fix(security): eliminate safeBins file-existence oracle

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-19 14:14:46 +01:00
parent 1316e57403
commit bafdbb6f11
5 changed files with 350 additions and 95 deletions

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Commands/Doctor: avoid rewriting invalid configs with new `gateway.auth.token` defaults during repair and only write when real config changes are detected, preventing accidental token duplication and backup churn.
- Sandbox/Registry: serialize container and browser registry writes with shared file locks and atomic replacement to prevent lost updates and delete rollback races from desyncing `sandbox list`, `prune`, and `recreate --all`. Thanks @kexinoh.
- Security/Exec: require `tools.exec.safeBins` binaries to resolve from trusted bin directories (system defaults plus gateway startup `PATH`) so PATH-hijacked trojan binaries cannot bypass allowlist checks. Thanks @jackhax for reporting.
- Security/Exec: remove file-existence oracle behavior from `tools.exec.safeBins` by using deterministic argv-only stdin-safe validation and blocking file-oriented flags (for example `sort -o`, `jq -f`, `grep -f`) so allow/deny results no longer disclose host file presence. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
- Security/Browser: route browser URL navigation through one SSRF-guarded validation path for tab-open/CDP-target/Playwright navigation flows and block private/metadata destinations by default (configurable via `browser.ssrfPolicy`). This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
- Security/Exec: for the next npm release, harden safe-bin stdin-only enforcement by blocking output/recursive flags (`sort -o/--output`, grep recursion) and tightening default safe bins to remove `sort`/`grep`, preventing safe-bin allowlist bypass for file writes/recursive reads. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
- Cron/Webhooks: protect cron webhook POST delivery with SSRF-guarded outbound fetch (`fetchWithSsrFGuard`) to block private/metadata destinations before request dispatch. Thanks @Adam55A-code.

View File

@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ are treated as allowlisted on nodes (macOS node or headless node host). This use
`tools.exec.safeBins` defines a small list of **stdin-only** binaries (for example `jq`)
that can run in allowlist mode **without** explicit allowlist entries. Safe bins reject
positional file args and path-like tokens, so they can only operate on the incoming stream.
Validation is deterministic from argv shape only (no host filesystem existence checks), which
prevents file-existence oracle behavior from allow/deny differences.
File-oriented options are denied for default safe bins (for example `sort -o`, `sort --output`,
`sort --files0-from`, `wc --files0-from`, `jq -f/--from-file`, `grep -f/--file`).
Safe bins also enforce explicit per-binary flag policy for options that break stdin-only
behavior (for example `sort -o/--output` and grep recursive flags).
Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at execution time (no globbing

View File

@@ -123,8 +123,7 @@ describe("createOpenClawCodingTools safeBins", () => {
const { createOpenClawCodingTools } = await import("./pi-tools.js");
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-safe-bins-expand-"));
const secret = `TOP_SECRET_${Date.now()}`;
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "secret.txt"), `${secret}\n`, "utf8");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "secret.txt"), "TOP_SECRET\n", "utf8");
const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
tools: {
@@ -146,16 +145,57 @@ describe("createOpenClawCodingTools safeBins", () => {
const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
const result = await execTool!.execute("call1", {
command: "head $FOO ; wc -l",
workdir: tmpDir,
env: { FOO: "secret.txt" },
});
const text = result.content.find((content) => content.type === "text")?.text ?? "";
await expect(
execTool!.execute("call1", {
command: "head $FOO ; wc -l",
workdir: tmpDir,
env: { FOO: "secret.txt" },
}),
).rejects.toThrow("exec denied: allowlist miss");
});
const blockedResultDetails = result.details as { status?: string };
expect(blockedResultDetails.status).toBe("completed");
expect(text).not.toContain(secret);
it("does not leak file existence from sort output flags", async () => {
if (process.platform === "win32") {
return;
}
const { createOpenClawCodingTools } = await import("./pi-tools.js");
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-safe-bins-oracle-"));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tmpDir, "existing.txt"), "x\n", "utf8");
const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
tools: {
exec: {
host: "gateway",
security: "allowlist",
ask: "off",
safeBins: ["sort"],
},
},
};
const tools = createOpenClawCodingTools({
config: cfg,
sessionKey: "agent:main:main",
workspaceDir: tmpDir,
agentDir: path.join(tmpDir, "agent"),
});
const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
const run = async (command: string) => {
try {
const result = await execTool!.execute("call-oracle", { command, workdir: tmpDir });
const text = result.content.find((content) => content.type === "text")?.text ?? "";
return { kind: "result" as const, status: result.details.status, text };
} catch (err) {
return { kind: "error" as const, message: String(err) };
}
};
const existing = await run("sort -o existing.txt");
const missing = await run("sort -o missing.txt");
expect(existing).toEqual(missing);
});
it("blocks sort output flags from writing files via safeBins", async () => {

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import type { ExecAllowlistEntry } from "./exec-approvals.js";
import {
@@ -31,14 +30,6 @@ function isPathLikeToken(value: string): boolean {
return /^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]/.test(trimmed);
}
function defaultFileExists(filePath: string): boolean {
try {
return fs.existsSync(filePath);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export function normalizeSafeBins(entries?: string[]): Set<string> {
if (!Array.isArray(entries)) {
return new Set();
@@ -62,57 +53,253 @@ function hasGlobToken(value: string): boolean {
return /[*?[\]]/.test(value);
}
type SafeBinOptionPolicy = {
blockedShort?: ReadonlySet<string>;
blockedLong?: ReadonlySet<string>;
type SafeBinProfile = {
minPositional?: number;
maxPositional?: number;
valueFlags?: ReadonlySet<string>;
blockedFlags?: ReadonlySet<string>;
};
const SAFE_BIN_OPTION_POLICIES: Readonly<Record<string, SafeBinOptionPolicy>> = {
// sort can write arbitrary output paths via -o/--output, which breaks stdin-only guarantees.
sort: {
blockedShort: new Set(["o"]),
blockedLong: new Set(["output"]),
const NO_FLAGS = new Set<string>();
const SAFE_BIN_GENERIC_PROFILE: SafeBinProfile = {};
const SAFE_BIN_PROFILES: Record<string, SafeBinProfile> = {
jq: {
maxPositional: 1,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--arg",
"--argjson",
"--argstr",
"--argfile",
"--rawfile",
"--slurpfile",
"--from-file",
"--library-path",
"-L",
"-f",
]),
blockedFlags: new Set([
"--argfile",
"--rawfile",
"--slurpfile",
"--from-file",
"--library-path",
"-L",
"-f",
]),
},
// grep recursion flags read from cwd (or provided roots), so they are not stdin-only.
grep: {
blockedShort: new Set(["d", "r"]),
blockedLong: new Set(["dereference-recursive", "directories", "recursive"]),
maxPositional: 1,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--regexp",
"--file",
"--max-count",
"--after-context",
"--before-context",
"--context",
"--devices",
"--directories",
"--binary-files",
"--exclude",
"--exclude-from",
"--include",
"--label",
"-e",
"-f",
"-m",
"-A",
"-B",
"-C",
"-D",
"-d",
]),
blockedFlags: new Set([
"--file",
"--exclude-from",
"--dereference-recursive",
"--directories",
"--recursive",
"-f",
"-d",
"-r",
"-R",
]),
},
cut: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--bytes",
"--characters",
"--fields",
"--delimiter",
"--output-delimiter",
"-b",
"-c",
"-f",
"-d",
]),
},
sort: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--key",
"--field-separator",
"--buffer-size",
"--temporary-directory",
"--compress-program",
"--parallel",
"--batch-size",
"--random-source",
"--files0-from",
"--output",
"-k",
"-t",
"-S",
"-T",
"-o",
]),
blockedFlags: new Set(["--files0-from", "--output", "-o"]),
},
uniq: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--skip-fields",
"--skip-chars",
"--check-chars",
"--group",
"-f",
"-s",
"-w",
]),
},
head: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set(["--lines", "--bytes", "-n", "-c"]),
},
tail: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set([
"--lines",
"--bytes",
"--sleep-interval",
"--max-unchanged-stats",
"--pid",
"-n",
"-c",
]),
},
tr: {
minPositional: 1,
maxPositional: 2,
},
wc: {
maxPositional: 0,
valueFlags: new Set(["--files0-from"]),
blockedFlags: new Set(["--files0-from"]),
},
};
function parseLongOptionName(token: string): string | null {
if (!token.startsWith("--") || token === "--") {
return null;
function isSafeLiteralToken(value: string): boolean {
if (!value || value === "-") {
return true;
}
const body = token.slice(2);
if (!body) {
return null;
}
const eqIndex = body.indexOf("=");
const name = (eqIndex >= 0 ? body.slice(0, eqIndex) : body).trim().toLowerCase();
return name.length > 0 ? name : null;
return !hasGlobToken(value) && !isPathLikeToken(value);
}
function hasBlockedSafeBinOption(execName: string, token: string): boolean {
const policy = SAFE_BIN_OPTION_POLICIES[execName];
if (!policy || !token.startsWith("-")) {
return false;
}
const longName = parseLongOptionName(token);
if (longName) {
return policy.blockedLong?.has(longName) ?? false;
}
if (token === "-" || token === "--") {
return false;
}
for (const ch of token.slice(1)) {
if (policy.blockedShort?.has(ch.toLowerCase())) {
return true;
function validateSafeBinArgv(args: string[], profile: SafeBinProfile): boolean {
const valueFlags = profile.valueFlags ?? NO_FLAGS;
const blockedFlags = profile.blockedFlags ?? NO_FLAGS;
const positional: string[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i += 1) {
const token = args[i];
if (!token) {
continue;
}
if (token === "--") {
for (let j = i + 1; j < args.length; j += 1) {
const rest = args[j];
if (!rest || rest === "-") {
continue;
}
if (!isSafeLiteralToken(rest)) {
return false;
}
positional.push(rest);
}
break;
}
if (token === "-") {
continue;
}
if (!token.startsWith("-")) {
if (!isSafeLiteralToken(token)) {
return false;
}
positional.push(token);
continue;
}
if (token.startsWith("--")) {
const eqIndex = token.indexOf("=");
const flag = eqIndex > 0 ? token.slice(0, eqIndex) : token;
if (blockedFlags.has(flag)) {
return false;
}
if (eqIndex > 0) {
if (!isSafeLiteralToken(token.slice(eqIndex + 1))) {
return false;
}
continue;
}
if (!valueFlags.has(flag)) {
continue;
}
const value = args[i + 1];
if (!value || !isSafeLiteralToken(value)) {
return false;
}
i += 1;
continue;
}
let consumedValue = false;
for (let j = 1; j < token.length; j += 1) {
const flag = `-${token[j]}`;
if (blockedFlags.has(flag)) {
return false;
}
if (!valueFlags.has(flag)) {
continue;
}
const inlineValue = token.slice(j + 1);
if (inlineValue) {
if (!isSafeLiteralToken(inlineValue)) {
return false;
}
} else {
const value = args[i + 1];
if (!value || !isSafeLiteralToken(value)) {
return false;
}
i += 1;
}
consumedValue = true;
break;
}
if (!consumedValue && hasGlobToken(token)) {
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
const minPositional = profile.minPositional ?? 0;
if (positional.length < minPositional) {
return false;
}
if (typeof profile.maxPositional === "number" && positional.length > profile.maxPositional) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
export function isSafeBinUsage(params: {
argv: string[];
resolution: CommandResolution | null;
@@ -151,44 +338,9 @@ export function isSafeBinUsage(params: {
) {
return false;
}
const cwd = params.cwd ?? process.cwd();
const exists = params.fileExists ?? defaultFileExists;
const argv = params.argv.slice(1);
for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
const token = argv[i];
if (!token) {
continue;
}
if (token === "-") {
continue;
}
if (token.startsWith("-")) {
if (hasBlockedSafeBinOption(execName, token)) {
return false;
}
const eqIndex = token.indexOf("=");
if (eqIndex > 0) {
const value = token.slice(eqIndex + 1);
if (value && hasGlobToken(value)) {
return false;
}
if (value && (isPathLikeToken(value) || exists(path.resolve(cwd, value)))) {
return false;
}
}
continue;
}
if (hasGlobToken(token)) {
return false;
}
if (isPathLikeToken(token)) {
return false;
}
if (exists(path.resolve(cwd, token))) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
const profile = SAFE_BIN_PROFILES[execName] ?? SAFE_BIN_GENERIC_PROFILE;
return validateSafeBinArgv(argv, profile);
}
export type ExecAllowlistEvaluation = {

View File

@@ -524,6 +524,64 @@ describe("exec approvals safe bins", () => {
expect(defaults.has("sort")).toBe(false);
expect(defaults.has("grep")).toBe(false);
});
it("blocks sort output flags independent of file existence", () => {
if (process.platform === "win32") {
return;
}
const cwd = makeTempDir();
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, "existing.txt"), "x");
const resolution = {
rawExecutable: "sort",
resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/sort",
executableName: "sort",
};
const safeBins = normalizeSafeBins(["sort"]);
const existing = isSafeBinUsage({
argv: ["sort", "-o", "existing.txt"],
resolution,
safeBins,
cwd,
});
const missing = isSafeBinUsage({
argv: ["sort", "-o", "missing.txt"],
resolution,
safeBins,
cwd,
});
const longFlag = isSafeBinUsage({
argv: ["sort", "--output=missing.txt"],
resolution,
safeBins,
cwd,
});
expect(existing).toBe(false);
expect(missing).toBe(false);
expect(longFlag).toBe(false);
});
it("does not consult file existence callbacks for safe-bin decisions", () => {
if (process.platform === "win32") {
return;
}
let checkedExists = false;
const ok = isSafeBinUsage({
argv: ["sort", "-o", "target.txt"],
resolution: {
rawExecutable: "sort",
resolvedPath: "/usr/bin/sort",
executableName: "sort",
},
safeBins: normalizeSafeBins(["sort"]),
cwd: "/tmp",
fileExists: () => {
checkedExists = true;
return true;
},
});
expect(ok).toBe(false);
expect(checkedExists).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("exec approvals allowlist evaluation", () => {