β
with local_minimum(
40, baseline_cost["beta"] + 1, precision=2, log_level=log_level + 1
) as it:
for beta in it:
it.update(f(beta))
for beta in it.neighborhood:
it.update(f(beta))
cost = it.y
Logging.log("bdd", log_level, f"H1: {repr(cost)}")
# step 2. optimize d
if cost and cost.get("tag", "XXX") != "usvp" and optimize_d:
with local_minimum(
params.n, cost["d"] + cost["zeta"] + 1, log_level=log_level + 1
) as it:
for d in it:
it.update(f(beta=cost["beta"], d=d))
cost = it.y
Logging.log("bdd", log_level, f"H2: {repr(cost)}")
if cost is None:
return Cost(rop=oo)
return cost
def __call__(
self,
params: LWEParameters,
babai: bool = True,
zeta: int = None,
mitm: bool = True,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model_default,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
log_level=1,
**kwds,
):
"""
Estimate the cost of the hybrid attack and its variants.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param zeta: Guessing dimension ζ ≥ 0.
:param babai: Insist on Babai's algorithm for finding close vectors.
:param mitm: Simulate MITM approach (√ of search space).
:return: A cost dictionary
The returned cost dictionary has the following entries:
- ``rop``: Total number of word operations (≈ CPU cycles).
- ``red``: Number of word operations in lattice reduction.
- ``δ``: Root-Hermite factor targeted by lattice reduction.
- ``β``: BKZ block size.
- ``η``: Dimension of the final BDD call.
- ``ζ``: Number of guessed coordinates.
- ``|S|``: Guessing search space.
- ``prob``: Probability of success in guessing.
- ``repeat``: How often to repeat the attack.
- ``d``: Lattice dimension.
- When ζ = 0 this function essentially estimates the BDD strategy as given in [RSA:LiuNgu13]_.
- When ζ ≠ 0 and ``babai=True`` this function estimates the hybrid attack as given in
[C:HowgraveGraham07]_
- When ζ ≠ 0 and ``babai=False`` this function estimates the hybrid attack as given in
[SAC:AlbCurWun19]_
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator import *
>>> LWE.primal_hybrid(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)), mitm = False, babai = False)
rop: ≈2^94.9, red: ≈2^94.3, svp: ≈2^93.3, β: 178, η: 21, ζ: 256, |S|: ≈2^56.6, d: 531, prob: 0.003, ...
>>> LWE.primal_hybrid(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)), mitm = False, babai = True)
rop: ≈2^94.7, red: ≈2^94.0, svp: ≈2^93.3, β: 169, η: 2, ζ: 256, |S|: ≈2^62.4, d: 519, prob: 0.001, ...
>>> LWE.primal_hybrid(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)), mitm = True, babai = False)
rop: ≈2^75.4, red: ≈2^75.0, svp: ≈2^73.3, β: 102, η: 15, ζ: 322, |S|: ≈2^82.9, d: 354, prob: 0.001, ...
>>> LWE.primal_hybrid(Kyber512.updated(Xs=ND.SparseTernary(512, 16)), mitm = True, babai = True)
rop: ≈2^86.6, red: ≈2^85.7, svp: ≈2^85.6, β: 104, η: 2, ζ: 371, |S|: ≈2^91.1, d: 308, prob: ≈2^-21.3, ...
"""
if zeta == 0:
tag = "bdd"
else:
tag = "hybrid"
params = LWEParameters.normalize(params)
# allow for a larger embedding lattice dimension: Bai and Galbraith
m = params.m + params.n if params.Xs <= params.Xe else params.m
red_shape_model = simulator_normalize(red_shape_model)
f = partial(
self.cost_zeta,
params=params,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
babai=babai,
mitm=mitm,
m=m,
log_level=log_level + 1,
)
if zeta is None:
with local_minimum(0, params.n, log_level=log_level) as it:
for zeta in it:
it.update(
f(
zeta=zeta,
optimize_d=False,
**kwds,
)
)
# TODO: this should not be required
cost = min(it.y, f(0, optimize_d=False, **kwds))
else:
cost = f(zeta=zeta)
cost["tag"] = tag
cost["problem"] = params
if tag == "bdd":
cost["tag"] = tag
cost["problem"] = params
try:
del cost["|S|"]
del cost["prob"]
del cost["repetitions"]
del cost["zeta"]
except KeyError:
pass
return cost
__name__ = "primal_hybrid"
primal_hybrid = PrimalHybrid()
def primal_bdd(
params: LWEParameters,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model_default,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model_default,
log_level=1,
**kwds,
):
"""
Estimate the cost of the BDD approach as given in [RSA:LiuNgu13]_.
:param params: LWE parameters.
:param red_cost_model: How to cost lattice reduction
:param red_shape_model: How to model the shape of a reduced basis
"""
return primal_hybrid(
params,
zeta=0,
mitm=False,
babai=False,
red_shape_model=red_shape_model,
red_cost_model=red_cost_model,
log_level=log_level,
**kwds,
)

374
estimator_new/nd.py
View File

@@ -1,374 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from dataclasses import dataclass
from sage.all import parent, RR, RealField, sqrt, pi, oo, ceil, binomial, exp
def stddevf(sigma):
"""
Gaussian width parameter σ → standard deviation.
:param sigma: Gaussian width parameter σ
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import stddevf
>>> stddevf(64.0)
25.532...
>>> stddevf(64)
25.532...
>>> stddevf(RealField(256)(64)).prec()
256
"""
try:
prec = parent(sigma).prec()
except AttributeError:
prec = 0
if prec > 0:
FF = parent(sigma)
else:
FF = RR
return FF(sigma) / FF(sqrt(2 * pi))
def sigmaf(stddev):
"""
Standard deviation → Gaussian width parameter σ.
:param stddev: standard deviation
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import stddevf, sigmaf
>>> n = 64.0
>>> sigmaf(stddevf(n))
64.000...
>>> sigmaf(RealField(128)(1.0))
2.5066282746310005024157652848110452530
>>> sigmaf(1.0)
2.506628274631...
>>> sigmaf(1)
2.506628274631...
"""
RR = parent(stddev)
# check that we got ourselves a real number type
try:
if abs(RR(0.5) - 0.5) > 0.001:
RR = RealField(53) # hardcode something
except TypeError:
RR = RealField(53) # hardcode something
return RR(sqrt(2 * pi)) * stddev
@dataclass
class NoiseDistribution:
"""
All noise distributions are instances of this class.
"""
# cut-off for Gaussian distributions
gaussian_tail_bound = 2
# probability that a coefficient falls within the cut-off
gaussian_tail_prob = 1 - 2 * exp(-4 * pi)
stddev: float
mean: float = 0
n: int = None
bounds: tuple = None
density: float = 1.0 # Hamming weight / dimension.
tag: str = ""
def __lt__(self, other):
"""
We compare distributions by comparing their standard deviation.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(2.0) < ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
True
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0) < ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
False
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(4.0) < ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
False
"""
try:
return self.stddev < other.stddev
except AttributeError:
return self.stddev < other
def __le__(self, other):
"""
We compare distributions by comparing their standard deviation.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(2.0) <= ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
True
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0) <= ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
True
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(4.0) <= ND.CenteredBinomial(18)
False
"""
try:
return self.stddev <= other.stddev
except AttributeError:
return self.stddev <= other
def __str__(self):
"""
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussianAlpha(0.01, 7681)
D(σ=30.64)
"""
if self.n:
return f"D(σ={float(self.stddev):.2f}, μ={float(self.mean):.2f}, n={int(self.n)})"
else:
return f"D(σ={float(self.stddev):.2f}, μ={float(self.mean):.2f})"
def __repr__(self):
if self.mean == 0.0:
return f"D(σ={float(self.stddev):.2f})"
else:
return f"D(σ={float(self.stddev):.2f}, μ={float(self.mean):.2f})"
def __hash__(self):
"""
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> hash(ND(3.0, 1.0)) == hash((3.0, 1.0, None))
True
"""
return hash((self.stddev, self.mean, self.n))
def __len__(self):
"""
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> D = ND.SparseTernary(1024, p=128, m=128)
>>> len(D)
1024
>>> int(round(len(D) * float(D.density)))
256
"""
if self.n is not None:
return self.n
else:
raise ValueError("Distribution has no length.")
@property
def is_Gaussian_like(self):
return ("Gaussian" in self.tag) or ("CenteredBinomial" in self.tag)
@property
def is_bounded(self):
return (self.bounds[1] - self.bounds[0]) < oo
@property
def is_sparse(self):
"""
We consider a distribution "sparse" if its density is < 1/2.
"""
# NOTE: somewhat arbitrary
return self.density < 0.5
def support_size(self, n=None, fraction=1.0):
"""
Compute the size of the support covering the probability given as fraction.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> D = ND.Uniform(-3,3, 64)
>>> D.support_size(fraction=.99)
1207562882759477428726191443614714994252339953407098880
>>> D = ND.SparseTernary(64, 8)
>>> D.support_size()
32016101348447354880
"""
if not n:
if not self.n:
raise ValueError(f"Length required to determine support size, but n was {n}.")
n = self.n
if "SparseTernary" in self.tag:
h = self.h
# TODO: this is assuming that the non-zero entries are uniform over {-1,1}
# need p and m for more accurate calculation
size = 2 ** h * binomial(n, h) * RR(fraction)
elif self.is_bounded:
# TODO: this might be suboptimal/inaccurate for binomial distribution
a, b = self.bounds
size = RR(fraction) * (b - a + 1) ** n
else:
# Looks like nd is Gaussian
# -> we'll treat it as bounded (with failure probability)
t = self.gaussian_tail_bound
p = self.gaussian_tail_prob
if p ** n < fraction:
raise NotImplementedError(
f"TODO(nd.support-size): raise t. {RR(p ** n)}, {n}, {fraction}"
)
b = 2 * t * sigmaf(self.stddev) + 1
return (2 * b + 1) ** n
return ceil(size)
def get_hamming_weight(self, n=None):
if hasattr(self, "h"):
return self.h
if not n:
if not self.n:
raise ValueError("Length required to determine hamming weight.")
n = self.n
return round(n * self.density)
@staticmethod
def DiscreteGaussian(stddev, mean=0, n=None):
"""
A discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation ``stddev`` per component.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussian(3.0, 1.0)
D(σ=3.00, μ=1.00)
"""
return NoiseDistribution(
stddev=RR(stddev), mean=RR(mean), n=n, bounds=(-oo, oo), tag="DiscreteGaussian"
)
@staticmethod
def DiscreteGaussianAlpha(alpha, q, mean=0, n=None):
"""
A discrete Gaussian distribution with standard deviation α⋅q/√(2π) per component.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.DiscreteGaussianAlpha(0.001, 2048)
D(σ=0.82)
"""
stddev = stddevf(alpha * q)
return NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=RR(stddev), mean=RR(mean), n=n)
@staticmethod
def CenteredBinomial(eta, n=None):
"""
Sample a_1, …, a_η, b_1, …, b_η and return Σ(a_i - b_i).
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.CenteredBinomial(8)
D(σ=2.00)
"""
stddev = sqrt(eta / 2.0)
# TODO: density
return NoiseDistribution(
stddev=RR(stddev), mean=RR(0), n=n, bounds=(-eta, eta), tag="CenteredBinomial"
)
@staticmethod
def Uniform(a, b, n=None):
"""
Uniform distribution ∈ ``[a,b]``, endpoints inclusive.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.Uniform(-3, 3)
D(σ=2.00)
>>> ND.Uniform(-4, 3)
D(σ=2.29, μ=-0.50)
"""
if b < a:
raise ValueError(f"upper limit must be larger than lower limit but got: {b} < {a}")
m = b - a + 1
mean = (a + b) / RR(2)
stddev = sqrt((m ** 2 - 1) / RR(12))
if a <= 0 and 0 <= b:
density = 1.0 - 1.0 / m
else:
density = 0.0
return NoiseDistribution(
n=n, stddev=stddev, mean=mean, bounds=(a, b), density=density, tag="Uniform"
)
@staticmethod
def UniformMod(q, n=None):
"""
Uniform mod ``q``, with balanced representation.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.UniformMod(7)
D(σ=2.00)
>>> ND.UniformMod(8)
D(σ=2.29, μ=-0.50)
"""
a = -(q // 2)
b = q // 2
if q % 2 == 0:
b -= 1
return NoiseDistribution.Uniform(a, b, n=n)
@staticmethod
def SparseTernary(n, p, m=None):
"""
Distribution of vectors of length ``n`` with ``p`` entries of 1 and ``m`` entries of -1, rest 0.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from estimator.nd import NoiseDistribution as ND
>>> ND.SparseTernary(100, p=10)
D(σ=0.45)
>>> ND.SparseTernary(100, p=10, m=10)
D(σ=0.45)
>>> ND.SparseTernary(100, p=10, m=8)
D(σ=0.42, μ=0.02)
"""
if m is None:
m = p
if n == 0:
# this might happen in the dual attack
return NoiseDistribution(stddev=0, mean=0, density=0, bounds=(-1, 1), tag="SparseTernary", n=0)
mean = RR(p / n - m / n)
stddev = RR(sqrt((p + m) / n))
density = RR((p + m) / n)
D = NoiseDistribution(
stddev=stddev, mean=mean, density=density, bounds=(-1, 1), tag="SparseTernary", n=n
)
D.h = p + m
return D

131
estimator_new/prob.py
View File

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from sage.all import binomial, ZZ, log, ceil, RealField, oo, exp, pi
from sage.all import RealDistribution, RR, sqrt, prod, erf
from .nd import sigmaf
def mitm_babai_probability(r, stddev, q, fast=False):
"""
Compute the "e-admissibility" probability associated to the mitm step, according to
[EPRINT:SonChe19]_
:params r: the squared GSO lengths
:params stddev: the std.dev of the error distribution
:params q: the LWE modulus
:param fast: toggle for setting p = 1 (faster, but underestimates security)
:return: probability for the mitm process
# NOTE: the model sometimes outputs negative probabilities, we set p = 0 in this case
"""
if fast:
# overestimate the probability -> underestimate security
p = 1
else:
# get non-squared norms
R = [sqrt(s) for s in r]
alphaq = sigmaf(stddev)
probs = [
RR(
erf(s * sqrt(RR(pi)) / alphaq)
+ (alphaq / s) * ((exp(-s * sqrt(RR(pi)) / alphaq) - 1) / RR(pi))
)
for s in R
]
p = RR(prod(probs))
if p < 0 or p > 1:
p = 0.0
return p
def babai(r, norm):
"""
Babai probability following [EPRINT:Wun16]_.
"""
R = [RR(sqrt(t) / (2 * norm)) for t in r]
T = RealDistribution("beta", ((len(r) - 1) / 2, 1.0 / 2))
probs = [1 - T.cum_distribution_function(1 - s ** 2) for s in R]
return prod(probs)
def drop(n, h, k, fail=0, rotations=False):
"""
Probability that ``k`` randomly sampled components have ``fail`` non-zero components amongst
them.
:param n: LWE dimension `n > 0`
:param h: number of non-zero components
:param k: number of components to ignore
:param fail: we tolerate ``fail`` number of non-zero components amongst the `k` ignored
components
:param rotations: consider rotations of the basis to exploit ring structure (NTRU only)
"""
N = n # population size
K = n - h # number of success states in the population
n = k # number of draws
k = n - fail # number of observed successes
prob_drop = binomial(K, k) * binomial(N - K, n - k) / binomial(N, n)
if rotations:
return 1 - (1 - prob_drop) ** N
else:
return prob_drop
def amplify(target_success_probability, success_probability, majority=False):
"""
Return the number of trials needed to amplify current `success_probability` to
`target_success_probability`
:param target_success_probability: targeted success probability < 1
:param success_probability: targeted success probability < 1
:param majority: if `True` amplify a deicsional problem, not a computational one
if `False` then we assume that we can check solutions, so one success suffices
:returns: number of required trials to amplify
"""
if target_success_probability < success_probability:
return ZZ(1)
if success_probability == 0.0:
return oo
prec = max(
53,
2 * ceil(abs(log(success_probability, 2))),
2 * ceil(abs(log(1 - success_probability, 2))),
2 * ceil(abs(log(target_success_probability, 2))),
2 * ceil(abs(log(1 - target_success_probability, 2))),
)
prec = min(prec, 2048)
RR = RealField(prec)
success_probability = RR(success_probability)
target_success_probability = RR(target_success_probability)
try:
if majority:
eps = success_probability / 2
return ceil(2 * log(2 - 2 * target_success_probability) / log(1 - 4 * eps ** 2))
else:
# target_success_probability = 1 - (1-success_probability)^trials
return ceil(log(1 - target_success_probability) / log(1 - success_probability))
except ValueError:
return oo
def amplify_sigma(target_advantage, sigma, q):
"""
Amplify distinguishing advantage for a given σ and q
:param target_advantage:
:param sigma: (Lists of) Gaussian width parameters
:param q: Modulus q > 0
"""
try:
sigma = sum(sigma_ ** 2 for sigma_ in sigma).sqrt()
except TypeError:
pass
advantage = float(exp(-float(pi) * (float(sigma / q) ** 2)))
return amplify(target_advantage, advantage, majority=True)

571
estimator_new/reduction.py
View File

@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Cost estimates for lattice redution.
"""
from sage.all import ZZ, RR, pi, e, find_root, ceil, log, oo, round
from scipy.optimize import newton
def _delta(beta):
"""
Compute δ from block size β without enforcing β ∈ ZZ.
δ for β ≤ 40 were computed as follows:
```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from fpylll import BKZ, IntegerMatrix
from multiprocessing import Pool
from sage.all import mean, sqrt, exp, log, cputime
d, trials = 320, 32
def f((A, beta)):
par = BKZ.Param(block_size=beta, strategies=BKZ.DEFAULT_STRATEGY, flags=BKZ.AUTO_ABORT)
q = A[-1, -1]
d = A.nrows
t = cputime()
A = BKZ.reduction(A, par, float_type="dd")
t = cputime(t)
return t, exp(log(A[0].norm()/sqrt(q).n())/d)
if __name__ == '__main__':
for beta in (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 28, 30, 35, 40):
delta = []
t = []
i = 0
while i < trials:
threads = int(open("delta.nthreads").read()) # make sure this file exists
pool = Pool(threads)
A = [(IntegerMatrix.random(d, "qary", beta=d//2, bits=50), beta) for j in range(threads)]
for (t_, delta_) in pool.imap_unordered(f, A):
t.append(t_)
delta.append(delta_)
i += threads
print u"β: %2d, δ_0: %.5f, time: %5.1fs, (%2d,%2d)"%(beta, mean(delta), mean(t), i, threads)
print
```
"""
small = (
(2, 1.02190), # noqa
(5, 1.01862), # noqa
(10, 1.01616),
(15, 1.01485),
(20, 1.01420),
(25, 1.01342),
(28, 1.01331),
(40, 1.01295),
)
if beta <= 2:
return RR(1.0219)
elif beta < 40:
for i in range(1, len(small)):
if small[i][0] > beta:
return RR(small[i - 1][1])
elif beta == 40:
return RR(small[-1][1])
else:
return RR(beta / (2 * pi * e) * (pi * beta) ** (1 / beta)) ** (1 / (2 * (beta - 1)))
def delta(beta):
"""
Compute root-Hermite factor δ from block size β.
:param beta: Block size.
"""
beta = ZZ(round(beta))
return _delta(beta)
def _beta_secant(delta):
"""
Estimate required block size β for a given root-Hermite factor δ based on [PhD:Chen13]_.
:param delta: Root-Hermite factor.
EXAMPLE::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> 50 == RC._beta_secant(1.0121)
True
>>> 100 == RC._beta_secant(1.0093)
True
>>> RC._beta_secant(1.0024) # Chen reports 800
808
"""
# newton() will produce a "warning", if two subsequent function values are
# indistinguishable (i.e. equal in terms of machine precision). In this case
# newton() will return the value beta in the middle between the two values
# k1,k2 for which the function values were indistinguishable.
# Since f approaches zero for beta->+Infinity, this may be the case for very
# large inputs, like beta=1e16.
# For now, these warnings just get printed and the value beta is used anyways.
# This seems reasonable, since for such large inputs the exact value of beta
# doesn't make such a big difference.
try:
beta = newton(
lambda beta: RR(_delta(beta) - delta),
100,
fprime=None,
args=(),
tol=1.48e-08,
maxiter=500,
)
beta = ceil(beta)
if beta < 40:
# newton may output beta < 40. The old beta method wouldn't do this. For
# consistency, call the old beta method, i.e. consider this try as "failed".
raise RuntimeError("β < 40")
return beta
except (RuntimeError, TypeError):
# if something fails, use old beta method
beta = _beta_simple(delta)
return beta
def _beta_find_root(delta):
"""
Estimate required block size β for a given root-Hermite factor δ based on [PhD:Chen13]_.
:param delta: Root-Hermite factor.
TESTS::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> RC._beta_find_root(RC.delta(500))
500
"""
# handle beta < 40 separately
beta = ZZ(40)
if _delta(beta) < delta:
return beta
try:
beta = find_root(lambda beta: RR(_delta(beta) - delta), 40, 2 ** 16, maxiter=500)
beta = ceil(beta - 1e-8)
except RuntimeError:
# finding root failed; reasons:
# 1. maxiter not sufficient
# 2. no root in given interval
beta = _beta_simple(delta)
return beta
def _beta_simple(delta):
"""
Estimate required block size β for a given root-Hermite factor δ based on [PhD:Chen13]_.
:param delta: Root-Hermite factor.
TESTS::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> RC._beta_simple(RC.delta(500))
501
"""
beta = ZZ(40)
while _delta(2 * beta) > delta:
beta *= 2
while _delta(beta + 10) > delta:
beta += 10
while True:
if _delta(beta) < delta:
break
beta += 1
return beta
def beta(delta):
"""
Estimate required block size β for a given root-hermite factor δ based on [PhD:Chen13]_.
:param delta: Root-hermite factor.
EXAMPLE::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> 50 == RC.beta(1.0121)
True
>>> 100 == RC.beta(1.0093)
True
>>> RC.beta(1.0024) # Chen reports 800
808
"""
# TODO: decide for one strategy (secant, find_root, old) and its error handling
beta = _beta_find_root(delta)
return beta
# BKZ Estimates
def svp_repeat(beta, d):
"""
Return number of SVP calls in BKZ-β.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
.. note :: Loosely based on experiments in [PhD:Chen13].
.. note :: When d ≤ β we return 1.
"""
if beta < d:
return 8 * d
else:
return 1
def LLL(d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation for LLL algorithm based on [AC:CheNgu11]_.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
"""
if B:
return d ** 3 * B ** 2
else:
return d ** 3 # ignoring B for backward compatibility
def _BDGL16_small(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation given β and assuming sieving is used to realise the SVP oracle for small
dimensions following [SODA:BDGL16]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
TESTS::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC._BDGL16_small(500, 1024), 2.0)
222.9
"""
return LLL(d, B) + ZZ(2) ** RR(0.387 * beta + 16.4 + log(svp_repeat(beta, d), 2))
def _BDGL16_asymptotic(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation given `β` and assuming sieving is used to realise the SVP oracle following [SODA:BDGL16]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
TESTS::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC._BDGL16_asymptotic(500, 1024), 2.0)
175.4
"""
# TODO we simply pick the same additive constant 16.4 as for the experimental result in [SODA:BDGL16]_
return LLL(d, B) + ZZ(2) ** RR(0.292 * beta + 16.4 + log(svp_repeat(beta, d), 2))
def BDGL16(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation given `β` and assuming sieving is used to realise the SVP oracle following [SODA:BDGL16]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.BDGL16(500, 1024), 2.0)
175.4
"""
# TODO this is somewhat arbitrary
if beta <= 90:
return _BDGL16_small(beta, d, B)
else:
return _BDGL16_asymptotic(beta, d, B)
def LaaMosPol14(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation for quantum sieving following [EPRINT:LaaMosPol14]_ and [PhD:Laarhoven15]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.LaaMosPol14(500, 1024), 2.0)
161.9
"""
return LLL(d, B) + ZZ(2) ** RR((0.265 * beta + 16.4 + log(svp_repeat(beta, d), 2)))
def CheNgu12(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Runtime estimation given β and assuming [CheNgu12]_ estimates are correct.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
The constants in this function were derived as follows based on Table 4 in
[CheNgu12]_::
>>> from sage.all import var, find_fit
>>> dim = [100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250]
>>> nodes = [39.0, 44.0, 49.0, 54.0, 60.0, 66.0, 72.0, 78.0, 84.0, 96.0, 99.0, 105.0, 111.0, 120.0, 127.0, 134.0] # noqa
>>> times = [c + log(200,2).n() for c in nodes]
>>> T = list(zip(dim, nodes))
>>> var("a,b,c,beta")
(a, b, c, beta)
>>> f = a*beta*log(beta, 2.0) + b*beta + c
>>> f = f.function(beta)
>>> f.subs(find_fit(T, f, solution_dict=True))
beta |--> 0.2701...*beta*log(beta) - 1.0192...*beta + 16.10...
The estimation 2^(0.18728 β⋅log_2(β) - 1.019⋅β + 16.10) is of the number of enumeration
nodes, hence we need to multiply by the number of cycles to process one node. This cost per
node is typically estimated as 64.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.CheNgu12(500, 1024), 2.0)
365.70...
"""
repeat = svp_repeat(beta, d)
cost = RR(
0.270188776350190 * beta * log(beta)
- 1.0192050451318417 * beta
+ 16.10253135200765
+ log(100, 2)
)
return LLL(d, B) + repeat * ZZ(2) ** cost
def ABFKSW20(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Enumeration cost according to [C:ABFKSW20]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.ABFKSW20(500, 1024), 2.0)
316.26...
"""
if 1.5 * beta >= d or beta <= 92: # 1.5β is a bit arbitrary, β≤92 is the crossover point
cost = RR(0.1839 * beta * log(beta, 2) - 0.995 * beta + 16.25 + log(64, 2))
else:
cost = RR(0.125 * beta * log(beta, 2) - 0.547 * beta + 10.4 + log(64, 2))
repeat = svp_repeat(beta, d)
return LLL(d, B) + repeat * ZZ(2) ** cost
def ABLR21(beta, d, B=None):
"""
Enumeration cost according to [C:ABLR21]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.ABLR21(500, 1024), 2.0)
278.20...
"""
if 1.5 * beta >= d or beta <= 97: # 1.5β is a bit arbitrary, 97 is the crossover
cost = RR(0.1839 * beta * log(beta, 2) - 1.077 * beta + 29.12 + log(64, 2))
else:
cost = RR(0.1250 * beta * log(beta, 2) - 0.654 * beta + 25.84 + log(64, 2))
repeat = svp_repeat(beta, d)
return LLL(d, B) + repeat * ZZ(2) ** cost
def ADPS16(beta, d, B=None, mode="classical"):
"""
Runtime estimation from [USENIX:ADPS16]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.ADPS16(500, 1024), 2.0)
146.0
>>> log(RC.ADPS16(500, 1024, mode="quantum"), 2.0)
132.5
>>> log(RC.ADPS16(500, 1024, mode="paranoid"), 2.0)
103.75
"""
if mode not in ("classical", "quantum", "paranoid"):
raise ValueError(f"Mode {mode} not understood.")
c = {
"classical": 0.2920,
"quantum": 0.2650, # paper writes 0.262 but this isn't right, see above
"paranoid": 0.2075,
}
c = c[mode]
return ZZ(2) ** RR(c * beta)
def d4f(beta):
"""
Dimensions "for free" following [EC:Ducas18]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
If β' is output by this function then sieving is expected to be required up to dimension β-β'.
EXAMPLE::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> RC.d4f(500)
42.597...
"""
return max(float(beta * log(4 / 3.0) / log(beta / (2 * pi * e))), 0.0)
# These are not asymptotic expressions but compress the data in [AC:AGPS20]_ which covers up to
# β = 1024
NN_AGPS = {
"all_pairs-classical": {"a": 0.4215069316613415, "b": 20.1669683097337},
"all_pairs-dw": {"a": 0.3171724396445732, "b": 25.29828951733785},
"all_pairs-g": {"a": 0.3155285835002801, "b": 22.478746811528048},
"all_pairs-ge19": {"a": 0.3222895263943544, "b": 36.11746438609666},
"all_pairs-naive_classical": {"a": 0.4186251294633655, "b": 9.899382654377058},
"all_pairs-naive_quantum": {"a": 0.31401512556555794, "b": 7.694659515948326},
"all_pairs-t_count": {"a": 0.31553282515234704, "b": 20.878594142502994},
"list_decoding-classical": {"a": 0.2988026130564745, "b": 26.011121212891872},
"list_decoding-dw": {"a": 0.26944796385592995, "b": 28.97237346443934},
"list_decoding-g": {"a": 0.26937450988892553, "b": 26.925140365395972},
"list_decoding-ge19": {"a": 0.2695210400018704, "b": 35.47132142280775},
"list_decoding-naive_classical": {"a": 0.2973130399197453, "b": 21.142124058689426},
"list_decoding-naive_quantum": {"a": 0.2674316807758961, "b": 18.720680589028465},
"list_decoding-t_count": {"a": 0.26945736714156543, "b": 25.913746774011887},
"random_buckets-classical": {"a": 0.35586144233444716, "b": 23.082527816636638},
"random_buckets-dw": {"a": 0.30704199612690264, "b": 25.581968903639485},
"random_buckets-g": {"a": 0.30610964725102385, "b": 22.928235564044563},
"random_buckets-ge19": {"a": 0.31089687599538407, "b": 36.02129978813208},
"random_buckets-naive_classical": {"a": 0.35448283789554513, "b": 15.28878540793908},
"random_buckets-naive_quantum": {"a": 0.30211421791887644, "b": 11.151745013027089},
"random_buckets-t_count": {"a": 0.30614770082829745, "b": 21.41830142853265},
}
def Kyber(beta, d, B=None, nn="classical", C=5.46):
"""
Runtime estimation from [Kyber20]_ and [AC:AGPS20]_.
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
:param nn: Nearest neighbor cost model. We default to "ListDecoding" (i.e. BDGL16) and to
the "depth × width" metric. Kyber uses "AllPairs".
:param C: Progressive overhead lim_{β → ∞} ∑_{i ≤ β} 2^{0.292 i + o(i)}/2^{0.292 β + o(β)}.
EXAMPLE::
>>> from math import log
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> log(RC.Kyber(500, 1024), 2.0)
174.16...
>>> log(RC.Kyber(500, 1024, nn="list_decoding-ge19"), 2.0)
170.23...
"""
if beta < 20: # goes haywire
return CheNgu12(beta, d, B)
if nn == "classical":
nn = "list_decoding-classical"
elif nn == "quantum":
nn = "list_decoding-dw"
svp_calls = C * max(d - beta, 1)
# we do not round to the nearest integer to ensure cost is continuously increasing with β which
# rounding can violate.
beta_ = beta - d4f(beta)
gate_count = 2 ** (NN_AGPS[nn]["a"] * beta_ + NN_AGPS[nn]["b"])
return LLL(d, B=B) + svp_calls * gate_count
def cost(cost_model, beta, d, B=None, predicate=None, **kwds):
"""
Return cost dictionary for computing vector of norm` δ_0^{d-1} Vol(Λ)^{1/d}` using provided lattice
reduction algorithm.
:param cost_model:
:param beta: Block size ≥ 2.
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param B: Bit-size of entries.
:param predicate: if ``False`` cost will be infinity.
EXAMPLE::
>>> import estimator.reduction as RC
>>> RC.cost(RC.ABLR21, 120, 500)
rop: ≈2^68.9, red: ≈2^68.9, δ: 1.008435, β: 120, d: 500
>>> RC.cost(RC.ABLR21, 120, 500, predicate=False)
rop: ≈2^inf, red: ≈2^inf, δ: 1.008435, β: 120, d: 500
"""
from .cost import Cost
cost = cost_model(beta, d, B)
delta_ = delta(beta)
cost = Cost(rop=cost, red=cost, delta=delta_, beta=beta, d=d, **kwds)
cost.register_impermanent(rop=True, red=True, delta=False, beta=False, d=False)
if predicate is not None and not predicate:
cost["red"] = oo
cost["rop"] = oo
return cost

402
estimator_new/schemes.py
View File

@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
from .nd import NoiseDistribution, stddevf
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
#
# Kyber
#
#
# https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/data/kyber-specification-round3-20210804.pdf
# Table 1, Page 11, we are ignoring the compression
#
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1308.pdf
# Table 2, page 27, disagrees on Kyber 512
Kyber512 = LWEParameters(
n=2 * 256,
q=3329,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(3),
m=2 * 256,
tag="Kyber 512",
)
Kyber768 = LWEParameters(
n=3 * 256,
q=3329,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(2),
m=3 * 256,
tag="Kyber 768",
)
Kyber1024 = LWEParameters(
n=4 * 256,
q=3329,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(2),
m=4 * 256,
tag="Kyber 1024",
)
#
# Saber
#
#
# https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/pqcrypto/saber/files/saberspecround3.pdf
# Table 1, page 11
#
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1308.pdf
# Table 2, page 27, agrees
LightSaber = LWEParameters(
n=2 * 256,
q=8192,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(5),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(7),
m=2 * 256,
tag="LightSaber",
)
Saber = LWEParameters(
n=3 * 256,
q=8192,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(4),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(7),
m=3 * 256,
tag="Saber",
)
FireSaber = LWEParameters(
n=4 * 256,
q=8192,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.CenteredBinomial(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(7),
m=4 * 256,
tag="FireSaber",
)
NTRUHPS2048509Enc = LWEParameters(
n=508,
q=2048,
Xe=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(508, 2048 / 16 - 1),
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
m=508,
tag="NTRUHPS2048509Enc",
)
NTRUHPS2048677Enc = LWEParameters(
n=676,
q=2048,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(676, 2048 / 16 - 1),
m=676,
tag="NTRUHPS2048677Enc",
)
NTRUHPS4096821Enc = LWEParameters(
n=820,
q=4096,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(820, 4096 / 16 - 1),
m=820,
tag="NTRUHPS4096821Enc",
)
NTRUHRSS701Enc = LWEParameters(
n=700,
q=8192,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
m=700,
tag="NTRUHRSS701",
)
NISTPQC_R3 = (
Kyber512,
Kyber768,
Kyber1024,
LightSaber,
Saber,
FireSaber,
NTRUHPS2048509Enc,
NTRUHPS2048677Enc,
NTRUHPS4096821Enc,
NTRUHRSS701Enc,
)
HESv111024128error = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 27,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(3.0),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(3.0),
m=1024,
tag="HESv11error",
)
HESv111024128ternary = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 27,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(3.0),
m=1024,
tag="HESv11ternary",
)
HESv11 = (HESv111024128error, HESv111024128ternary)
# FHE schemes
# TFHE
# https://tfhe.github.io/tfhe/security_and_params.html
TFHE630 = LWEParameters(
n=630,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2 ** (-15) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE630",
)
TFHE1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2 ** (-25) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE630",
)
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/421.pdf
# Table 3, page 55
TFHE16_500 = LWEParameters(
n=500,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2.43 * 10 ** (-5) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE16_500",
)
TFHE16_1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.73 * 10 ** (-9) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE16_1024",
)
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/421.pdf
# Table 4, page 55
TFHE20_612 = LWEParameters(
n=612,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2 ** (-15) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE20_612",
)
TFHE20_1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2 ** (-26) * 2 ** 32),
tag="TFHE20_1024",
)
# FHEW
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/816.pdf
# page 14
FHEW = LWEParameters(
n=500,
q=2 ** 32,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(2),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2 ** (-15) * 2 ** 32),
tag="FHEW",
)
# SEAL
# v2.0
# https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/sealmanual.pdf
# Table 3, page 19
SEAL20_1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 48 - 2 ** 20 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL20_1024",
)
SEAL20_2048 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 94 - 2 ** 20 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL20_2048",
)
SEAL20_4096 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 190 - 2 ** 30 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL20_4096",
)
SEAL20_8192 = LWEParameters(
n=8192,
q=2 ** 383 - 2 ** 33 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL20_8192",
)
SEAL20_16384 = LWEParameters(
n=16384,
q=2 ** 767 - 2 ** 56 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL20_16384",
)
# v2.2
# https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/sealmanual_v2.2.pdf
# Table 3, page 20
SEAL22_2048 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 60 - 2 ** 14 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL22_2048",
)
SEAL22_4096 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 116 - 2 ** 18 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL22_4096",
)
SEAL22_8192 = LWEParameters(
n=8192,
q=2 ** 226 - 2 ** 26 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL22_8192",
)
SEAL22_16384 = LWEParameters(
n=16384,
q=2 ** 435 - 2 ** 33 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL22_16384",
)
SEAL22_32768 = LWEParameters(
n=32768,
q=2 ** 889 - 2 ** 54 - 2 ** 53 - 2 ** 52 + 1,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.UniformMod(3),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.19),
tag="SEAL22_32768",
)
# The following are not parameters of actual schemes
# but useful for benchmarking
# HElib
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/047.pdf
# Table 1, page 6
# 80-bit security
HElib80_1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 47,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=1024, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_1024",
)
HElib80_2048 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 87,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=2048, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_2048",
)
HElib80_4096 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 167,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=4096, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_4096",
)
# 120-bit security
HElib120_1024 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 38,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=1024, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_1024",
)
HElib120_2048 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 70,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=2048, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_2048",
)
HElib120_4096 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 134,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=4096, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=3.2),
tag="HElib80_4096",
)
# Test parameters from CHHS
# https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1114.pdf
# Table 4, page 18
CHHS_1024_25 = LWEParameters(
n=1024,
q=2 ** 25,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=1024, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=stddevf(8)),
tag="CHHS_1024_25",
)
CHHS_2048_38 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 38,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=2048, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=stddevf(8)),
tag="CHHS_2048_38",
)
CHHS_2048_45 = LWEParameters(
n=2048,
q=2 ** 45,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=2048, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=stddevf(8)),
tag="CHHS_2048_45",
)
CHHS_4096_67 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 67,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=4096, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=stddevf(8)),
tag="CHHS_4096_67",
)
CHHS_4096_82 = LWEParameters(
n=4096,
q=2 ** 82,
Xs=NoiseDistribution.SparseTernary(n=4096, p=32),
Xe=NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(stddev=stddevf(8)),
tag="CHHS_4096_82",
)

72
estimator_new/simulator.py
View File

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Simulate lattice reduction on the rows of::
⌜ ξI A 0 ⌝
ǀ 0 qI 0 |
⌞ 0 c τ ⌟
where
- ξI ∈ ZZ^{n × n},
- A ∈ ZZ_q^{n × m},
- qI ∈ ZZ^{m × m},
- τ ∈ ZZ and
- d = m + n + 1.
The last row is optional.
"""
from sage.all import RR, log
def CN11(d, n, q, beta, xi=1, tau=1):
from fpylll import BKZ
from fpylll.tools.bkz_simulator import simulate
if tau is not None:
r = [q ** 2] * (d - n - 1) + [xi ** 2] * n + [tau ** 2]
else:
r = [q ** 2] * (d - n) + [xi ** 2] * n
return simulate(r, BKZ.EasyParam(beta))[0]
def GSA(d, n, q, beta, xi=1, tau=1):
"""Reduced lattice shape fallowing the Geometric Series Assumption [Schnorr03]_
:param d: Lattice dimension.
:param n: Number of `q` vectors
:param q: Modulus `q`
:param beta: Block size β.
:param xi: Scaling factor ξ for identity part.
:param tau: Kannan factor τ.
"""
from .reduction import delta as deltaf
if tau is not None:
log_vol = RR(log(q, 2) * (d - n - 1) + log(xi, 2) * n + log(tau, 2))
else:
log_vol = RR(log(q, 2) * (d - n) + log(xi, 2) * n)
delta = deltaf(beta)
r_log = [(d - 1 - 2 * i) * RR(log(delta, 2)) + log_vol / d for i in range(d)]
r = [2 ** (2 * r_) for r_ in r_log]
return r
def normalize(name):
if str(name).upper() == "CN11":
return CN11
elif str(name).upper() == "GSA":
return GSA
else:
return name
def plot_gso(r, *args, **kwds):
from sage.all import line
return line([(i, log(r_, 2) / 2.0) for i, r_ in enumerate(r)], *args, **kwds)

295
estimator_new/util.py
View File

@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
from multiprocessing import Pool
from functools import partial
from sage.all import ceil, floor
from .io import Logging
class local_minimum_base:
"""
An iterator context for finding a local minimum using binary search.
We use the immediate neighborhood of a point to decide the next direction to go into (gradient
descent style), so the algorithm is not plain binary search (see ``update()`` function.)
.. note :: We combine an iterator and a context to give the caller access to the result.
"""
def __init__(
self,
start,
stop,
smallerf=lambda x, best: x <= best,
suppress_bounds_warning=False,
log_level=5,
):
"""
Create a fresh local minimum search context.
:param start: starting point
:param stop: end point (exclusive)
:param smallerf: a function to decide if ``lhs`` is smaller than ``rhs``.
:param suppress_bounds_warning: do not warn if a boundary is picked as optimal
"""
if stop < start:
raise ValueError(f"Incorrect bounds {start} > {stop}.")
self._suppress_bounds_warning = suppress_bounds_warning
self._log_level = log_level
self._start = start
self._stop = stop - 1
self._initial_bounds = (start, stop - 1)
self._smallerf = smallerf
# abs(self._direction) == 2: binary search step
# abs(self._direction) == 1: gradient descent direction
self._direction = -1 # going down
self._last_x = None
self._next_x = self._stop
self._best = (None, None)
self._all_x = set()
def __enter__(self):
""" """
return self
def __exit__(self, type, value, traceback):
""" """
pass
def __iter__(self):
""" """
return self
def __next__(self):
abort = False
if self._next_x is None:
abort = True # we're told to abort
elif self._next_x in self._all_x:
abort = True # we're looping
elif self._next_x < self._initial_bounds[0] or self._initial_bounds[1] < self._next_x:
abort = True # we're stepping out of bounds
if not abort:
self._last_x = self._next_x
self._next_x = None
return self._last_x
if self._best[0] in self._initial_bounds and not self._suppress_bounds_warning:
# We warn the user if the optimal solution is at the edge and thus possibly not optimal.
Logging.log(
"bins",
self._log_level,
f'warning: "optimal" solution {self._best[0]} matches a bound ∈ {self._initial_bounds}.',
)
raise StopIteration
@property
def x(self):
return self._best[0]
@property
def y(self):
return self._best[1]
def update(self, res):
"""
TESTS:
We keep cache old inputs in ``_all_x`` to prevent infinite loops::
>>> from estimator.util import binary_search
>>> from estimator.cost import Cost
>>> f = lambda x, log_level=1: Cost(rop=1) if x >= 19 else Cost(rop=2)
>>> binary_search(f, 10, 30, "x")
rop: 1
"""
Logging.log("bins", self._log_level, f"({self._last_x}, {repr(res)})")
self._all_x.add(self._last_x)
# We got nothing yet
if self._best[0] is None:
self._best = self._last_x, res
# We found something better
if res is not False and self._smallerf(res, self._best[1]):
# store it
self._best = self._last_x, res
# if it's a result of a long jump figure out the next direction
if abs(self._direction) != 1:
self._direction = -1
self._next_x = self._last_x - 1
# going down worked, so let's keep on doing that.
elif self._direction == -1:
self._direction = -2
self._stop = self._last_x
self._next_x = ceil((self._start + self._stop) / 2)
# going up worked, so let's keep on doing that.
elif self._direction == 1:
self._direction = 2
self._start = self._last_x
self._next_x = floor((self._start + self._stop) / 2)
else:
# going downwards didn't help, let's try up
if self._direction == -1:
self._direction = 1
self._next_x = self._last_x + 2
# going up didn't help either, so we stop
elif self._direction == 1:
self._next_x = None
# it got no better in a long jump, half the search space and try again
elif self._direction == -2:
self._start = self._last_x
self._next_x = ceil((self._start + self._stop) / 2)
elif self._direction == 2:
self._stop = self._last_x
self._next_x = floor((self._start + self._stop) / 2)
# We are repeating ourselves, time to stop
if self._next_x == self._last_x:
self._next_x = None
class local_minimum(local_minimum_base):
"""
An iterator context for finding a local minimum using binary search.
We use the neighborhood of a point to decide the next direction to go into (gradient descent
style), so the algorithm is not plain binary search (see ``update()`` function.)
We also zoom out by a factor ``precision``, find an approximate local minimum and then
search the neighbourhood for the smallest value.
.. note :: We combine an iterator and a context to give the caller access to the result.
"""
def __init__(
self,
start,
stop,
precision=1,
smallerf=lambda x, best: x <= best,
suppress_bounds_warning=False,
log_level=5,
):
"""
Create a fresh local minimum search context.
:param start: starting point
:param stop: end point (exclusive)
:param precision: only consider every ``precision``-th value in the main loop
:param smallerf: a function to decide if ``lhs`` is smaller than ``rhs``.
:param suppress_bounds_warning: do not warn if a boundary is picked as optimal
"""
self._precision = precision
self._orig_bounds = (start, stop)
start = ceil(start / precision)
stop = floor(stop / precision)
local_minimum_base.__init__(self, start, stop, smallerf, suppress_bounds_warning, log_level)
def __next__(self):
x = local_minimum_base.__next__(self)
return x * self._precision
@property
def x(self):
return self._best[0] * self._precision
@property
def neighborhood(self):
"""
An iterator over the neighborhood of the currently best value.
"""
start, stop = self._orig_bounds
for x in range(max(start, self.x - self._precision), min(stop, self.x + self._precision)):
yield x
def binary_search(
f, start, stop, param, step=1, smallerf=lambda x, best: x <= best, log_level=5, *args, **kwds
):
"""
Searches for the best value in the interval [start,stop] depending on the given comparison function.
:param start: start of range to search
:param stop: stop of range to search (exclusive)
:param param: the parameter to modify when calling `f`
:param smallerf: comparison is performed by evaluating ``smallerf(current, best)``
:param step: initially only consider every `steps`-th value
"""
with local_minimum(start, stop + 1, step, smallerf=smallerf, log_level=log_level) as it:
for x in it:
kwds_ = dict(kwds)
kwds_[param] = x
it.update(f(*args, **kwds_))
for x in it.neighborhood:
kwds_ = dict(kwds)
kwds_[param] = x
it.update(f(*args, **kwds_))
return it.y
def _batch_estimatef(f, x, log_level=0, f_repr=None):
y = f(x)
if f_repr is None:
f_repr = repr(f)
Logging.log("batch", log_level, f"f: {f_repr}")
Logging.log("batch", log_level, f"x: {x}")
Logging.log("batch", log_level, f"f(x): {repr(y)}")
return y
def f_name(f):
try:
return f.__name__
except AttributeError:
return repr(f)
def batch_estimate(params, algorithm, jobs=1, log_level=0, **kwds):
from .lwe_parameters import LWEParameters
if isinstance(params, LWEParameters):
params = (params,)
try:
iter(algorithm)
except TypeError:
algorithm = (algorithm,)
tasks = []
for x in params:
for f in algorithm:
tasks.append((partial(f, **kwds), x, log_level, f_name(f)))
if jobs == 1:
res = {}
for f, x, lvl, f_repr in tasks:
y = _batch_estimatef(f, x, lvl, f_repr)
res[f_repr, x] = y
else:
pool = Pool(jobs)
res = pool.starmap(_batch_estimatef, tasks)
res = dict([((f_repr, x), res[i]) for i, (f, x, _, f_repr) in enumerate(tasks)])
ret = dict()
for f, x in res:
ret[x] = ret.get(x, dict())
ret[x][f] = res[f, x]
return ret

272
old_files/concrete_params.py
View File

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
concrete_LWE_params = {
# 128-bits
"LWE128_256":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 256,
"sd": -5},
"LWE128_512":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 512,
"sd": -11},
"LWE128_638":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 630,
"sd": -14},
"LWE128_650":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 650,
"sd": -15},
"LWE128_688":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 688,
"sd": -16},
"LWE128_710":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 710,
"sd": -17},
"LWE128_750":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 750,
"sd": -17},
"LWE128_800":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 800,
"sd": -19},
"LWE128_830":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 830,
"sd": -20},
"LWE128_1024":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 1024,
"sd": -25},
"LWE128_2048":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 2048,
"sd": -52},
"LWE128_4096":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 4096,
"sd": -105},
# 80 bits
"LWE80_256":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 256,
"sd": -9,
},
"LWE80_256":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 256,
"sd": -19,
},
"LWE80_512":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 512,
"sd": -24,
},
"LWE80_650":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 650,
"sd": -25,
},
"LWE80_688":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 688,
"sd": -26,
},
"LWE80_710":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 710,
"sd": -27,
},
"LWE80_750":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 750,
"sd": -29,
},
"LWE80_800":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 800,
"sd": -31,
},
"LWE80_830":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 830,
"sd": -32,
},
"LWE80_1024":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 1024,
"sd": -40,
},
"LWE80_2048":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 2048,
"sd": -82,
}
}
concrete_RLWE_params = {
# 128-bits
## dimension 1
"RLWE128_256_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 256,
"sd": -5},
"RLWE128_512_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 512,
"sd": -11},
"RLWE128_1024_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 1024,
"sd": -25},
"RLWE128_2048_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 2048,
"sd": -52},
"RLWE128_4096_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 4096,
"sd": -105},
## dimension 2
"RLWE128_256_2":
{
"k": 2,
"n": 256,
"sd": -11},
"RLWE128_512_2":
{
"k": 2,
"n": 512,
"sd": -25},
## dimension 4
"RLWE128_256_4":
{
"k": 4,
"n": 256,
"sd": -25},
# 80 bits
## dimension 1
"RLWE80_256_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 256,
"sd": -9,
},
"RLWE80_512_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 512,
"sd": -19,
},
"RLWE80_1024_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 1024,
"sd": -40,
},
"RLWE80_2048_1":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 2048,
"sd": -82,
},
# dimension 2
"RLWE80_256_2":
{
"k": 2,
"n": 256,
"sd": -19,
},
"RLWE80_512_2":
{
"k": 1,
"n": 512,
"sd": -40,
},
# dimension 4
"RLWE80_256_4":
{
"k": 4,
"n": 256,
"sd": -40,
},
}

129
old_files/estimate_oldparams.py
View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
import estimator.estimator as est
from concrete_params import concrete_LWE_params, concrete_RLWE_params
from hybrid_decoding import parameter_search
def get_all_security_levels(params):
""" A function which gets the security levels of a collection of TFHE parameters,
using the four cost models: classical, quantum, classical_conservative, and
quantum_conservative
:param params: a dictionary of LWE parameter sets (see concrete_params)
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = get_all_security_levels(concrete_LWE_params)
sage: X
[['LWE128_256',
126.692189756144,
117.566189756144,
98.6960000000000,
89.5700000000000], ...]
"""
RESULTS = []
for param in params:
results = [param]
x = params["{}".format(param)]
n = x["n"] * x["k"]
q = 2 ** 32
sd = 2 ** (x["sd"]) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
secret_distribution = (0, 1)
# assume access to an infinite number of samples
m = oo
for model in cost_models:
try:
model = model[0]
except:
model = model
estimate = parameter_search(mitm = True, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, n = n, q = q, alpha = alpha, m = m, secret_distribution = secret_distribution)
results.append(get_security_level(estimate))
RESULTS.append(results)
return RESULTS
def get_hybrid_security_levels(params):
""" A function which gets the security levels of a collection of TFHE parameters,
using the four cost models: classical, quantum, classical_conservative, and
quantum_conservative
:param params: a dictionary of LWE parameter sets (see concrete_params)
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = get_all_security_levels(concrete_LWE_params)
sage: X
[['LWE128_256',
126.692189756144,
117.566189756144,
98.6960000000000,
89.5700000000000], ...]
"""
RESULTS = []
for param in params:
results = [param]
x = params["{}".format(param)]
n = x["n"] * x["k"]
q = 2 ** 32
sd = 2 ** (x["sd"]) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
secret_distribution = (0, 1)
# assume access to an infinite number of papers
m = oo
model = est.BKZ.sieve
estimate = parameter_search(mitm = True, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, n = n, q = q, alpha = alpha, m = m, secret_distribution = secret_distribution)
results.append(get_security_level(estimate))
RESULTS.append(results)
return RESULTS
def latexit(results):
"""
A function which takes the output of get_all_security_levels() and
turns it into a latex table
:param results: the security levels
sage: X = get_all_security_levels(concrete_LWE_params)
sage: latextit(X)
\begin{tabular}{llllll}
LWE128_256 & $126.69$ & $117.57$ & $98.7$ & $89.57$ & $217.55$ \\
LWE128_512 & $135.77$ & $125.92$ & $106.58$ & $96.73$ & $218.53$ \\
LWE128_638 & $135.27$ & $125.49$ & $105.7$ & $95.93$ & $216.81$ \\
[...]
"""
return latex(table(results))
def markdownit(results, headings = ["Parameter Set", "Classical", "Quantum", "Classical (c)", "Quantum (c)", "Enum"]):
"""
A function which takes the output of get_all_security_levels() and
turns it into a markdown table
:param results: the security levels
sage: X = get_all_security_levels(concrete_LWE_params)
sage: markdownit(X)
# estimates
|Parameter Set|Classical|Quantum|Classical (c)|Quantum (c)| Enum |
|-------------|---------|-------|-------------|-----------|------|
|LWE128_256 |126.69 |117.57 |98.7 |89.57 |217.55|
|LWE128_512 |135.77 |125.92 |106.58 |96.73 |218.53|
|LWE128_638 |135.27 |125.49 |105.7 |95.93 |216.81|
[...]
"""
writer = MarkdownTableWriter(value_matrix = results, headers = headings, table_name = "estimates")
writer.write_table()
return writer
# dual bug example
# n = 256; q = 2**32; sd = 2**(-4); reduction_cost_model = BKZ.sieve
# _ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, reduction_cost_model)

BIN
old_files/figs/iso.png
View File

Binary file not shown.
Side by Side

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 74 KiB

BIN
old_files/figs/plot.png
View File

Binary file not shown.
Side by Side

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 34 KiB

BIN
old_files/figs/plot2.png
View File

Binary file not shown.
Side by Side

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 32 KiB

BIN
old_files/figs/sieve.png
View File

Binary file not shown.
Side by Side

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 26 KiB

BIN
old_files/figs/uSVP.png
View File

Binary file not shown.
Side by Side

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 20 KiB

329
old_files/hybrid_decoding.py
View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Seucrity estimates for the Hybrid Decoding attack
Requires a local copy of the LWE Estimator from https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/src/master/estimator.py in a folder called "estimator"
"""
from sage.all import ZZ, binomial, sqrt, log, exp, oo, pi, prod, RR
from sage.probability.probability_distribution import RealDistribution
from estimator import estimator as est
from concrete_params import concrete_LWE_params
## Core cost models
core_sieve = lambda beta, d, B: ZZ(2)**RR(0.292*beta + 16.4)
core_qsieve = lambda beta, d, B: ZZ(2)**RR(0.265*beta + 16.4)
## Utility functions
def sq_GSO(d, beta, det):
"""
Return squared GSO lengths after lattice reduction according to the GSA
:param q: LWE modulus
:param d: lattice dimension
:param beta: blocksize used in BKZ
:param det: lattice determinant
"""
r = []
for i in range(d):
r_i = est.delta_0f(beta)**(((-2*d*i) / (d-1))+d) * det**(1/d)
r.append(r_i**2)
return r
def babai_probability_wun16(r, norm):
"""
Compute the probability of Babai's Nearest Plane, using techniques from the NTRULPrime submission to NIST
:param r: squared GSO lengths
:param norm: expected norm of the target vector
"""
R = [RR(sqrt(t)/(2*norm)) for t in r]
T = RealDistribution('beta', ((len(r)-1)/2,1./2))
probs = [1 - T.cum_distribution_function(1 - s**2) for s in R]
return prod(probs)
## Estimate hybrid decoding attack complexity
def hybrid_decoding_attack(n, alpha, q, m, secret_distribution,
beta, tau = None, mitm=True, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve):
"""
Estimate cost of the Hybrid Attack,
:param n: LWE dimension `n > 0`
:param alpha: noise rate `0 ≤ α < 1`, noise will have standard deviation `αq/sqrt{2π}`
:param q: modulus `0 < q`
:param m: number of LWE samples `m > 0`
:param secret_distribution: distribution of secret
:param beta: BKZ block size β
:param tau: guessing dimension τ
:param mitm: simulate MITM approach (√ of search space)
:param reduction_cost_model: BKZ reduction cost model
EXAMPLE:
hybrid_decoding_attack(beta = 100, tau = 250, mitm = True, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, **example_64())
rop: 2^65.1
pre: 2^64.8
enum: 2^62.5
beta: 100
|S|: 2^73.1
prob: 0.104533
scale: 12.760
pp: 11
d: 1798
repeat: 42
"""
n, alpha, q = est.Param.preprocess(n, alpha, q)
# d is the dimension of the attack lattice
d = m + n - tau
# h is the Hamming weight of the secret
# NOTE: binary secrets are assumed to have Hamming weight ~n/2, ternary secrets ~2n/3
# this aligns with the assumptions made in the LWE Estimator
h = est.SDis.nonzero(secret_distribution, n=n)
sd = alpha*q/sqrt(2*pi)
# compute the scaling factor used in the primal lattice to balance the secret and error
scale = est._primal_scale_factor(secret_distribution, alpha=alpha, q=q, n=n)
# 1. get squared-GSO lengths via the Geometric Series Assumption
# we could also consider using the BKZ simulator, using the GSA is conservative
r = sq_GSO(d, beta, q**m * scale**(n-tau))
# 2. Costs
bkz_cost = est.lattice_reduction_cost(reduction_cost_model, est.delta_0f(beta), d)
enm_cost = est.Cost()
enm_cost["rop"] = d**2/(2**1.06)
# 3. Size of search space
# We need to do one BDD call at least
search_space, prob, hw = ZZ(1), 1.0, 0
# if mitm is True, sqrt speedup in the guessing phase. This allows us to square the size
# of the search space at no extra cost.
# NOTE: we conservatively assume that this mitm process succeeds with probability 1.
ssf = sqrt if mitm else lambda x: x
# use the secret distribution bounds to determine the size of the search space
a, b = est.SDis.bounds(secret_distribution)
# perform "searching". This part of the code balances the enm_cost with the cost of lattice
# reduction, where enm_cost is the total cost of calling Babai's algorithm on each vector in
# the search space.
if tau:
prob = est.success_probability_drop(n, h, tau)
hw = 1
while hw < h and hw < tau:
prob += est.success_probability_drop(n, h, tau, fail=hw)
search_space += binomial(tau, hw) * (b-a)**hw
if enm_cost.repeat(ssf(search_space))["rop"] > bkz_cost["rop"]:
# we moved too far, so undo
prob -= est.success_probability_drop(n, h, tau, fail=hw)
search_space -= binomial(tau, hw) * (b-a)**hw
hw -= 1
break
hw += 1
enm_cost = enm_cost.repeat(ssf(search_space))
# we use the expectation of the target norm. This could be longer, or shorter, for any given instance.
target_norm = sqrt(m * sd**2 + h * RR((n-tau)/n) * scale**2)
# account for the success probability of Babai's algorithm
prob*=babai_probability_wun16(r, target_norm)
# create a cost string, as in the LWE Estimator, to store the attack parameters and costs
ret = est.Cost()
ret["rop"] = bkz_cost["rop"] + enm_cost["rop"]
ret["pre"] = bkz_cost["rop"]
ret["enum"] = enm_cost["rop"]
ret["beta"] = beta
ret["|S|"] = search_space
ret["prob"] = prob
ret["scale"] = scale
ret["pp"] = hw
ret["d"] = d
ret["tau"] = tau
# 5. Repeat whole experiment ~1/prob times
ret = ret.repeat(est.amplify(0.99, prob), select={"rop": True,
"pre": True,
"enum": True,
"beta": False,
"d": False,
"|S|": False,
"scale": False,
"prob": False,
"pp": False,
"tau": False})
return ret
## Optimize attack parameters
def parameter_search(n, alpha, q, m, secret_distribution, mitm = True, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve):
"""
:param n: LWE dimension `n > 0`
:param alpha: noise rate `0 ≤ α < 1`, noise will have standard deviation `αq/sqrt{2π}`
:param q: modulus `0 < q`
:param m: number of LWE samples `m > 0`
:param secret_distribution: distribution of secret
:param beta_search: tuple (β_min, β_max, granularity) for the search space of β, default is (60,301,20)
:param tau: tuple (τ_min, τ_max, granularity) for the search space of τ, default is (0,501,20)
:param mitm: simulate MITM approach (√ of search space)
:param reduction_cost_model: BKZ reduction cost model
EXAMPLE:
parameter_search(mitm = False, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, **example_64())
rop: 2^69.5
pre: 2^68.9
enum: 2^68.0
beta: 110
|S|: 2^40.9
prob: 0.045060
scale: 12.760
pp: 6
d: 1730
repeat: 100
tau: 170
parameter_search(mitm = True, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, **example_64())
rop: 2^63.4
pre: 2^63.0
enum: 2^61.5
beta: 95
|S|: 2^72.0
prob: 0.125126
scale: 12.760
pp: 11
d: 1666
repeat: 35
tau: 234
"""
primald = est.partial(est.drop_and_solve, est.dual_scale, postprocess=True, decision=True)
bl = primald(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution, m=m, reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model)
# we take the number of LWE samples used to be the same as in the primal attack in the LWE Estimator
m = bl["m"]
f = est.partial(hybrid_decoding_attack, n=n, alpha=alpha, q=q, m=m, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model,
mitm=mitm)
# NOTE: we decribe our searching strategy below. To produce more accurate estimates,
# change this part of the code to ensure a more granular search. As we are using
# homomorphic-encryption style parameters, the running time of the code can be quite high,
# justifying the below choices.
# We start at beta = 60 and go up to beta_max in steps of 50
beta_max = bl["beta"] + 100
beta_search = (40, beta_max, 50)
best = None
for beta in range(beta_search[0], beta_search[1], beta_search[2])[::-1]:
tau = 0
best_beta = None
count = 3
while tau < n:
if count >= 0:
cost = f(beta=beta, tau=tau)
if best_beta is not None:
# if two consecutive estimates don't decrease, stop optimising over tau
if best_beta["rop"] < cost["rop"]:
count -= 1
cost["tau"] = tau
if best_beta is None:
best_beta = cost
if RR(log(cost["rop"],2)) < RR(log(best_beta["rop"],2)):
best_beta = cost
if best is None:
best = cost
if RR(log(cost["rop"],2)) < RR(log(best["rop"],2)):
best = cost
tau += n//100
# now do a second, more granular search
# we start at the beta which produced the lowest running time, and search ± 25 in steps of 10
tau_gap = max(n//100, 1)
for beta in range(best["beta"] - 25, best["beta"] + 25, 10)[::-1]:
tau = max(best["tau"] - 25,0)
best_beta = None
count = 3
while tau <= best["tau"] + 25:
if count >= 0:
cost = f(beta=beta, tau=tau)
if best_beta is not None:
# if two consecutive estimates don't decrease, stop optimising over tau
if best_beta["rop"] < cost["rop"]:
count -= 1
cost["tau"] = tau
if best_beta is None:
best_beta = cost
if RR(log(cost["rop"],2)) < RR(log(best_beta["rop"],2)):
best_beta = cost
if best is None:
best = cost
if RR(log(cost["rop"],2)) < RR(log(best["rop"],2)):
best = cost
tau += tau_gap
return best
def get_all_security_levels(params):
""" A function which gets the security levels of a collection of TFHE parameters,
using the four cost models: classical, quantum, classical_conservative, and
quantum_conservative
:param params: a dictionary of LWE parameter sets (see concrete_params)
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = get_all_security_levels(concrete_LWE_params)
sage: X
[['LWE128_256',
126.692189756144,
117.566189756144,
98.6960000000000,
89.5700000000000], ...]
"""
RESULTS = []
for param in params:
results = [param]
x = params["{}".format(param)]
n = x["n"] * x["k"]
q = 2 ** 32
sd = 2 ** (x["sd"]) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
secret_distribution = (0, 1)
# assume access to an infinite number of papers
m = oo
model = est.BKZ.sieve
estimate = parameter_search(mitm = True, reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, n = n, q = q, alpha = alpha, m = m, secret_distribution = secret_distribution)
results.append(get_security_level(estimate))
RESULTS.append(results)
return RESULTS

17
old_files/memory_tests/test.py
View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
from estimator_new import *
from sage.all import oo, save
def test():
# code
D = ND.DiscreteGaussian
params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2 ** 64, Xs=D(0.50, -0.50), Xe=D(2**57), m=oo, tag='TFHE_DEFAULT')
names = [params, params.updated(n=761), params.updated(q=2 ** 65), params.updated(n=762)]
for name in names:
x = LWE.estimate(name, deny_list=("arora-gb", "bkw"))
return 0
test()

31
old_files/memory_tests/test2.py
View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
from multiprocessing import *
from estimator_new import *
from sage.all import oo, save
def test_memory(x):
print("doing job...")
print(x)
y = LWE.estimate(x, deny_list=("arora-gb", "bkw"))
return y
if __name__ == "__main__":
D = ND.DiscreteGaussian
params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2 ** 64, Xs=D(0.50, -0.50), Xe=D(2**57), m=oo, tag='TFHE_DEFAULT')
names = [params, params.updated(n=761), params.updated(q=2**65), params.updated(n=762)]
procs = []
proc = Process(target=print_func)
procs.append(proc)
proc.start()
p = Pool(1)
for name in names:
proc = Process(target=test_memory, args=(name,))
procs.append(proc)
proc.start()
proc.join()
for proc in procs:
proc.join()

471
old_files/new_scripts.py
View File

@@ -1,471 +0,0 @@
from estimator_new import *
from sage.all import oo, save, load, ceil
from math import log2
import multiprocessing
def old_models(security_level, sd, logq=32):
"""
Use the old model as a starting point for the data gathering step
:param security_level: the security level under consideration
:param sd : the standard deviation of the LWE error distribution Xe
:param logq : the (base 2 log) value of the LWE modulus q
"""
def evaluate_model(a, b, stddev=sd):
return (stddev - b)/a
models = dict()
models["80"] = (-0.04049295502947623, 1.1288318226557081 + logq)
models["96"] = (-0.03416314056943681, 1.4704806061716345 + logq)
models["112"] = (-0.02970984362676178, 1.7848907787798667 + logq)
models["128"] = (-0.026361288425133814, 2.0014671315214696 + logq)
models["144"] = (-0.023744534465622812, 2.1710601038230712 + logq)
models["160"] = (-0.021667220727651954, 2.3565507936475476 + logq)
models["176"] = (-0.019947662046189942, 2.5109588704235803 + logq)
models["192"] = (-0.018552804646747204, 2.7168913723130816 + logq)
models["208"] = (-0.017291091126923574, 2.7956961446214326 + logq)
models["224"] = (-0.016257546811508806, 2.9582401000615226 + logq)
models["240"] = (-0.015329741032015766, 3.0744579055889782 + logq)
models["256"] = (-0.014530554319171845, 3.2094375376751745 + logq)
(a, b) = models["{}".format(security_level)]
n_est = evaluate_model(a, b, sd)
return round(n_est)
def estimate(params, red_cost_model=RC.BDGL16, skip=("arora-gb", "bkw")):
"""
Retrieve an estimate using the Lattice Estimator, for a given set of input parameters
:param params: the input LWE parameters
:param red_cost_model: the lattice reduction cost model
:param skip: attacks to skip
"""
est = LWE.estimate(params, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, deny_list=skip)
return est
def get_security_level(est, dp=2):
"""
Get the security level lambda from a Lattice Estimator output
:param est: the Lattice Estimator output
:param dp: the number of decimal places to consider
"""
attack_costs = []
# note: key does not need to be specified est vs est.keys()
for key in est:
attack_costs.append(est[key]["rop"])
# get the security level correct to 'dp' decimal places
security_level = round(log2(min(attack_costs)), dp)
return security_level
def inequality(x, y):
""" A utility function which compresses the conditions x < y and x > y into a single condition via a multiplier
:param x: the LHS of the inequality
:param y: the RHS of the inequality
"""
if x <= y:
return 1
if x > y:
return -1
def automated_param_select_n(params, target_security=128):
""" A function used to generate the smallest value of n which allows for
target_security bits of security, for the input values of (params.Xe.stddev,params.q)
:param params: the standard deviation of the error
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = automated_param_select_n(Kyber512, target_security = 128)
sage: X
456
"""
# get an estimate based on the prev. model
print("n = {}".format(params.n))
n_start = old_models(target_security, log2(params.Xe.stddev), log2(params.q))
# n_start = max(n_start, 450)
# TODO: think about throwing an error if the required n < 450
params = params.updated(n=n_start)
costs2 = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs2, 2)
z = inequality(security_level, target_security)
# we keep n > 2 * target_security as a rough baseline for mitm security (on binary key guessing)
while z * security_level < z * target_security:
# TODO: fill in this case! For n > 1024 we only need to consider every 256 (optimization)
params = params.updated(n = params.n + z * 8)
costs = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs, 2)
if -1 * params.Xe.stddev > 0:
print("target security level is unattainable")
break
# final estimate (we went too far in the above loop)
if security_level < target_security:
# we make n larger
print("we make n larger")
params = params.updated(n=params.n + 8)
costs = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs, 2)
print("the finalised parameters are n = {}, log2(sd) = {}, log2(q) = {}, with a security level of {}-bits".format(params.n,
log2(params.Xe.stddev),
log2(params.q),
security_level))
if security_level < target_security:
params.updated(n=None)
return params, security_level
def generate_parameter_matrix(params_in, sd_range, target_security_levels=[128], name="default_name"):
"""
:param params_in: a initial set of LWE parameters
:param sd_range: a tuple (sd_min, sd_max) giving the values of sd for which to generate parameters
:param target_security_levels: a list of the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
:param name: a name to save the file
"""
(sd_min, sd_max) = sd_range
for lam in target_security_levels:
for sd in range(sd_min, sd_max + 1):
print("run for {}".format(lam, sd))
Xe_new = nd.NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(2**sd)
(params_out, sec) = automated_param_select_n(params_in.updated(Xe=Xe_new), target_security=lam)
try:
results = load("{}.sobj".format(name))
except:
results = dict()
results["{}".format(lam)] = []
results["{}".format(lam)].append((params_out.n, log2(params_out.q), log2(params_out.Xe.stddev), sec))
save(results, "{}.sobj".format(name))
return results
def generate_zama_curves64(sd_range=[2, 58], target_security_levels=[128], name="default_name"):
"""
The top level function which we use to run the experiment
:param sd_range: a tuple (sd_min, sd_max) giving the values of sd for which to generate parameters
:param target_security_levels: a list of the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
:param name: a name to save the file
"""
if __name__ == '__main__':
D = ND.DiscreteGaussian
vals = range(sd_range[0], sd_range[1])
pool = multiprocessing.Pool(2)
init_params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2 ** 64, Xs=D(0.50, -0.50), Xe=D(2 ** 55), m=oo, tag='params')
inputs = [(init_params, (val, val), target_security_levels, name) for val in vals]
res = pool.starmap(generate_parameter_matrix, inputs)
return "done"
# The script runs the following commands
import sys
# grab values of the command-line input arguments
a = int(sys.argv[1])
b = int(sys.argv[2])
c = int(sys.argv[3])
# run the code
generate_zama_curves64(sd_range= (b,c), target_security_levels=[a], name="{}".format(a))
from estimator_new import *
from sage.all import oo, save, load
from math import log2
import multiprocessing
def old_models(security_level, sd, logq=32):
"""
Use the old model as a starting point for the data gathering step
:param security_level: the security level under consideration
:param sd : the standard deviation of the LWE error distribution Xe
:param logq : the (base 2 log) value of the LWE modulus q
"""
def evaluate_model(a, b, stddev=sd):
return (stddev - b)/a
models = dict()
models["80"] = (-0.04049295502947623, 1.1288318226557081 + logq)
models["96"] = (-0.03416314056943681, 1.4704806061716345 + logq)
models["112"] = (-0.02970984362676178, 1.7848907787798667 + logq)
models["128"] = (-0.026361288425133814, 2.0014671315214696 + logq)
models["144"] = (-0.023744534465622812, 2.1710601038230712 + logq)
models["160"] = (-0.021667220727651954, 2.3565507936475476 + logq)
models["176"] = (-0.019947662046189942, 2.5109588704235803 + logq)
models["192"] = (-0.018552804646747204, 2.7168913723130816 + logq)
models["208"] = (-0.017291091126923574, 2.7956961446214326 + logq)
models["224"] = (-0.016257546811508806, 2.9582401000615226 + logq)
models["240"] = (-0.015329741032015766, 3.0744579055889782 + logq)
models["256"] = (-0.014530554319171845, 3.2094375376751745 + logq)
(a, b) = models["{}".format(security_level)]
n_est = evaluate_model(a, b, sd)
return round(n_est)
def estimate(params, red_cost_model=RC.BDGL16, skip=("arora-gb", "bkw")):
"""
Retrieve an estimate using the Lattice Estimator, for a given set of input parameters
:param params: the input LWE parameters
:param red_cost_model: the lattice reduction cost model
:param skip: attacks to skip
"""
est = LWE.estimate(params, red_cost_model=red_cost_model, deny_list=skip)
return est
def get_security_level(est, dp=2):
"""
Get the security level lambda from a Lattice Estimator output
:param est: the Lattice Estimator output
:param dp: the number of decimal places to consider
"""
attack_costs = []
# note: key does not need to be specified est vs est.keys()
for key in est:
attack_costs.append(est[key]["rop"])
# get the security level correct to 'dp' decimal places
security_level = round(log2(min(attack_costs)), dp)
return security_level
def inequality(x, y):
""" A utility function which compresses the conditions x < y and x > y into a single condition via a multiplier
:param x: the LHS of the inequality
:param y: the RHS of the inequality
"""
if x <= y:
return 1
if x > y:
return -1
def automated_param_select_n(params, target_security=128):
""" A function used to generate the smallest value of n which allows for
target_security bits of security, for the input values of (params.Xe.stddev,params.q)
:param params: the standard deviation of the error
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = automated_param_select_n(Kyber512, target_security = 128)
sage: X
456
"""
# get an estimate based on the prev. model
print("n = {}".format(params.n))
n_start = old_models(target_security, log2(params.Xe.stddev), log2(params.q))
# n_start = max(n_start, 450)
# TODO: think about throwing an error if the required n < 450
params = params.updated(n=n_start)
costs2 = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs2, 2)
z = inequality(security_level, target_security)
# we keep n > 2 * target_security as a rough baseline for mitm security (on binary key guessing)
while z * security_level < z * target_security:
# TODO: fill in this case! For n > 1024 we only need to consider every 256 (optimization)
params = params.updated(n = params.n + z * 8)
costs = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs, 2)
if -1 * params.Xe.stddev > 0:
print("target security level is unattainable")
break
# final estimate (we went too far in the above loop)
if security_level < target_security:
# we make n larger
print("we make n larger")
params = params.updated(n=params.n + 8)
costs = estimate(params)
security_level = get_security_level(costs, 2)
print("the finalised parameters are n = {}, log2(sd) = {}, log2(q) = {}, with a security level of {}-bits".format(params.n,
log2(params.Xe.stddev),
log2(params.q),
security_level))
if security_level < target_security:
params.updated(n=None)
return params, security_level
def generate_parameter_matrix(params_in, sd_range, target_security_levels=[128], name="default_name"):
"""
:param params_in: a initial set of LWE parameters
:param sd_range: a tuple (sd_min, sd_max) giving the values of sd for which to generate parameters
:param target_security_levels: a list of the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
:param name: a name to save the file
"""
(sd_min, sd_max) = sd_range
for lam in target_security_levels:
for sd in range(sd_min, sd_max + 1):
print("run for {}".format(lam, sd))
Xe_new = nd.NoiseDistribution.DiscreteGaussian(2**sd)
(params_out, sec) = automated_param_select_n(params_in.updated(Xe=Xe_new), target_security=lam)
try:
results = load("{}.sobj".format(name))
except:
results = dict()
results["{}".format(lam)] = []
results["{}".format(lam)].append((params_out.n, log2(params_out.q), log2(params_out.Xe.stddev), sec))
save(results, "{}.sobj".format(name))
return results
def generate_zama_curves64(sd_range=[2, 58], target_security_levels=[128], name="default_name"):
"""
The top level function which we use to run the experiment
:param sd_range: a tuple (sd_min, sd_max) giving the values of sd for which to generate parameters
:param target_security_levels: a list of the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
:param name: a name to save the file
"""
if __name__ == '__main__':
D = ND.DiscreteGaussian
vals = range(sd_range[0], sd_range[1])
pool = multiprocessing.Pool(2)
init_params = LWE.Parameters(n=1024, q=2 ** 64, Xs=D(0.50, -0.50), Xe=D(2 ** 55), m=oo, tag='params')
inputs = [(init_params, (val, val), target_security_levels, name) for val in vals]
res = pool.starmap(generate_parameter_matrix, inputs)
return "done"
# The script runs the following commands
import sys
# grab values of the command-line input arguments
a = int(sys.argv[1])
b = int(sys.argv[2])
c = int(sys.argv[3])
# run the code
generate_zama_curves64(sd_range= (b,c), target_security_levels=[a], name="{}".format(a))
import numpy as np
from sage.all import save, load
def sort_data(security_level):
from operator import itemgetter
# step 1. load the data
X = load("{}.sobj".format(security_level))
# step 2. sort by SD
x = sorted(X["{}".format(security_level)], key = itemgetter(2))
# step3. replace the sorted value
X["{}".format(security_level)] = x
return X
def generate_curve(security_level):
# step 1. get the data
X = sort_data(security_level)
# step 2. group the n and sigma data into lists
N = []
SD = []
for x in X["{}".format(security_level)]:
N.append(x[0])
SD.append(x[2] + 0.5)
# step 3. perform interpolation and return coefficients
(a,b) = np.polyfit(N, SD, 1)
return a, b
def verify_curve(security_level, a = None, b = None):
# step 1. get the table and max values of n, sd
X = sort_data(security_level)
n_max = X["{}".format(security_level)][0][0]
sd_max = X["{}".format(security_level)][-1][2]
# step 2. a function to get model values
def f_model(a, b, n):
return ceil(a * n + b)
# step 3. a function to get table values
def f_table(table, n):
for i in range(len(table)):
n_val = table[i][0]
if n < n_val:
pass
else:
j = i
break
# now j is the correct index, we return the corresponding sd
return table[j][2]
# step 3. for each n, check whether we satisfy the table
n_min = max(2 * security_level, 450, X["{}".format(security_level)][-1][0])
print(n_min)
print(n_max)
for n in range(n_max, n_min, - 1):
model_sd = f_model(a, b, n)
table_sd = f_table(X["{}".format(security_level)], n)
print(n , table_sd, model_sd, model_sd >= table_sd)
if table_sd > model_sd:
print("MODEL FAILS at n = {}".format(n))
return "FAIL"
return "PASS", n_min
def generate_and_verify(security_levels, log_q, name = "verified_curves"):
data = []
for sec in security_levels:
print("WE GO FOR {}".format(sec))
# generate the model for security level sec
(a_sec, b_sec) = generate_curve(sec)
# verify the model for security level sec
res = verify_curve(sec, a_sec, b_sec)
# append the information into a list
data.append((a_sec, b_sec - log_q, sec, res[0], res[1]))
save(data, "{}.sobj".format(name))
return data
# To verify the curves we use
generate_and_verify([80, 96, 112, 128, 144, 160, 176, 192, 256], log_q = 64)

599
old_files/scripts.py
View File

@@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
import estimator.estimator as est
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import numpy as np
# define the four cost models used for Concrete (2 classical, 2 quantum)
# note that classical and quantum are the two models used in the "HE Std"
def classical(beta, d, B):
return ZZ(2) ** RR(0.292 * beta + 16.4 + log(8 * d, 2))
def quantum(beta, d, B):
return ZZ(2) ** RR(0.265 * beta + 16.4 + log(8 * d, 2))
def classical_conservative(beta, d, B):
return ZZ(2) ** RR(0.292 * beta)
def quantum_conservative(beta, d, B):
return ZZ(2) ** RR(0.265 * beta)
# we add an enumeration model for completeness
cost_models = [classical, quantum, classical_conservative, quantum_conservative, est.BKZ.enum]
def estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve, m=oo):
"""
A function to estimate the complexity of LWE, whilst skipping over any attacks which crash
:param n : the LWE dimension
:param alpha : the noise rate of the error
:param q : the LWE ciphertext modulus
:param secret_distribution : the LWE secret distribution
:param reduction_cost_model: the BKZ reduction cost model
:param m : the number of available LWE samples
EXAMPLE:
sage: estimate_lwe_nocrash(n = 256, q = 2**32, alpha = RR(8/2**32), secret_distribution = (0,1))
sage: 39.46
"""
# the success value denotes whether we need to re-run the estimator, in the case of a crash
success = 0
try:
# we begin by trying all four attacks (usvp, dual, dec, mitm)
estimate = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo,
skip={"bkw", "dec", "arora-gb"})
success = 1
except Exception as e:
print(e)
if success == 0:
try:
# dual crashes most often, so try skipping dual first
estimate = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo,
skip={"bkw", "dec", "arora-gb", "dual"})
success = 1
except Exception as e:
print(e)
if success == 0:
try:
# next, skip mitm
estimate = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo,
skip={"mitm", "bkw", "dec", "arora-gb", "dual"})
except Exception as e:
print(e)
# the output security level is just the cost of the fastest attack
security_level = get_security_level(estimate)
return security_level
def get_security_level(estimate, decimal_places = 2):
""" Function to get the security level from an LWE Estimator output,
i.e. returns only the bit-security level (without the attack params)
:param estimate: the input estimate
:param decimal_places: the number of decimal places
EXAMPLE:
sage: x = estimate_lwe(n = 256, q = 2**32, alpha = RR(8/2**32))
sage: get_security_level(x)
33.8016789754458
"""
levels = []
# use try/except to cover cases where we only consider one or two attacks
try:
levels.append(estimate["usvp"]["rop"])
except:
pass
try:
levels.append(estimate["dec"]["rop"])
except:
pass
try:
levels.append(estimate["dual"]["rop"])
except:
pass
try:
levels.append(estimate["mitm"]["rop"])
except:
pass
# take the minimum attack cost (in bits)
security_level = round(log(min(levels), 2), decimal_places)
return security_level
def inequality(x, y):
""" A function which compresses the conditions
x < y and x > y into a single condition via a
multiplier
"""
if x <= y:
return 1
if x > y:
return -1
def automated_param_select_n(sd, n=None, q=2 ** 32, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve, secret_distribution=(0, 1),
target_security=128):
""" A function used to generate the smallest value of n which allows for
target_security bits of security, for the input values of (sd,q)
:param sd: the standard deviation of the error
:param n: an initial value of n to use in optimisation, guessed if None
:param q: the LWE modulus (q = 2**32, 2**64 in TFHE)
:param reduction_cost_model: the BKZ cost model considered, BKZ.sieve is default
:param secret_distribution: the LWE secret distribution
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = automated_param_select_n(sd = -25, q = 2**32)
sage: X
1054
"""
if n is None:
# pick some random n which gets us close (based on concrete_LWE_params)
n = sd * (-25) * (target_security/80)
sd = 2 ** sd * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
# initial estimate, to determine if we are above or below the target security level
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
z = inequality(security_level, target_security)
while z * security_level < z * target_security and n > 80:
n += z * 8
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
if (-1 * sd > 0):
print("target security level is unatainable")
break
# final estimate (we went too far in the above loop)
if security_level < target_security:
n -= z * 8
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd / RR(q)
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
print("the finalised parameters are n = {}, log2(sd) = {}, log2(q) = {}, with a security level of {}-bits".format(n,
sd,
log(q,
2),
security_level))
# final sanity check so we don't return insecure (or inf) parameters
if security_level < target_security or security_level == oo:
n = None
return n
def automated_param_select_sd(n, sd=None, q=2**32, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve, secret_distribution=(0, 1),
target_security=128):
""" A function used to generate the smallest value of sd which allows for
target_security bits of security, for the input values of (n,q)
:param n: the LWE dimension
:param sd: an initial value of sd to use in optimisation, guessed if None
:param q: the LWE modulus (q = 2**32, 2**64 in TFHE)
:param reduction_cost_model: the BKZ cost model considered, BKZ.sieve is default
:param secret_distribution: the LWE secret distribution
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
EXAMPLE
sage: X = automated_param_select_sd(n = 1054, q = 2**32)
sage: X
-26
"""
if sd is None:
# pick some random sd which gets us close (based on concrete_LWE_params)
sd = round(n * 80 / (target_security * (-25)))
# make sure sd satisfies q * sd > 1
sd = max(sd, -(log(q,2) - 2))
sd_ = (2 ** sd) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd_ / RR(q)
# initial estimate, to determine if we are above or below the target security level
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
z = inequality(security_level, target_security)
while z * security_level < z * target_security and sd > -log(q,2):
sd += z * (0.5)
sd_ = (2 ** sd) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd_ / RR(q)
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
## THIS IS WHERE THE PROBLEM IS, CORRECT THIS CONDITION?
if (sd > log(q, 2)):
print("target security level is unatainable")
return None
# final estimate (we went too far in the above loop)
if security_level < target_security:
sd -= z * (0.5)
sd_ = (2 ** sd) * q
alpha = sqrt(2 * pi) * sd_ / RR(q)
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
print("the finalised parameters are n = {}, log2(sd) = {}, log2(q) = {}, with a security level of {}-bits".format(n,
sd,
log(q,
2),
security_level))
return sd
def generate_parameter_matrix(n_range, sd=None, q=2**32, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve,
secret_distribution=(0, 1), target_security=128):
"""
:param n_range: a tuple (n_min, n_max) giving the values of n for which to generate parameters
:param sd: the standard deviation of the LWE error
:param q: the LWE modulus (q = 2**32, 2**64 in TFHE)
:param reduction_cost_model: the BKZ cost model considered, BKZ.sieve is default
:param secret_distribution: the LWE secret distribution
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
TODO: we should probably parallelise this function for speed
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = generate_parameter_matrix([788, 790])
sage: X
[(788, 4294967296, -20.0), (789, 4294967296, -20.0)]
"""
RESULTS = []
# grab min and max value/s of n, with a granularity (if given as input)
try:
(n_min, n_max, gran) = n_range
except:
(n_min, n_max) = n_range
gran = 1
sd_ = sd
for n in range(n_min, n_max + 1, gran):
sd = automated_param_select_sd(n, sd=sd_, q=q, reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model,
secret_distribution=secret_distribution, target_security=target_security)
sd_ = sd
RESULTS.append((n, q, sd))
return RESULTS
def generate_parameter_matrix_sd(sd_range, n=None, q=2**32, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve,
secret_distribution=(0, 1), target_security=128):
"""
:param sd_range: a tuple (sd_min, sd_max) giving the values of sd for which to generate parameters
:param sd: the standard deviation of the LWE error
:param q: the LWE modulus (q = 2**32, 2**64 in TFHE)
:param reduction_cost_model: the BKZ cost model considered, BKZ.sieve is default
:param secret_distribution: the LWE secret distribution
:param target_security: the target number of bits of security, 128 is default
TODO: we should probably parallelise this function for speed
EXAMPLE:
sage: X = generate_parameter_matrix([788, 790])
sage: X
[(788, 4294967296, -20.0), (789, 4294967296, -20.0)]
"""
RESULTS = []
# grab min and max value/s of n
(sd_min, sd_max) = sd_range
n = n
for sd in range(sd_min, sd_max + 1):
n = automated_param_select_n(sd, n=n, q=q, reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model,
secret_distribution=secret_distribution, target_security=target_security)
RESULTS.append((n, q, sd))
return RESULTS
def generate_parameter_step(results, label = None, torus_sd = True):
"""
Plot results
:param results: an output of generate_parameter_matrix
returns: a step plot of chosen parameters
EXAMPLE:
X = generate_parameter_matrix([700, 790])
generate_parameter_step(X)
plt.show()
"""
N = []
SD = []
for (n, q, sd) in results:
N.append(n)
if torus_sd:
SD.append(sd)
else:
SD.append(sd + log(q,2))
plt.plot(N, SD, label = label)
plt.legend(loc = "upper right")
return plt
def generate_iso_lines(N = [256, 2048], SD = [0, 32], q = 2**32):
RESULTS = []
for n in range(N[0], N[1] + 1, 1):
for sd in range(SD[0], SD[1] + 1, 1):
sd = 2**sd
alpha = sqrt(2*pi) * sd / q
try:
est = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution = (0,1), reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, skip = ("bkw", "arora-gb", "dec"))
est = get_security_level(est, 2)
except:
est = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution = (0,1), reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve, skip = ("bkw", "arora-gb", "dual", "dec"))
est = get_security_level(est, 2)
RESULTS.append((n, sd, est))
return RESULTS
def plot_iso_lines(results):
x1 = []
x2 = []
for z in results:
x1.append(z[0])
# use log(q)
# use -ve values to match Pascal's diagram
x2.append(z[2])
plt.plot(x1, x2)
return plt
def test_multiple_sd(n, q, secret_distribution, reduction_cost_model, split = 33, m = oo):
est = []
Y = []
for sd_ in np.linspace(0,32,split):
Y.append(sd_)
sd = (2** (-1 * sd_))* q
alpha = sqrt(2*pi) * sd / q
try:
es = est.estimate_lwe(n=512, alpha=alpha, q=q, secret_distribution=(0, 1), reduction_cost_model = reduction_cost_model,
skip=("bkw", "dec", "arora-gb"), m = m)
except:
es = est.estimate_lwe(n=512, alpha=alpha, q=q, secret_distribution=(0, 1), reduction_cost_model = reduction_cost_model,
skip=("bkw", "dec", "arora-gb", "dual"), m = m)
est.append(get_security_level(es,2))
return est, Y
## parameter curves
def get_parameter_curves_data_sd(sec_levels, sd_range, q):
Results = []
for sec in sec_levels:
try:
result_sec = generate_parameter_matrix_sd(n = None, sd_range=sd_range, q=q, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve,
secret_distribution=(0,1), target_security=sec)
Results.append(result_sec)
except:
pass
return Results
def get_parameter_curves_data_n(sec_levels, n_range, q):
Results = []
for sec in sec_levels:
try:
result_sec = generate_parameter_matrix(n_range, sd = None, q=q, reduction_cost_model=est.BKZ.sieve,
secret_distribution=(0,1), target_security=sec)
Results.append(result_sec)
except:
pass
return Results
def interpolate_result(result, log_q):
# linear function interpolation
x = []
y = []
# 1. filter out any points which reccomend sd = -log(q) + 2
new_result= []
for res in result:
if res[2] >= - log_q + 2:
new_result.append(res)
result = new_result
for res in result:
x.append(res[0])
y.append(res[2])
(a,b) = np.polyfit(x, y, 1)
return (a,b)
def plot_interpolants(interpolants, n_range, log_q, degree = 1):
for x in interpolants:
if degree == 1:
vals = [x[0] * n + x[1] for n in range(n_range[0],n_range[1])]
elif degree == 2:
vals = [x[0] * n**2 + x[1]*n + x[2] for n in range(n_range[0],n_range[1])]
# any values which fall outside of the range and edited to give at least two bits of noise.
vvals = []
for v in vals:
if v < -log_q + 2:
vvals.append(-log_q + 2)
else:
vvals.append(v)
plt.plot(range(n_range[0], n_range[0] + len(vvals)), vvals)
return 0
## currently running
# sage: n_range = (256, 2048, 16)
# sage: sec_levels = [80 + 16*k for k in range(0,12)]
# sage: results = get_parameter_curves_data_n(sec_levels, n_range, q = 2**64)
def verify_results(results, security_level, secret_distribution = (0,1), reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve):
""" A function which verifies that a set of results match a given security level
:param results : a set of tuples of the form (n, q, sd)
:param security_level: the target security level for these params
"""
estimates = []
# 1. Grab the parameters
for (n, q, sd) in results:
if sd is not None:
sd = 2**sd
alpha = sqrt(2*pi) * sd
# 2. Test that these parameters satisfy the given security level
try:
estimate = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo, skip = {"bkw","dec","arora-gb"})
except:
estimate = est.estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo,
skip={"bkw", "dec", "arora-gb", "dual"})
estimates.append(estimate)
return estimates
def verify_interpolants(interpolant, n_range, log_q, secret_distribution = (0,1), reduction_cost_model = est.BKZ.sieve):
estimates = []
q = 2**log_q
(a, b) = interpolant
for n in range(n_range[0], n_range[1]):
print(n)
# we take the max here to ensure that the "cut-off" for the minimal error is met.
sd = max(a * n + b, -log_q + 2)
sd = 2 ** sd
alpha = sqrt(2*pi) * sd
security_level = estimate_lwe_nocrash(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model, m=oo)
print(security_level)
if security_level == oo:
security_level = 0
estimates.append(security_level)
return estimates
def get_zama_curves():
# hardcode the parameters for now
n_range = [128, 2048, 32]
sec_levels = [80 + 16*k for k in range(0,12)]
results = get_parameter_curves_data_n(sec_levels, n_range, q = 2**64)
return results
def test_curves():
# a small hardcoded example for testing purposes
n_range = [256, 1024, 128]
sec_levels = [80, 128, 256]
results = get_parameter_curves_data_n(sec_levels, n_range, q = 2**64)
return results
def find_nalpha(l, sec_lvl):
for j in range(len(l)):
if l[j] != oo and l[j] > sec_lvl:
return j
## we start with 80/128/192/256-bits of security
## lambda = 80
## z = verify_interpolants(interps[0], (128,2048), 64)
## i = 0
## min(z[i:]) = 80.36
## so the model is sd(n) = max(-0.04047677865612648 * n + 1.1433465085639063, log_q - 2), n >= 128
## lambda = 128
## z = verify_interpolants(interps[3], (128,2048), 64)
## i = 83
## min(z[i:]) = 128.02
## so the model is sd(n) = max(-0.026374888765705498 * n + 2.012143923330495, log_q - 2), n >= 211 ( = 128 + 83)
## lambda = 192
## z = verify_interpolants(interps[7], (128,2048), 64)
## i = 304
## min(z[i:]) = 192.19
## so the model is sd(n) = max(-0.018504919354426233 * n + 2.6634073426215843, log_q - 2), n >= 432 ( = 128 + 212)
## lambda = 256
## z = verify_interpolants(interps[-1], (128,2048), 64)
## i = 653
## min(z[i:]) = 256.25
## so the model is sd(n) = max(-0.014327640360322604 * n + 2.899270827311091), log_q - 2), n >= 781 ( = 128 + 653)